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ABSTRACT
SUBJECTIVITY AND THE OBJECTS OF BELIEF
MAY 1996
NEIL P. FEIT
,
B.A., COLUMBIA COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Edmund Gettier
This dissertation is a study of the problem of beliefs
about oneself, or so-called de se beliefs: for example, the
beliefs that I would express by saying ' I am left-handed' or
'I am in Massachusetts'. The problem arises against the
background conception of belief as a propositional attitude,
i.e., as a relation between conscious subjects and abstract
entities that are either true or false absolutely.
Many philosophers have recently argued that the
intentional objects of one's de se beliefs could not be
propositions: since, e.g., I can believe the proposition
that Neil Feit is left-handed without believing myself to be
left-handed (if I somehow fail to realize that I am Neil
Feit), and I can believe any proposition expressed by a
sentence of the form 'the F is left-handed' - where 'the F'
is a qualitative description - without believing myself to
be left-handed (if I do not think that 'the F' denotes me).
I take the position that the argument is sound, and,
after surveying various attempts to solve the problem, I
defend the self-ascription view of belief: viz., the view
v
that to have a belief is to ascribe a property to oneself.
For example, I believe that I am left-handed simply by self-
ascribing the property of being left-handed.
I defend the view against various objections to it,
discuss its relations to other views about the objects of
belief and the other attitudes, and maintain that it can
account for the acceptance of propositions (de dicto belief)
and for beliefs about particular individuals (de re belief)
as well as for beliefs directly about oneself. I argue that
belief states are best taken to be self-ascribed properties,
and try to solve some problems about de re belief from the
perspective of the self-ascription view.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that we are acquainted with two people, Adams
and Barber, say, each of whom believes that Adams is a spy:
i.e., Adams believes that he himself is a spy, and Barber
believes that Adams is a spy. (Perhaps Barber sees Adams
wearing a trench coat, and believes that anyone who wears a
trench coat is a spy.) It is quite plausible to assume that
in this case Adams and Barber believe the same proposition,
viz., the proposition that Adams is a spy. Whatever sort of
thing we take a proposition to be, it seems clear that if
Barber can believe the proposition that Adams is a spy, then
Adams could believe this proposition while at the same time
failing to believe himself to be a spy. For example, Adams
might see himself in a mirror, wearing a trench coat, but
fail to realize that he is looking at himself.
Suppose that there is a psychological law to the effect
that everyone who believes himself or herself to be a spy is
ipso facto a chronic paranoid. With respect to the above
example, we could infer from this that Adams is a chronic
paranoid, but not that Barber is. However, it appears that
we could not infer that Adams is a chronic paranoid merely
from the fact that he believes the proposition that Adams is
a spy - since he could, like Barber, come to believe this
proposition by entering into some sort of epistemic contact
with himself (e.g.
,
by perceiving himself in a mirror),
without thinking of himself, so to speak, as himself. Thus
the above "law” could not be formulated as follows: for any
subject x, if x believes the proposition that x is a spy,
then x is a chronic paranoid.
What, then, distinguishes one's believing oneself to be
a spy, on the one hand, from one's believing the proposition
that one is a spy, on the other? More generally, for any
property F whatsoever, what distinguishes believing oneself
to have F from believing the proposition that one has F? If
there is a genuine difference here, as there certainly seems
to be, then there is also a problem about how to account for
many of our beliefs about ourselves (such as Adams's belief
that he himself is a spy) - i.e., our de se beliefs - in
terms of a relation between believers and propositions. If
there is more to Adams's belief that he himself is a spy
than belief in the proposition that Adams is a spy, how is
such a belief to be characterized? This is the problem of
de se belief, an instance of the more comprehensive problem
of de se psychological attitudes. There are other ways to
present the problem, and some of these will be considered in
the next two chapters.
My main concern in this dissertation is the problem of
de se belief, although I will at times discuss analogous
problems having to do with the other so-called propositional
attitudes. One's de se beliefs are one's beliefs about what
features one has, understood broadly so as to include, e.g.,
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my beliefs that I am Neil Feit, that I am left-handed, that
I am presently in Massachusetts, and so on. With respect to
commonsense psychology, de se attitudes are neither unusual
nor unimportant; in fact, they are commonplace and central
to the prediction and explanation of purposeful behavior.
This is especially clear in the case of desire and the
locutions that we ordinarily use to attribute desire. For
example, the sentences 'Neil wants to be healthy', 'Neil
wants lunch' and 'Neil wants to catch the seven o'clock
train' all attribute de se desires to me. (For the most
part, I shall not be concerned with the analysis of
attributions of de se attitudes. My main topic is the
metaphysics of such attitudes rather than the semantic
analysis of the sentences used to report them.
)
Some notion of a proposition is essential to the
statement of the present problem. Like most other problems,
the problem of de se attitudes arises only given a certain
background. In this case, the background is a cornerstone
of contemporary philosophy of mind: viz., the view that
psychological attitudes (or, at least, many sorts of them)
are relations between conscious subjects and abstract
propositions. I make only two assumptions about the
existence and nature of propositions. The first is that
there are propositions; and the second is that propositions
have truth values in an absolute sense - truth values that
do not vary from time to time, place to place, etc. This
3
second assumption is intended to be equivalent to the claim
that propositions are the sorts of things that have
possible-worlds truth conditions. I will not review here
the many good reasons for thinking that belief, whatever
else it may be, is a propositional attitude.
The differences between the various conceptions of
propositions do not bear on the problem of de se belief, so
long as propositions are taken to have possible-worlds truth
conditions. I plan to remain neutral between the different
accounts of propositions, then, unless I am discussing the
views of a philosopher who is committed to one rather than
another of those accounts. Two general accounts will be
relevant to the views being considered in the dissertation.
The first takes propositions to be functions from possible
worlds into truth values, or, equivalently, sets of possible
worlds (it thus requires a view about the nature of possible
worlds). The second takes propositions to be complexes or
structured entities made up of properties (or concepts of
properties) and objects (or perhaps just concepts of
objects) (it thus requires a view about the kind of
structures involved)
.
Again, the problem to be considered in this thesis is
independent of the particulars of these competing views
about propositions. It thus cuts across the various
accounts of what sorts of things propositions are. So,
while it may be helpful (at least prima facie) in order to
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solve some problems about mathematical beliefs, and about
the mental processes essential to deduction, to distinguish
between necessarily equivalent propositions - as on the
structured propositions view - it does not matter to the
issues being considered here.
In this thesis, I will not be discussing certain
questions that are more or less related to any work in the
metaphysics of mental content. I will not, for instance,
have anything to say about issues concerning degrees of
belief, or of any other attitude. For simplicity, I will
treat belief as if it were an all-or-nothing affair rather
than something that comes in degrees; but what I say can
easily be adapted to an account of degrees of belief, e.g.,
a straightforward account that introduces a probability
distribution, for each subject, over various objects of
belief, instead of a single object of belief. (Just for
now, we can accept the background view of belief as a
propositional attitude and suppose that the objects of
belief are propositions.)
I will also have nothing to say in this dissertation
about issues having to do with the explication of the
concept of belief in non-semantic or non-intentional terms.
I am concerned here with a presentation and evaluation of
various theories about the objects of belief, with respect
to the problem of de se belief, and not with the question
whether there is a correct analysis of belief in purely
5
naturalistic terms. I do think that, as a matter of
contingent fact, intentional mental states are physical
states; but I do not think that anything I say in the thesis
either reguires or precludes any sort of reductive analysis
of the attitudes.
As I mentioned earlier, my primary focus is not on the
semantic analysis of belief sentences or of attributions of
a^titudes i-n general. My aim is to approach the problem of
de se belief from a more metaphysical point of view, by
evaluating some accounts of the belief relation (and hence
of the objects of belief) in light of the problem of de se
belief. However, from time to time I will not be able to
avoid making some brief remarks about the semantics of
belief sentences. Most of these remarks occur within the
scope of discussions of particular metaphysical views of
belief, and are not general recommendations for the
treatment of attitude reports.
Chapter 2 of this thesis contains a discussion of the
Triadic View of belief, which has been extracted from the
work of David Kaplan, John Perry, Nathan Salmon and others.
Perry, for example, adopts this view expressly to handle the
problem of de se belief. According to the sort of account
provided by Perry and the others, one's belief in a certain
proposition is mediated, in a way, by what has come to be
called a belief state or propositional guise.
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So, our make-believe spy, Adams, believes the
proposition that Adams is a spy in virtue of being in a
certain belief state - a state that typically disposes a
speaker of English, for example, to assent to a sentence
like ' I am a spy'. Barber, on the other hand, believes this
very same proposition in virtue of being in a different
belief state - a state that might dispose a speaker of
English to assent to a sentence such as 'he is a spy'
,
or
perhaps 'the person I am looking at is a spy'. Many of the
psychological differences between Adams and Barber (maybe,
for example, the fact that Adams is paranoid while Barber
isn't) are taken by proponents of the Triadic View to be
explained, at least in part, by the differences in their
belief states. What is essential to belief, on this view,
is the three-place relation between subjects, belief states
and believed-true propositions.
In chapter 3, I consider a different approach to the
problem of de se belief, due chiefly to the work of David
Lewis and Roderick Chisholm. Lewis and Chisholm have
proposed what I shall call the Property Theory of belief.
Like the Triadic View, the Property Theory rejects the idea
that belief, or the relation that is essential to belief, is
a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition.
Unlike the Triadic View, however, the Property Theory
implies that belief is in fact a binary relation - a
relation between subjects and properties.
7
According to the view held by Lewis and Chisholm, to
have a belief is to self-ascribe a property. When Adams
believes himself to be a spy, for example, he does so in
virtue of self-ascribing the property of being a spy. The
difference between Adams and Barber is thus accounted for in
terms of the fact that they each have a different object of
belief. Barber does not self-ascribe the property of being
a spy, and so the property of being a spy is not an object
of his belief. Instead, Barber self-ascribes a property
such as the property of looking at someone who is a spy, or
looking at a man in a trench coat who is a spy, or some such
property.
It might appear at first glance that the Triadic View
and the Property Theory are competing views of belief that
could not both be true. In chapter 4, however, I argue that
the two theories are not really competitors. After giving a
precise formulation of each view, I try to show that on very
plausible assumptions, the two views are in a strong sense
equivalent. Part of this amounts to arguing for the claim
that the correct theory of belief states is the theory of
self-ascription of properties. Finally, in the last part of
the chapter, I provide a set of principles that connect a
subject's self-ascribed properties with the propositions
that the subject may be said to believe.
Both the Triadic View and the Property Theory reject
what I shall call the doctrine of propositional objects of
8
belief
:
viz., the view that belief, or any relation that is
essential to belief, is merely a binary relation between a
conscious subject and an abstract proposition. However,
some philosophers - most notably Robert Stalnaker - have
argued that the problem of de se belief can be solved
without resorting to a view that rejects the doctrine of
propositional objects of belief. In chapter 5, I examine
the attempt to solve the problem while maintaining this
doctrine
.
I also consider, in chapter 5, an argument given by
Lewis against any view like Stalnaker 's: Lewis's case of
the two gods. Despite Stalnaker 's assertion that Lewis's
argument begs the guestion, I find the argument persuasive.
I try to sort out the details and solidify the argument
against the doctrine of propositional objects of belief. I
also present a related argument against Stalnaker's view,
which is based upon another, related, argument sketched by
Lewis
.
The remainder of the thesis consists mainly of a
defense of the Property Theory as a view of belief and an
application of the theory to some problems having to do with
de re belief. My main thesis is that the Property Theory is
a better alternative than any version of the doctrine of
propositional objects of belief.
In chapter 6, I consider various arguments that have
been raised against the Property Theory. The arguments that
9
I survey are intended to refute any version of the Property
Theory, rather than just, say, Lewis's version or Chisholm's
version. (The differences between these two versions of the
same general view are chiefly due to the different theories
of properties held by the two philosophers.) In each case,
I focus on a careful presentation and explanation of the
argument. I do not find any of the arguments to be sound,
and in each case, I present what I take to be the best
objection to the argument. Although I maintain that each
argument against the Property Theory is unsuccessful
,
I do
think that each one of them raises some interesting
questions about the objects of belief.
Finally, in chapter 7, I turn to a discussion of some
issues concerning the relations between the Property Theory
and de re belief. I first briefly review Lewis's account of
the nature of belief in general, and his analysis of de re
belief in particular. After taking a look at what I think
is an unsuccessful argument against Lewis's account of de re
belief, I present a case that I suggest is a counterexample
to Lewis's analysis: I claim that the analysis implies that
a certain subject has a de re belief about a particular
individual, when intuitively it seems that the subject has
no such de re belief. I then suggest a way in which we
might modify Lewis's account in order to give a plausible,
property-theoretic view of belief de re.
10
In the remainder of chapter 7, I consider (within the
framework of the Property Theory) some questions concerning
de re beliefs about pluralities and the individuals that are
contained within them. In particular, I ask whether it is
always necessary, in order to have a de re belief about a
given individual, to be acquainted uniquely with that
individual - i.e., to stand in a certain relation of
acquaintance to that individual and only to that individual.
I suggest that it is not necessary in some cases where the
subject is acquainted uniquely with a plurality of things
that contains the individual. I also try to formulate some
principles, through a systematic study of cases, connecting
plurally de re beliefs with individually de re beliefs.
11
CHAPTER 2
THE TRIADIC VIEW OF BELIEF
In a number of influential papers including "The
Problem of the Essential Indexical
,
nl John Perry suggests
that certain features of some of our attitudes about or
toward ourselves tell against the traditional doctrine of
propositional objects of belief, or the view that belief is
ultimately a binary relation between a conscious subject and
an abstract proposition. A proposition, on this view, is a
bearer of truth or falsehood in an absolute sense, and not
merely for a person, or at a time. 2 The attitudes that are
currently in question Perry calls "locating beliefs" - they
are "one's beliefs about where one is, when it is, and who
one is." 3
In the first two sections of this chapter, I briefly
review the problem that leads Perry to the alternative view
that he favors, and discuss the theory and some of its
consequences. According to Perry, what often explains our
behavior is not merely the fact that we believe a certain
proposition, but rather the fact that, roughly, we believe
3Perry (1979). I will cite a reprinted version of
Perry's paper in Salmon and Soames (1988), pp. 83-101.
2Perry favors a theory of propositions according to
which they have a sort of internal structure akin to the
structure of the natural language sentences that express
them. I will discuss this additional constraint upon the
nature of propositions only when its details are relevant to
the discussion of Perry's treatment of belief.
3Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 85.
it in a certain way, in virtue of being in what he calls a
belief state. if this view is correct, then in some of our
successful psychological explanations we convey information
about these belief states, as well as about believed-true
propositions. It may even be the case that we quantify
implicitly over belief states in all of our ordinary talk
about what we believe.
In the third section, I discuss the very similar and
somewhat more detailed view held by Nathan Salmon. Salmon
and Perry acknowledge a debt to the work of David Kaplan,
who also holds what I will call the Triadic View of belief.
Salmon, however, is primarily interested in the philosophy
of language, and in section four of this chapter I briefly
explore some semantic views about attributions of locating
beliefs that presuppose the Triadic View.
2 . 1 The Messy Shopper Puzzle
Perry presents the well known case of the messy shopper
as a puzzle for the doctrine of propositional objects of
belief, which implies that change in belief is necessarily
change in a believed-true proposition. He originally
describes the case as follows:
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket
floor, pushing my trolly down the aisle on one
side of a tall counter and back along the aisle on
the other, seeking the shopper with the torn bag
to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip
around the counter, the trail became thicker. But
13
I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on
me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. 4
The problem for the proponent of the doctrine of
propositional objects of belief is to pick out two distinct
propositions: first, the one Perry believed before his
epiphany, viz., the proposition that he would have expressed
by saying 'the shopper with the torn bag is making a mess'
;
and second, the proposition he comes to believe, the one he
would express by saying 'I am making a mess'. According to
Perry,
I believed at the outset that the shopper with a
torn bag was making a mess. And I was right. But
I did not believe that I was making a mess. That
seems to be something I came to believe. And when
I came to believe that, I stopped following the
trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn
bag in my trolly. 5
We explain why Perry stopped to rearrange the bag of
sugar in part by conveying information about the relevant
change in his beliefs. Since this change in belief is what
explains his mess-assuaging behavior, the doctrine of
propositional objects of belief must be able to provide the
propositions to give a plausible account for the change.
Perry favors an account of propositions according to
which any two sentences express the same proposition only if
they involve the same concepts, and concern the same objects
“Ibid.
,
p. 83
.
5Ibid
.
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and relations. 6 The proposition that Clinton is bigger
than Reich is not the same as the proposition that the
president of the U.S. is bigger than the Secretary of Labor,
for example, since although both concern Clinton and Reich
and the 'bigger than' relation, only the latter involves the
concept of being the president of the U.S.
This view of propositions need not be worked out in
great detail in order to identify what Perry believed,
according to the doctrine of propositional objects of
belief, before he discovered that he himself had been making
a mess. He believed the proposition that the shopper with
the torn bag was making a mess. This proposition is somehow
made up, in part, out of the individual concept of being a
shopper of a certain sort, and the property of making a mess
(and perhaps a certain moment or duration of time). While
the proposition concerns Perry in that he accidentally makes
it true, it does not involve him essentially, and neither
Perry himself, nor the concept of being Perry, nor even the
concept of being called 'Perry', is a constituent of the
proposition
.
The problem for the doctrine of propositional objects
of belief arises when the task is to identify the belief
that Perry comes to have when he discovers that he himself
is making a mess - the proposition that he would express by
saying 'I am making a mess', or some such thing. Again, the
6See ibid.
,
p. 86
.
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doctrine must hold that it is his coming to believe this
proposition that explains why he stops following the trail
of sugar on the floor and rearranges his own torn bag.
Perry first notes that independently of a context, the
sentence
' I am making a mess' does not express a proposition
since "this sentence is not true or false absolutely, but
only as said by one person or another; had another shopper
said it when I did, he would have been wrong." 7
What about the proposition that Perry is making a mess?
This may be a singular proposition, made up of Perry himself
and the property of making a mess; or, it may be a quasi-
singular proposition made up out of the individual concept
of being Perry. Could this be the proposition that Perry
discovers? He argues that it could not. The proposition
that he discovers explains some interesting aspect of his
behavior, whereas the proposition that Perry is making a
mess does not. Attributing to him the belief that Perry is
making a mess explains his behavior only on the assumption
that he believes that he is Perry. It seems that he could
come to believe the proposition that Perry is making a mess
without thereby coming to believe that he himself is making
a mess - e.g., he might see himself in a mirror and fail to
recognize himself. 8 So, the argument goes, the proposition
7Ibid.
,
p. 87
.
8This assumes that seeing a particular person, under good
conditions, etc., is sufficient for believing a singular, or
object-dependent, proposition about that person.
16
that Perry is making a mess cannot be the one that he comes
to believe when he learns that he himself is making a mess.
Perhaps there is less need to argue against the claim
that, of necessity, when Perry discovers himself to be the
mess-maker, he thinks of himself under an individual concept
with some descriptive content. According to this claim, the
proposition that Perry comes to believe is constituted by
the individual concept in question as well as by the concept
or property of making a mess. But Perry argues that this
suggestion does not work. He writes:
even if I was thinking of myself as, say, the only
bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the
Mississippi, the fact that I came to believe that
the only such philosopher was making a mess
explains my action only on the assumption that I
believed that I was the only such philosopher,
which brings in the indexical again. 9
On the doctrine of propositional objects of belief, the
fact that Perry comes to believe a particular proposition
explains why he engages in some mess-assuaging behavior or
other. However, the fact that he comes to believe the
proposition that the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway
store west of the Mississippi is making a mess does not
explain such activity. The same goes for all propositions
that are expressed by sentences lacking indexical terms
designating Perry.
As Perry observes, the only way to preserve the force
of an explanation in which the above proposition is
9Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 88.
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expressed is to add to it by saying something like 'and
Perry believes that he is the only bearded philosopher in a
Safeway store west of the Mississippi'. As Perry also
observes, however, this brings the entire problem back anew.
It seems that there is no way for the proponent of the
doctrine of propositional objects of belief to say just
which proposition Perry comes to believe when he comes to
believe that he himself is the only bearded philosopher
Reflection on the case of the messy shopper shows that
some of our belief attributions are essentially indexical:
couched partly in terms of indexicals, the substitution of
which with non-indexical terms renders the attributions
devoid of their original explanatory force or meaning. I
take this to be a claim in epistemology, or perhaps the
philosophy of language. Perry suggests that a metaphysical
result follows from this (much like the way in which the
claim that the word 'red' expresses the property of being
red entails that there is the property of being red) . The
result is that the doctrine of propositional objects of
belief lacks the resources to account for, and hence is
refuted by, cases in which such attributions are true, like
that of the messy shopper. According to Perry, "there is
something lacking in the propositions offered by the
doctrine, a missing indexical ingredient ." 10
xoIbid
.
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Since we could not find a proposition - a truth-value
bearer in an absolute sense - that would explain Perry's
behavior if he were to come to believe it, it seems likely
that there is no such proposition; for surely we knew well
enough where to search. But the doctrine of propositional
objects of belief implies that there is such a proposition,
indeed, that it is his coming to believe this proposition
that explains why Perry does what he does. Perry concludes
that we ought instead to search for an alternative to views
of belief as a two-place relation. I will defer until
chapter 5 a detailed discussion of possible objections to
Perry's argument, from the point of view of an adherent to
the doctrine of propositional objects of belief.
2 . 2 Perry's Solution to the Puzzle
The solution to the problem of the essential indexical
favored by Perry involves viewing belief as a three-place
relation between a subject, a proposition, and a belief
state. What determines the truth, or falsehood, of
attributions of belief to someone is her being, or not
being, one of the relata of such a relation. He also
maintains that we typically make implicit reference to
belief states in our talk about beliefs, in particular when
we make essentially indexical belief attributions, or
generalizations about locating beliefs:
19
We use sentences with indexicals ... toindividuate belief states, for the purposes of
classifying believers in ways useful for
explanation and prediction. That is, belief
states individuated in this way enter into our
commonsense theory about human behaviour and more
sophisticated theories emerging from it. 11
We can think of a belief state, roughly, as a way of
assenting to, or believing, a proposition. To say that
belief states somehow play a role in the comparison of
believers and their actions, and that they are sometimes
individuated by sentences containing indexicals, is surely
to say something about belief states. However, a more
precise and thorough characterization of them is needed.
Perry suggests that it is important, in order to
understand our own belief states, that we realize that they
can be individuated by sentences of natural language. On
this picture, for example, there is a belief state such that
only those people in it are disposed to utter a token of the
sentence 'I am making a mess'. Perry comes to be in this
belief state when he realizes that the torn bag of sugar is
his own. Were someone else to be in the same belief state,
on this view, she would thereby believe a proposition that
is distinct from the one that Perry in fact believes.
Perry certainly does not claim to have analyzed the
notion of a belief state, or to have given necessary and
sufficient conditions for being in a certain belief state,
in terms of a disposition to utter or otherwise assent to a
“Ibid.
,
p. 98
.
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particular sentence. He says only the following:
That we individuate belief states in this waydoubtless has something to do with the fact that
one criterion for being in the states we
postulate, at least for articulate, sincere
adults, is being disposed to utter the indexical
sentence in question. 12
Clearly Perry is wise not to say that being disposed to
utter a certain sentence is both a necessary and sufficient
condition for being in a given belief state. For one thing,
plenty of people who do not speak English - and hence are
not disposed to utter any English sentences - have been in
the same belief state that led Perry to rearrange the bag of
sugar in his grocery cart. Moreover, such an analysis would
have the surely implausible result that creatures without
language could not be in belief states.
Perry also acknowledges that "the characterization of
one's belief states may include sentences without any
indexical element." 13 If two people are in a belief state
in which they are disposed to utter 'Everest is [has always
been, always will be] the tallest mountain', then each of
them is related to the same proposition. We might take the
view that the proposition that Everest is the tallest
mountain has as a constituent Mt. Everest itself, i.e., that
it is a de re or singular proposition. Perry takes such a
view. But a belief state that is characterized by a non-
12Ibid
.
“Ibid.
,
p. 99
.
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indexical sentence may also relate someone to a proposition
that does not have a (concrete) individual as a part. in
such a case, the belief relation relates a subject, a belief
state, and a de dicto or general proposition.
In the cases of belief states that are in fact
characterized by sentences with indexical terms, two people
in the same belief state will not in general believe the
same proposition - i.e., each may be related to that same
belief state and a different proposition. If I were in the
same belief state that Perry was in, for example, I would
not be related to the same proposition to which he was
related; rather, I would be related to the proposition that
Feit is making a mess.
On the other hand, also in cases where belief states
are characterized by sentences with indexicals, two people
in different belief states will not in general believe
distinct propositions. Consider the supermarket manager,
who sees Perry leaving a sugary trail all over the store,
and is disposed to utter 'he is making a mess'. In virtue
of being in such a belief state, the manager believes the
same proposition that Perry believes when he identifies
himself with the messy shopper: the proposition that Perry
is making a mess. Perry himself is related to this
proposition and a different belief state . 14
14The same might be true for two people who are
disposed to utter 'Twain lived in Hartford', and 'Clemens
lived in Hartford', respectively. These people, perhaps,
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Perry sums up these points as follows:
We have here a metaphysically benign form oflimited accessibility. Anyone at any time canhave access to any proposition. But not in any
way. Anyone can believe of John Perry that he is
making a mess. And anyone can be in the belief
state classified by the sentence ' I am making a
mess'. But only I can have that belief by beina
in that state. 15
According to the account of the case of the messy
shopper offered by Perry, the change in Perry's behavior is
explained not by his coming to believe a new proposition,
but by his coming to be in a new belief state. Before he
realizes that he himself is the shopper with the torn bag
(but after he has noticed the trail of sugar on the floor)
,
Perry believes the proposition that Perry is making a mess.
Perhaps he believes this proposition in part because he is
in a belief state that disposes him to utter or somehow
assent to a sentence like 'the shopper who left that trail
of sugar on the floor is making a mess', and in part because
he happens to be the shopper whose trail of sugar he is now
observing. (Perhaps he would need to be in a position to
demonstrate himself, in a mirror, for example, in order to
believe this proposition; but at this point I am not much
concerned with what it takes, according to the proponent of
the Triadic View, to believe a singular proposition.)
are in different belief states, each characterized by a non-
indexical sentence. But it is at least plausible to claim
that they believe the same proposition.
15Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 99.
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What explains the change in his behavior is his coming
to believe this same proposition in virtue of being in a
new, "essentially indexical" belief state - a state that
disposes him to utter or otherwise assent to the indexical
sentence ' I am making a mess'. Perry comes to believe, in a
new way, the proposition that he already believes in some
other way. The moral: change in belief is not necessarily
change in propositions believed.
2 . 3 Salmon and the BEL Relation
I have said that on Perry's view belief is not a two-
place relation between a subject and a proposition, but
rather is a three-place relation between a subject, a
proposition and a belief state. In other terminology, this
is the view that there are two objects of belief rather than
just one. 16 (Perry, however, might object to the use of
this terminology, since he reserves the term 'object of
belief' for the believed-true proposition.)
The first of these objects is, of course, a proposition
(Lewis and Perry use the word 'proposition' in different
senses, but let me continue for the moment to use it to
refer to a kind of structured entity made up out of
properties, relations, perhaps physical objects, etc.). On
16Lewis gives this interpretation of Perry's view in
Lewis (1979). My references to this paper are to a reprint
in Lewis (1983a). Lewis bases his remarks on Perry (1977).
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Lewis's characterization of Perry's view, "the second object
[of belief] is a function that takes the subject as argument
and delivers as value the first object ...." 17 Let us, for
the time being, accept this characterization and identify a
belief state with a function from (possible) subjects into
propositions
.
18
Some philosophers writing recently on this topic -
notably Nathan Salmon and Robert Stalnaker - have suggested
that Perry's account is not really incompatible with the
doctrine of propositional objects of belief. In Frege's
Puzzle, Salmon notes that Perry takes the problem of the
essential indexical to tell against an "account of belief as
a binary relation between believers and propositions,
sometimes singular propositions ." 19 Salmon, however, goes
on to claim that the doctrine is a consequence of Perry's
own account of belief. "In fact," he writes, "Perry's
solution apparently preserves this binary relational
account, and couples it with an existential analysis of
17Lewis (1983a), p. 151.
18Consider someone - call him 'Terry' - who at some
time is disposed to utter sincerely a token of 'I am making
a mess'. Terry, at this time, is in the same belief state
that Perry comes to be in when he realizes that his bag of
sugar is torn. On the current view, each is related to -
i.e., has as an object of belief - the function that takes
Terry into the proposition that Terry is making a mess, and
Perry into the proposition that Perry is making a mess.
This accounts for the way in which Terry and Perry believe
alike
.
19Salmon (1986), p. 173 (fn. 1 to chapter 9).
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belief in terms of belief states." 20 what, exactly, is at
issue here?
It appears that Perry does endorse an existential
analysis of belief sentences according to which a sentence
of the form ' S believes that p' is true if and only if there
is some belief state b such that the person denoted by 'S'
is in b, and the value of b for this person is the
proposition named by the expression 'that p'. 21 On this
view, the truth-maker for attributions of belief is a three-
place relation between a subject, a proposition and a belief
state. Following Salmon, let us call this relation 'BEL'.
Suppose we have a person called 'S', a proposition
called 'P', and a variable over belief states, denoted by
'x'. Then it might be the case that there is an x such that
BEL( S , P, x) . If so, then some belief sentence about S will
be true. Of course, it is possible to define two related
relations, called 'B' and 'B*', as follows:
(Dl) B ( S
,
p) =df there is an x such that BEL( S , p, x)
( D2
)
B* ( S
,
x) =df . there is a p such that BEL( S , p, x) .
From the fact that there is an x such that BEL( S , P, x) , it
follows that B(S, P)
,
and also that B*(S, x)
.
Salmon, then,
seems to be worried about which relation we call 'belief':
2
°Ibid. Cf. Stalnaker (1981), fn. 11.
21Again, I assume that belief states are functions.
The locution 'in a belief state' may be taken as shorthand
for 'related (in the appropriate sort of way) to a function
from subjects into propositions'.
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BEL, B or B*
. It seems to me that it really doesn't matter
which of these relations we decide to call 'belief'.
Of course, in English 'believes' is a binary predicate.
Perhaps Salmon takes this, along with certain other facts
about belief sentences, to entail that belief is a binary
relation between subjects and propositions. This inference,
however, may plausibly be denied, and it appears that Perry
would wish to deny it. What Perry and Salmon agree updn is
that in some sense the logical form of a sentence like 'S
believes that p' is something of the form 'there is an x
such that BEL( S , p, x)' (which is equivalent to 'B(S, p)'
and implies 'B*(S, x)').
Again, I do not much care about which relation, two- or
three-place, we call 'belief', and so I take this agreement
to be considerable. Both Perry and Salmon think that BEL is
the truth-maker for belief sentences, and it really doesn't
matter whether we take the word 'belief' to express this
relation, or which of its relata we pick out with the phrase
'object of belief'. It therefore seems to me that there is
no genuine disagreement about the nature of belief between
Perry and Salmon.
In the remainder of this section, I would like to
consider Salmon's account of the BEL relation. According to
Salmon, the third relatum of BEL is a way of taking, or a
means of grasping, or a "guise" of, a proposition - and the
relation BEL is something like "the relation of disposition
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to inward agreement [to a proposition] when taken in a
certain way." 22 I shall disregard any difference there
be between what Perry calls 'belief states' and what Salmon
sometimes calls 'guises'. 23
Earlier, we entertained a conception of belief states
as functions from subjects into propositions. This seemed
to work well enough for the de se cases under discussion,
but it may not work straightforwardly for all guises. For
example, two different guises or belief states intuitively
correspond to the following two sentences:
(i) Mark Twain is Mark Twain
(ii) Sam Clemens is Mark Twain.
Here we have two different guises by means of which, on the
view favored by Perry and Salmon, a single proposition may
be believed. If a guise is a function from subjects into
propositions, however, then it seems that there is no way to
distinguish these two guises.
In order to get around this problem, perhaps we should
give a new account of belief states or propositional guises.
I suggest that, at least for the time being, we take belief
22Salmon (1986), p. 111. Since Salmon is mainly
interested in the logic of belief, he doesn't care much
about whether this is the correct account of the relation in
question. However, the semantic theory he defends requires
that there be some such three-place relation.
23Perhaps a belief state is a guise to which someone
stands in B* . Perhaps also we should be talking about the
objects of belief states rather than the states themselves;
but this is distinction that I will for the most part ignore
in the text.
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states to be ordered structures that may contain the
relations that the subject bears to the constituents of the
(perhaps singular) proposition believed. Very roughly, if
we believe Russellian propositions, then we do so by means
of modes of presentation of them, or Fregean propositions.
(In this chapter, I will not say much about individuating
belief states by means of their truth conditions - in fact,
the question whether belief states (call them what you may)
have possible-worlds truth conditions will be one of the
central questions of this thesis.)
Consider again belief states (i) and (ii) above. I
will represent the singular proposition believed as follows:
<MT, =, MT> . Then, the belief state that corresponds to (i)
may be represented by the ordered triple: <RMT , =, RMT>. 24
Rmt is a single relation by means of which a believer may be
acquainted with someone. For example, it might be the
relation of having heard of someone under the name 'Twain'.
On the other hand, the belief state that corresponds to (ii)
above may be represented by the triple: <RSC / =/ RMt>* In
this case, Rsc and RMT are two different relations of
acquaintance, and so we have a way of distinguishing the
belief states corresponding with (i) and (ii), even though
they are ways of believing the selfsame proposition.
24Here, I have put the identity relation, given by '=',
into the belief state. Perhaps what should really go into
the belief state is some mode of presentation, or concept,
of identity, given by 'R= '. In the text, however, I will
ignore this sort of complication.
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On this picture, which may accord better with Salmon's
views on guises, the proposition that a subject believes may
be recovered from his belief state together with information
about the identities of the external objects to which he is
related. if I am in one of the belief states above, then
the proposition that I believe is determined by replacing
each relation of acguaintance with the individual to whom I
bear that relation (if there is such an individual; see
chapters 4 and 7 for a discussion of other sorts of case).
If there are no relations of acquaintance in the belief
state, then the proposition believed may just be taken to be
the belief state (but see also fn. 24). This is the case
for genuine de dicto belief. For de se cases, belief states
may be taken to be pairs of a special sort of acquaintance
relation - the relation of being identical to someone - and
properties. So, when I believe myself to be making a mess,
my belief state may be represented by the following pair:
<R=, making a mess>. The propositional object of my belief
would then be the proposition: <Feit, making a mess>.
There is a way to reconcile this account with Lewis's
suggestion that belief states are functions from subjects
into propositions. Consider again the following belief
state: <RSC , = , RMt> « We could also represent this as a
propositional function, although the value must not be the
sigular proposition that Twain is Twain. Using 'x' as a
free variable, we can represent the same belief state as
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follows: there is a y and a z such that x bears Rsc to y
and Rmt to z, and y=z . The belief state corresponding to
(i) above may be given in a similar way.
For belief states without relations of acguaintance -
e.g.
,
'anything extended has mass' - we may represent the
state as a function whose value will be either true for all
arguments, or false for all arguments, e.g.: x is such that
anything extended has mass. For de se cases, a belief state
like <R=
,
making a mess> may be given by: there is a y such
that x=y
,
and y is making a mess (or more simply by: x is
making a mess). In chapter 4, I discuss various conceptions
of belief states in greater detail.
Salmon and Perry arrive at their similar views about
belief in quite different ways. In particular, Salmon does
not think that the phenomena related to locating beliefs, or
indexical beliefs, pose a special problem about accounting
for the attitudes. He argues that other puzzle cases also
require an analysis of belief in terms of the BEL relation:
the general problems posed by self-locating
beliefs and other beliefs formulated by means of
an indexical are not peculiar to these special
subcases of de re beliefs, and arise even with de
re beliefs whose psychological explanatory force
does not involve an "essential indexical." 25
In order to support this claim, Salmon describes a case
that is similar to Frege's Puzzle about identity statements
and thoughts, and Kripke's puzzle about belief. He calls
25Salmon (1986), p. 174 (fn. 1, chapter 9).
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the case 'Elmer's Befuddlement '
. Rather than quote at
length, I will summarize the situation as follows. 26 Elmer
is a bounty hunter, somehow affiliated with the FBI, who is
hot on the trail of an infamous jewel thief, Bugsy Wabbit.
For some months before January 1, Elmer spends a good deal
of time scrutinizing various photographs and movies of
Bugsy, studying FBI documents about Bugsy, etc. On January
1, after learning quite a lot about Bugsy Wabbit, Elmer
forms the opinion that Bugsy is (is now, has always been,
and will always be throughout his lifetime)
dangerous...." 27 Unbeknownst to Elmer, however, Bugsy,
having learned that a bounty hunter was after him, endures
major plastic surgery, has his voice altered, and otherwise
changes his publicly observable characteristics. Elmer's
leads allow him to track down and encounter Bugsy Wabbit;
but Elmer fails to recognize Bugsy as the suspect whom he
has been tracking, and simply thinks that he has met another
person with the same name. Elmer befriends Bugsy and soon
comes to know a good deal about him. On April 1, Elmer
overhears a dispute between his friend Bugsy and someone
else, and in virtue of the nature of the fight, "Elmer
decides then and there that this Bugsy Wabbit is also a
dangerous man." 28
26See ibid., pp. 92-8.
27Ibid.
,
p. 92
.
28Ibid
. ,
p. 94.
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The story takes a final twist on June 1, when Elmer
gets some information from the FBI to the effect that
despite being a criminal, Bugsy might be relatively harmless
after all. This new information fails to persuade Elmer to
form the opinion that Bugsy is not dangerous; however, it
does persuade him to suspend his former opinion that Bugsy
is dangerous. So, as of June 1, "Elmer feels certain that
his friend Bugsy is dangerous, but still wonders whether
Bugsy the criminal is dangerous or not." 29
The puzzle may be stated in terms of a guestion about
Elmer s doxastic state on or after June 1 . Salmon describes
it as follows:
Either Elmer believes that Bugsy is dangerous or
he does not. Which is it? We seem to be reguired
to say that Elmer does indeed believe that Bugsy
is dangerous, for he remains convinced of his
friend Bugsy's dangerousness. We also seem to be
required to say Elmer does not believe that Bugsy
is dangerous, for he now actively suspends
judgment concerning the criminal's dangerousness.
Yet we are logically prohibited from saying both
together. How, then, are we to describe
coherently Elmer's doxastic disposition with
respect to the information that Bugsy Wabbit is
dangerous? How can it be consistent for Elmer to
believe that Bugsy is dangerous, on the one hand,
and to withhold that belief, on the other? 30
According to Salmon, the case of Elmer's Beffudlement
poses the same problem as the case of the messy shopper for
the view that belief sentences are to be analyzed ultimately
in terms of a two-place relation between a subject and a
29Ibid
.
3
°Ibid.
,
p. 97.
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proposition. I would urge that the de se cases may pose
special problems in metaphysics or the philosophy of mind,
even if they do not in the philosophy of language. if
Salmon is right, then cases involving indexical belief are
not the only ones that provide support for an existential
analysis of belief sentences in terms of a three-place
relation between a subject, a proposition and something
else. (We may wish, however, to treat belief sentences in
some other way. I will briefly discuss this issue in
chapter 3
.
)
On the theory favored by Salmon, Elmer believes that
Bugsy is dangerous if and only if he stands in a certain
relation to the singular proposition that Bugsy is dangerous
- a relation that would lead us to agree that he has a
belief about Bugsy, to the effect that he is dangerous. A
consequence of Salmon's version of the Triadic View is this:
even after the events of June 1, Elmer believes that Bugsy
is dangerous, so that to say that he does not believe this
is to say something literally false.
Despite the fact that Salmon's view has an answer to
the question whether or not Elmer believes that Bugsy is
dangerous, things are not quite so simple. Elmer's state is
such that (in many ordinary contexts) it would be at least
seriously misleading to say that he believes that Bugsy is
dangerous. Since Elmer thinks that two different people
share the name 'Bugsy', the belief attributed to Elmer seems
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to be incompatible with some of his other beliefs. Elmer's
attitude toward Bugsy's dangerousness changed substantially
as of June 1, and it would be nice to be able to account for
this change. What is needed, then, is a way to distinguish
Elmer's believing that Bugsy is dangerous, on the one hand,
from his suspending or withholding belief that Bugsy is
dangerous, on the other.
Salmon presents some principles about belief and the
BEL relation - principles that allow the Triadic View to
entail both that Elmer believes that Bugsy is dangerous, and
that he withholds belief as to whether Bugsy is dangerous.
The principles help to locate BEL within a certain
conceptual scheme. According to Salmon:
(i) [A believes p] may be analyzed as (3x)[A
grasps p by means of x & BEL ( A , p, x)],
(ii) A may stand in BEL to p and some x by means
of which A grasps p, without standing in BEL
to p and all x by means of which A grasps p,
and
(iii) fA withholds belief from p] , in the sense
relevant to Elmer's befuddleraent
,
may be
analyzed as (3x)[A grasps p by means of x &
~BEL(A, p, x)]. 31
Salmon wants to say that there is a means by which
Elmer grasps the proposition (or information) that Bugsy is
dangerous such that he does not stand in BEL to this
proposition and this particular means of grasping it. It is
somehow essential to this means of grasping the proposition
31Ibid.
,
p. Ill
.
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that it involves a mental representation of Bugsy as a
notorious jewel thief, rather than as, say, a new friend.
The way in which Elmer is acquainted with Bugsy, according
to Salmon, constitutes in part the guise by means of which
Elmer grasps the proposition that he is dangerous.
On the plausible assumption that a subject may stand in
BEL to a proposition and a propositional guise only if she
grasps the proposition by means of the guise 32 - i.e., that
BEL ( S , p, x) only if s grasps p by means of x - we may say
simply that on the view of belief attribution given by
Salmon, a sentence of the form f A believes that p] is true
if and only if there is a guise x, a subject S such that A
denotes S, and a proposition P such that p expresses P, such
that BEL( S , P, x). The presumed background for this
semantic thesis is the Triadic View, according to which both
propositions and belief states (or guises) are essential to
belief
.
2 . 4 Explaining Behavior on the Triadic View
In this section I would like to consider again the
issue of how change in belief explains change in behavior.
According to the semantic and metaphysical views of Salmon
and Perry, in English we may use only a two-place predicate
32I do not think that Salmon would object to this. It
may be more or less plausible depending upon how the
metaphor of grasping is cashed out.
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'believes' for the purpose of conveying information about a
certain three-place relation. It might be interesting to
see how these views account for the very sentences in terms
of which Perry originally explained his behavior in the case
of the messy shopper. As we have seen, Perry wrote:
I believed at the outset that the shopper with atorn bag was making a mess. And I was right. But
I did not believe that I was making a mess. That
seems to be something I came to believe. And when
I came to believe that, I stopped following the
trail around the counter, and rearranged the tornbag in my trolley. 33
The first sentence of this passage is true, according
to the present semantic view. The embedded sentence - 'the
shopper with a torn bag was making a mess' — expresses a
certain proposition (presumably not a singular proposition,
although complications may arise) such that Perry stood in
BEL to it and some belief state: Perry, for example, was
disposed to assent to the sentence 'the shopper with a torn
bag is making a mess'.
According to a view like Salmon's, however, the third
sentence of the passage - viz., 'I did not believe that I
was making a mess' - could very well have been false. The
embedded sentence here, on the view favored by Salmon and
perhaps Perry as well, expresses the singular proposition
that Perry is making a mess (at the relevant time in the
past) . If Elmer could believe singular propositions about
Bugsy Wabbit in virtue of tracking him in a certain fashion,
33Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 83.
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it seems there is no reason to deny that Perry could believe
singular propositions about himself in virtue of following
his own trail of sugar. If he can, and if the sentence in
question literally means that he did not stand in BEL to the
singular proposition that Perry is making a mess, then it
appears that the sentence is false: Perry did believe that
he was making a mess (despite the way in which he would have
expressed his belief) just as Elmer believed that Bugsy was
dangerous
.
However, perhaps it takes more than merely following
someone's trail of sugar to believe singular propositions
about that person. Perry also discusses a revised version
of his example, in which the relation of acquaintance that
he bears to himself is more direct:
Suppose there were mirrors at either end of the
counter so that as I pushed my trolley down the
aisle in pursuit I saw myself in the mirror. I
take what I see to be a reflection of the messy
shopper going up the aisle on the other side, not
realizing that what I am really seeing is a
reflection of a reflection of myself. I point and
say, truly, 'I believe that he is making a
mess '
.
34
Let us suppose with Perry that these are the facts of
the case. Then Perry's claim that he did not believe that
he was making a mess really is false, if the role of the
embedded sentence is simply to express the singular
proposition that Perry is making a mess, since in fact he
stood in the BEL relation to the proposition that Perry is
34Ibid.
,
p. 92
.
38
making a mess (in virtue of pointing to himself) and some
belief state. So, the fact that Perry comes to have a
singular proposition about himself as an object of belief
does not explain the change in his behavior.
Consider an ordinary explanation of Perry's mess-
assuaging behavior, e.g., 'he rearranged the torn bag in his
trolley because he came to believe that he was making a
mess'. We take this to be true, given the facts of the
case. On the semantic view taken by Salmon, however, it
seems that the explanation is literally false, since on this
view it was true that Perry came to believe that he was
making a mess when he saw himself in the mirror; but this
caused him to speed off in pursuit of the messy shopper
rather than rearrange his bag of sugar.
Regardless of the literal meaning of the explanation -
which I will discuss briefly later in this section - we do
come to understand why Perry rearranged the bag of sugar
when we hear it, and when we read Perry's own explanation of
his behavior. (Like Elmer, Perry had thought that there
were two distinct people instead of just one.) We have
already seen how the apparatus of the Triadic View can
account for the behavior of the messy shopper. What
explains Perry's behavior is not a change with respect to
the propositions he believes; rather, it is a change in
belief state. The proposition that Perry was making a mess
may have been an object of his belief all along, but the
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I am making a mess'
belief state that disposes him to utter '
surely was not. The fact that he comes to stand in BEL to
this proposition and this particular belief state explains
why he stopped to check and rearrange his own bag of sugar.
It will be helpful to characterize the sort of belief
state under consideration, assuming a previous account of
belief states in general. I will call such a belief state
an I-guise
,
and give the following definition, which makes
use of the notion of grasping a proposition by means of a
guise or belief state:
(IG) f is an I-guise =df . necessarily, for all agents x
and propositions p, if x grasps p by means of f,
then there is a property F such that p is
logically equivalent to the singular proposition
that x is F.
We might have occasion to characterize a belief state, in
part, with a natural language sentence containing an
indexical, such as 'I am making a mess'. The belief state
that is so characterized is an I-guise: if a person grasps
a proposition by means of it, or stands in BEL to it and a
proposition, then it is the singular proposition about that
person to the effect that she is making a mess . 35
35The class of I-guises is one of many classes of
essentially indexical guises, by means of which different
subjects may believe different propositions. For example,
we might be interested in the notion of a Now-guise, for
grasping propositions directly about the present moment.
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How does the Triadic View explain the change in the
messy shopper's behavior? Let us suppose that the relevant
change in belief occurs at a particular time, called 't'.
The explanation goes as follows: there is an I-guise such
that before t. Perry does not stand in BEL to it and the
proposition that he is making a mess; but as of t. Perry
does stand in BEL to it and the proposition that he is
making a mess. As it happened, before t Perry stood in BEL
to the proposition that he is making a mess, and some guise
or other. However, that guise (cf. 'he is making a mess')
was not an I-guise: the supermarket manager might have
grasped a proposition by means of it, but this proposition
is not equivalent to any singular proposition about the
manager
.
I would now like to discuss briefly some issues about
the semantic meaning of sentences of the form 'S believes
that he (she) is F', and hence about the meaning of
psychological explanations into which such sentences figure.
These issues are not at all central to the thesis as a
whole; but I will make a few remarks about them with respect
to the Triadic View of belief. I will also make a few
remarks about the 'he himself' and 'she herself' locutions
as they occur in belief sentences.
Given the background of the Triadic View, there is
little question that if I were to utter, in the ordinary
course of a conversation, the sentence 'Perry believes that
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he is making a mess', where 'he' clearly refers to Perry, my
remark would convey the information that there is an I-guise
such that Perry stands in BEL to it and the proposition that
he is making a mess. The guestion is whether or not all of
this information is entailed by the literal or semantic
meaning of my utterance.
On Salmon's view, the semantic meaning of the utterance
implies nothing at all about I-guises. He maintains that
the embedded sentence merely functions to pick out the
singular proposition that Perry is making a mess, and from
his first principle concerning the BEL relation, we get the
result that my remark would be literally true even if I said
it at some time during the interval in which Perry was
chasing down the messy shopper in the mirror. Salmon's view
requires only that there be some way or other, by means of
which Perry grasps the proposition that Perry is making a
mess - and there is such a way, since Perry is pointing to
himself in the mirror and saying 'he is making a mess'.
A case can be made, however, for the claim that this
semantic view does not correctly account for the truth
values of many English sentences. If Smith watches Perry
chase after a reflection of himself rather than simply
straighten out his bag, and Smith, in a report to Jones
concerning Perry's state of mind, says "Perry believes that
he is making a mess," it is plausible to think that Smith
would have said something false. Many speakers of English
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probably have such intuitions. If Jones were watching Perry
along with Smith, he could surely reply to him, truly, in
the following way: "No. Of course Perry doesn't believe
he s making a mess. If he did, he would be rearranging that
torn bag of sugar in his cart." 36
Salmon might reply that so many people would take
Smith's remark to be false because it is easy to confuse a
statement's semantic meaning with one of its pragmatic
implicatures
,
especially if similar implicatures are
commonplace. For example, Smith's remark may carry the
conversational implicature that Perry's belief state is an
I-guise, or, perhaps as a consequence, that Perry would
answer "yes" if he were asked "are you making a mess?" 37
If this information - or something like it - is a
conversational implicature of the sentence 'Perry believes
that he is making a mess', we should expect it to be
cancelable by a subsequent utterance of the speaker. It
might be claimed that this is what would happen if I were to
say the following: "Perry believes that he is making a
mess; but even if he were to express his belief, he would
not express it by saying anything like 'I am making a
mess'." Salmon would probably make this claim, maintaining
that the second clause serves to cancel the implicature of
36I will not press this point against Salmon here. I
do think that an even stronger case against his view can be
made with certain belief sentences containing proper names.
37See, e.g.
,
Salmon (1986), p. 115.
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the first. 38 He might also claim that since it is easier,
from the point of view of communicating in English, to deny
the (true, on his view) belief attribution in the first
clause, instead of cancelling it with the second, an English
speaker would likely do just that, taking it to be false.
Another way of treating this case seems to me to be
more plausible. We might hold that the second clause in the
monologue above has the effect of selecting between two
different readings of the belief attribution in the first.
On this view, a sentence of the form 'S believes that he/she
is F' would be literally ambiguous: it may mean (1) that
there is an x such that BEL( S , that S is F, x) , 39 as on
Salmon's view; or, it may mean (2) that there is an x such
that x is an I-guise, and BEL( S , that S is F, x) . Here, the
second reading does imply that the subject grasps the
relevant proposition by means of an I-guise, and this
reading might be forced by certain features of the context
in which such a sentence is used.
One could also hold that sentences of the same general
form are univocal, and that their meanings are given by (2)
above. If this were correct, it would be literally false to
say, before Perry discovers himself to be the mess-maker but
after he sees himself in the mirror, that Perry believes
38Cf . ibid.
,
p. 118.
39For ease of exposition, I ignore the use/mention
distinction here and later in this section.
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that he is making a mess, even with an added qualification
about Perry's state of mind, as in the monologue above. of
these three possible views concerning the semantics of such
sentences, the second - i.e., the view that they are
systematically ambiguous between two sorts of reading -
seems to me to be the most plausible.
The same options are available, again given the
background of the Triadic View, for the evaluation of
sentences of the form 'S believes that he himself (she
herself) is F'. On a view like Salmon's, it might be
claimed that the 'he himself' and 'she herself' locutions,
when they occur in belief sentences of the present form,
conventionally indicate the alleged presence of an I-guise.
For example, if I were to utter 'Perry believes that he
himself is making a mess', it might be a conventional
implicature of my utterance - one that has come to be
associated with the form of words and hence does not depend
upon any special features of the context of utterance - that
Perry believes the proposition that he is making a mess in
virtue of being in a very special sort of belief state,
viz
.
,
an I-guise
.
If this information is a conventional implicature of my
utterance, then it is not part of the proposition expressed
semantically by the words in the utterance itself, and hence
the utterance could be true even if Perry did not grasp the
proposition that he is making a mess by an I-guise (if, for
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example, he saw himself in the mirror). However, there is
good reason to think that the information about the de se
nature of the belief reported in the sentence is represented
at the level of logical form, and as a result is not merely
conventional implicature.
This leaves us with the second and third options listed
above. A proponent of the Triadic View could claim that the
sentences in guestion are ambiguous: on one reading, a
sentence of the form 'S believes that he himself (she
herself) is F' is true if and only if there is an x such
that BEL(S, that S is F, x) ; and, on the other reading, a
sentence of this form is true if and only if there is an x
such that x is an I-guise, and BEL( S , that S is F, x).
The second reading is much more likely, it seems, to be
intended by a speaker and accommodated by an audience. For
this reason, it might be tempting to take the third option
and claim that it is the univocal reading of the relevant
form of words. On this view, if I said 'Perry believes that
he himself is making a mess' while he was chasing the messy
shopper in the mirror, I could not possibly have said
something true. It seems to me that the second strategy is
still the best option for a semantic theorist working within
the framework of the Triadic View, although the third
alternative certainly is a plausible candidate as well.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROPERTY THEORY OF BELIEF
In 1957 Peter Geach asked the following question about
belief and its attribution, and then went on to restrict the
range of possible answers:
...if we say of a number of people that each of
them believes that he himself is clever, what
belief exactly are we attributing to all of them?
Certainly they do not all believe the same
proposition, as 'proposition' is commonly
understood by philosophers. 1
As commonly understood by philosophers, of course, the word
'proposition' names a kind of thing that is true or false
simpliciter, and not merely true, say, of one person, and
false of another.
Geach 's question seems to presuppose that the assertion
in question is true provided that there is some entity such
that each person in the relevant domain of quantification
stands in a certain binary relation - the belief relation -
to that entity. The view to be discussed in this chapter
entails that such a presupposition is correct: it is the
view that belief, although it is a binary relation, is not a
relation between subjects and propositions; rather, the view
holds that the objects of belief are properties, and hence
are neither true nor false simpliciter.
The thesis that belief is essentially a relation
between subjects and properties has been developed and
xGeach (1957), p. 23.
defended by both David Lewis and Roderick Chisholm. The
view, however, had been to a certain extent anticipated by
Sydney Shoemaker
.
2 Shoemaker argues that some of the
statements that we make about ourselves using the pronoun
'I' are not "subject to error through misidentif ication"
relative to 'I '. 3 Shoemaker goes on to write:
There are predicates which I apply to others, and
which others apply to me, on the basis of
observations of behavior, but which I do not
ascribe to myself on this basis, and these
predicates are precisely those the self-ascription
of which is immune to error through
misidentification
. I see nothing wrong with
describing the self-ascription of such predicates
as manifestations of self-knowledge or self-
awareness
.
4
Shoemaker here considers the self-ascription of a
predicate (or an attribute) to be a certain kind of speech
act; but the analogy with belief is apparent. Moreover,
Shoemaker suggests that our ability to self-ascribe the kind
of predicate mentioned above is not to be explicated in
terms of an ability to refer to ourselves by means of
grasping some individual concept . 5
2See Shoemaker (1968).
3Ibid.
,
p. 557. My statement, for example, 'I am
tired' is subject to error through misidentif ication
relative to 'I' if and only if it is possible that I should
know that some particular thing is tired, but mistakenly
think that the thing I know to be tired is what my use of
'I' refers to. Presumably this is not possible, and hence
my statement is immune to error through misidentif ication
.
4Ibid.
,
p. 562
.
5See ibid., pp. 562-3.
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Brian Loar has also proposed that we posit a primitive
relation between agents and (something like) properties:
I suggest taking self-ascriptive belief as
unanalyzed. If Cynthia believes that she has theflu, then what is true is:
B*( Cynthia, y has the flu).
She is related by the self-ascriptive belief
relation to that propositional function. 6
Loar does not, however, go on to make the stronger claim
made by Lewis and Chisholm: that necessarily, if someone
believes something, then there is a property such that she
self-ascribes it; and indeed, that the believing is to be
analyzed in terms of the self-ascription, or direct
attribution, of the property.
3 • 1 Lewis and Self-Ascription
In this section I would like to discuss Lewis's
arguments for, and version of, the view that properties are
the objects of belief. Lewis argues for two theses:
(1) When propositional objects will do, property
objects also will do. (2) Sometimes property
objects will do and propositional objects won't. 7
It should be noted that Lewis takes propositions to be sets
of possible worlds - the members of the set are the worlds
6Loar (1976), p. 358. We may identify properties with
propositional functions, since there is a trivial one-one
correspondence between them.
7Lewis (1983a), p. 134. Lewis intends the theses to
hold for attitudes other than belief, but here I consider
only the case of belief. Many other cases are analogous.
49
where the proposition is true - and takes properties to be
sets of possible individuals - the members of the set are
the things that have the property. (We might think of
propositions as properties of entire worlds.) As we shall
see in the next section, Chisholm arrives at essentially the
same view about belief, despite his markedly different views
about the ontological status of propositions and properties.
Lewis defends his first thesis by showing that there is
a one-one correspondence between all of the propositions
that there are, and some of the properties that there are.
He observes:
to any set of worlds whatever, there corresponds
the property of inhabiting some world in that set.
In other words, to any proposition there
corresponds the property of inhabiting some world
where that proposition holds. 8
This procedure obviously yields a unigue property
corresponding to each proposition. The correspondence is
one-one since none of the properties is yielded by more than
one proposition; if there were such a property, then
something at a world where one of the propositions is true
and the other false would both have and fail to have the
property, which of course is impossible.
The motivation for replacing propositional objects of
belief with property objects of belief is provided by
Lewis's second thesis, together with the methodological
principle that positing uniform objects of belief is the
8Ibid.
,
p. 135
.
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best way to systematize our knowledge about the causal role
of belief in behavior. Lewis's strategy for replacing
propositional objects with property ones is straightforward:
We have a one-one correspondence between allpropositions and some properties. Whenever it
would be right to assign a proposition as the
object of an attitude, I shall simply assign the
corresponding property. Since the correspondence
is one-one, no information is lost and no surplusinformation is added. 9
To believe the proposition, for example, that elms are
deciduous, is by analysis to self-ascribe the corresponding
property of inhabiting a possible world where elms are
deciduous (or, being such that elms are deciduous). In this
section, I will not question Lewis's claim that information
is neither gained nor lost in the analysis, even though the
structure of the objects of belief is different: the
proposition is a set of worlds, and the corresponding
property is a set most of the members of which are not
entire worlds (for Lewis, each world inhabits itself, and of
course so does every proper part of it). There is an
argument in the literature against the move made here by
Lewis - an unsound argument, in my view - which I discuss in
chapter 6
.
Considering the objects of the attitudes, Lewis
suggests that since they might just as well be properties as
propositions, they might just as well be properties that
don't correspond to entire worlds as ones that do. Of
9Ibid.
,
pp. 135-6
.
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course, there is no reason to take the view that properties,
rather than propositions, are the objects of belief if there
are no cases of belief that may be analyzed in terms of
property objects but not in terms of propositional ones.
Lewis's second thesis maintains that there are such cases.
The standard examples of self-locating or de se belief
are by now familiar. Lewis first discusses Perry's example
about Rudolf Lingens, who is an amnesiac and is lost in Main
Library, Stanford. Lingens, in a perfectly ordinary sense,
does not know who he is (e.g., that he is Lingens) or where
he is; yet he has read in the library an accurate biography
of himself and a correct account of the library itself.
Somehow, Lingens could even come to believe that Lingens is
lost in Main Library, without thereby believing that he
himself is in that situation. What is the nature, then, of
this belief that Lingens lacks? 10
Lewis diagnoses the case as follows:
The more he reads, the more propositions he
believes, and the more he is in a position to
self-ascribe properties of inhabiting such-and-
such a kind of world. But none of this, by
itself, can guarantee that he knows where in the
world he is. He needs to locate himself not only
in logical space but also in ordinary space. He
needs to self-ascribe the property of being in
aisle five, floor six, of Main Library, Stanford;
and this is not one of the properties that
corresponds to a proposition. 11
10Cf. Perry (1977).
“Lewis (1983a), p. 138.
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a proposition, then if an
If a property corresponds to
individual has the property, so does everything else (i.e.,
everything that inhabits the same world that it inhabits).
The property of being in the fifth aisle of the sixth floor
of Main Library, then, is not a property that corresponds to
a proposition: Lingens has this property, but most things
that inhabit his world do not.
Lewis claims that the present example shows that
certain beliefs can be analyzed in terms of property objects
but not in terms of propositional objects, and that for this
reason his second thesis is true. Suppose that Lingens
comes to know, and hence believe, that he is in Main Library
- then his belief can be understood in terms of his self-
ascribing the property of being in a certain building; but
not, it seems, in terms of his self-ascribing the property
of being in a certain kind of world.
Perry himself also uses the Lingens case, and others
like it, to argue for the thesis that belief is not a binary
relation between a person and a proposition - conceived of
as a Fregean proposition with a kind of syntactic structure;
but Perry ultimately proposes a view that is at least prima
facie distinct from the one endorsed by Lewis. 12
12For reasons to believe that Lingens does not come to
believe a new Fregean proposition when he learns where he is
or who he is, and for a discussion of Perry's own positive
view, see Chapter 2. Perry claimed that propositions lack
an "indexical ingredient" needed to account for certain
beliefs; Lewis responds not by giving indexicality to the
objects of belief (since properties are just sets of
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In Chapter 5, I discuss Robert Stalnaker's objection to
Lewis's claims about the Lingens case. Roughly, Stalnaker
would take the object of Lingens's belief that he himself is
in Main Library to be a set of possible situations in which
Lingens (or an epistemic counterpart for himself) is in that
very building; 13 and he would take the object of Lingens's
different, previous belief - say, the one that Lingens would
have expressed by saying 'Lingens is lost in the library' -
to be a set of possible situations in which some person or
other named 'Lingens' (and who has certain other properties)
happens to be lost there.
To be sure, Lewis does not claim that his second thesis
has been proved before he presents his case of the two gods:
Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a
certain possible world, and they know exactly
which world it is. Therefore they know every
proposition that is true at their world. Insofar
as knowledge is a propositional attitude, they are
omniscient. Still I can imagine them to suffer
ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he
is. They are not exactly alike. One lives on top
of the tallest mountain and throws down manna; the
other lives on top of the coldest mountain and
throws down thunderbolts. Neither one knows
whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on the
coldest mountain; nor whether he throws manna or
thunderbolts
.
14
individuals) but by making use of the relation of self-
ascription, which is necessarily such that any agent can
bear it only to himself or herself (and, when location in
time is important, by claiming that the self-ascribing is
done by a momentary temporal part of the persisting agent).
13I put off a discussion of the details of Stalnaker's
view until chapter 5.
14Lewis (1983a), p. 139.
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Lewis claims that the situation is a possible one, and
is thus a legitimate test case for our views about knowledge
and belief. He also suggests that the gods could lack the
beliefs that they do because "they have an egually perfect
view of every part of their world, and hence cannot identify
the perspectives from which they view it." 15 Since the
gods believe every proposition that is true at their world
but could nevertheless believe (truly) more than they in
fact do, the argument goes, the objects of the missing
beliefs could not be propositions.
Lewis's solution, as discussed earlier, is to say that
the objects of belief and other attitudes are properties
rather than propositions. On this view belief is a binary
relation; but not between a subject and a bearer of a truth
value in any absolute sense. If the god on the tallest
mountain were to learn that he himself lived on the tallest
mountain (never mind for the moment that this seems to be
impossible given the description of the case), he would not
come to believe a new proposition; rather, he would self-
ascribe a new property: viz., the property of living on the
tallest mountain. This property does not correspond to any
proposition, since the god who lives on the tallest mountain
is the only one in his world who has it. 16
15Ibid
.
16I discuss the debate between Stalnaker and Lewis,
over the correct treatment of the case of the two gods, in
chapter 5
.
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Lewis suggests that these examples warrant the analysis
of belief in general as the self-ascription of a property,
m cases where the property corresponds to a proposition as
well as cases where it does not. Again, the uniformity in
kind of the objects of our attitudes is desirable since it
best explains the logical relations between them, reference
to which is indispensable in accounting systematically for
how what we think affects what we do.
Lewis coined the phrase 'belief de se' for the self-
ascription of properties. He describes part of his project
as follows: "My thesis is that the de se subsumes the de
dicto; but not vice versa. A general account of belief or
knowledge must therefore be an account of belief or
knowledge de se ." 17 The other part of Lewis's project is
the explication of de re belief also in terms of the self-
ascription of properties. I discuss this account briefly in
the third section of this chapter and at greater length in
chapter 7
.
Although Lewis claims that these two examples suffice
to show that his second thesis is true, he does discuss
another example originally due to Perry. I think that
consideration of this example will bring out an interesting
consequence of Lewis's view in particular, and the Property
Theory in general. The example concerns a certain man
Heimson, who is a bit mad and thinks, wrongly of course,
17Lewis (1983a), p. 139.
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that he is David Hume
.
18 what is the object of Heimson's
mistaken belief that he is Hume?
Lewis claims that there are two problems with taking
the object of Heimson's crazy belief to be a proposition,
neither of which is present if instead it is taken to be a
property that he self-ascribes
. Lewis writes:
The first problem is that Heimson couldn't be
Hume. if he believes the proposition that holds
at just those worlds where he is Hume, then hebelieves the empty proposition that holds at no
worlds
.
19
Whatever the object of Heimson's belief is, according to
Lewis, it is surely not the necessarily false proposition:
Heimson is deluded, but this proposition does not seem to
appropriately characterize his delusion.
Lewis is right to point out, to anyone who favors
propositional objects of belief (but is unwilling to opt for
the Triadic View), that the object of Heimson's belief that
he himself is Hume should not be taken to be the proposition
that Heimson is Hume (assuming, as Lewis does, that the same
person could not have both the property of being Hume and
the property of being Heimson). This is not to say,
however, that the problem cannot be solved in a way that is
consistent with a view of belief as a binary propositional
attitude. One who wishes to save propositional objects of
belief might, for example, want to analyze Heimson's belief
18See Perry (1977), pp. 487-8.
19Lewis (1983a), p. 141.
57
as a relation to a proposition that is true at just those
worlds in which Heimson does many of the things that Hume
actually did - e.g., writing a book called the Treatise,
loving literary fame, etc. (Heimson need not be called
Hume' at such worlds, although he might be
.) 20
Lewis's account of the Heimson case also avoids mention
of the empty proposition. He analyzes Heimson's believing
himself to be Hume simply as Heimson's self-ascribing the
property of being Hume, a possible property that Hume
actually had . 21 The fact that Heimson could not have this
property does not entail that he cannot self-ascribe it.
(We may take the property of being Hume, in this context, to
be the set of Hume and all of his counterparts. Since
Heimson is not in this set, and since none of Heimson's
counterparts is in this set, Heimson could not have this
property.
)
Lewis goes on to give the second problem with taking
the object of Heimson's belief to be a proposition, which
involves the sense in which Hume and Heimson believe the
same thing when each believes himself to be Hume:
2
°Stalnaker, I think, would opt for a treatment along
these lines. See chapter 5.
21See Lewis (1983a), pp. 141-2. Note that Lewis does
not hesitate to say that it is possible that we should self-
ascribe non-qualitative properties. However, the analysis
of belief in terms of the self-ascription of properties
would be just as plausible if, e.g., we were to claim that
Heimson could not self-ascribe a non-qualitative property
such as that of being (identical to) Hume.
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is wrona 5 f !!S when we ask why Heimson
that u
belleves he 1S Hume. Hume believedtoo. Hume was right. if Hume believed hewas Hume by believing a proposition, thatproposition was true. Heimson believes just whatHume did. But Hume and Heimson are worldmatesAny proposition true for Hume is likewise true 'forHeimson. So Heimson, like Hume, believes he isHume by believing a true proposition. So he's
right But he's not right. He's wrong, becausehe believes he's Hume and he isn't. 22
Lewis obviously supposes that Heimson believes just
what Hume did. if Heimson believed the same proposition
that Hume did, however, his belief could not be false. But
he does falsely believe himself to be Hume. So the object
of both Hume's and Heimson's beliefs is not a proposition:
both of them, rather, self-ascribe the property of being
Hume
.
One who favors propositional objects of belief, then,
must say that Hume and Heimson do not, strictly speaking,
believe the same thing. In itself this is not especially
problematic - Hume believed a proposition about himself, and
Heimson believes one about himself. But, as Lewis observes,
"there had better also be a central and important sense in
which Heimson and Hume believe alike." 23 After all, we may
say correctly that each one of them believes himself to be
Hume
.
We have seen that on Perry's view two distinct entities
account for the ways in which Hume and Heimson do, and do
22Lewis (1983a), p. 142.
23Ibid.
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not
'
believe the same thing: Hume and Heimson believe
different (singular) propositions, but each of them is in
the same belief state. For Perry, perhaps, each of their
dispositions to utter sincerely a token of the sentence 'I
am Hume' (or something similar) suffices for their being in
the same belief state.
It seems to me that even someone like Stalnaker, who
maintains that belief is analyzable as a binary relation
between a subject and a proposition, can provide an account
of how Hume and Heimson both believe the same thing. Of
course, they can't believe the same proposition; but
nevertheless the account could go as follows: suppose that
two people, say, A and B, believe two propositions, P and Q,
respectively. Then A and B believe the same thing (in the
relevant sense) if and only if there is a property H such
that necessarily, P is true if and only if A has H and Q is
true if and only if B has H.
Lewis's solution is simpler because, for example, it
implies that any two people believe the same thing (in the
relevant sense) if and only if the objects of their beliefs
are identical
.
24 However, since Hume and Heimson believe
the same thing but one is right and the other wrong, Lewis
must say that Heimson falsely believes what Hume truly
24If Lewis were to recognize a sense in which Hume and
Heimson believe differently, he must say that it just
reduces to the fact that they are different people: Hume
self-ascribes a property to Hume, and Heimson self-ascribes
the same property to Heimson.
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believes. Insofar as our ordinary practice of belief
attribution dictates that to falsely believe something is
just to believe something that is false, this is fairly
striking.
The property of being Hume, of course, is neither true
nor false. So, what Heimson believes, according to Lewis,
when he believes himself to be Hume, is not something that
is either true or false:
The solution is that the object is not a
proposition at all. it is a property: theproperty of being Hume. Hume self-ascribes thisproperty; he has it; he is right. Heimson,
believing just what Hume does, self-ascribes the
very same property; he lacks it; he is wrong. 25
On Lewis's view, then, to believe falsely is not
necessarily to believe something that is false in any
absolute sense. Of course, there is a range of cases -
viz.
,
cases of de dicto belief — in which (near enough)
believing falsely just is having a false object of belief,
and believing truly just is having a true object of belief.
Lewis could just give the following definition:
(Tl) y is a true object of x's belief =af y is a
property that corresponds to a true proposition,
and x self-ascribes y.
Lewis could also maintain that the fact that our
beliefs are true of us is what explains why we believe
truly, and could give the following more general definition
25Lewis (1983a), p. 143.
61
x self-
( T 2 ) Y is a true object of x's belief =df
ascribes y, and x has y.
As a result, even the god living on the tallest mountain,
who self
-ascribes every property that corresponds to a true
proposition and no property that corresponds to a false one,
could still believe something that isn't true, e.g., he may
self-ascribe the property of living on the coldest mountain.
3 • 2 Chisholm and Direct Attribution
In his book The First Person, Chisholm presents and
defends a view of belief that is essentially the same as the
one endorsed by Lewis. In this section, I discuss the
problem that leads Chisholm to posit a fundamental relation
between persons and properties, in terms of which all of our
ordinary discourse about belief may be understood.
Understanding belief as a relation between a believer
and a property, according to Chisholm, is the simplest way
to solve a problem about the logical relations between the
following attributions of belief:
(P) The tallest man believes that the tallest man
is wise.
(Q) There is an x such that x is identical with
the tallest man and x is believed by x to be
wise
.
(S) The tallest man believes that he himself is
wise 26
26Chisholm (1981), p. 18.
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Each of these sentences is possibly true. The problem
is to account for their logical form in such a way that the
entailment relations between them are preserved. (Lewis
might object to this way of stating the problem, since he
maintains that the semantics of belief sentences is a topic
distinct from that of assigning objects of belief.) The
facts about the logical relations that interest us here are
as follows: P does not imply S, and S does not imply P; and
S implies Q, although Q does not imply S. Chisholm
describes a case in which s would be false but Q would be
true
:
In this case the tallest man cannot sincerely say:
'I believe that I am wise'. Suppose, however,
that he reads the lines on his hand and takes them
to be a sign of wisdom; he doesn't realize the
hand is his; and he is unduly modest and entirely
without conceit. He arrives at the belief, with
respect to the man in question, that he is
wise . . . , 27
Perhaps various accounts of belief and belief sentences
could provide an adequate solution to the problem. After
reviewing some of these, including his own earlier view,
Chisholm maintains the following:
The simplest conception, I suggest, is one which
construes believing as a relation involving a
believer and a property - a property which he may
be said to attribute to himself. Then the various
senses of believing may be understood by reference
to this simple conception. 28
27Ibid.
,
p. 19
.
28Ibid.
,
p. 27
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It should be clear that the present strategy is
identical in important respects with Lewis's. Rather than
constructing properties, by means of sets, out of possible
individuals, however, Chisholm takes a Platonistic view of
them. in particular, he takes as primitive the notions of
exemplification and de re modality, and defines a property
as something that is possibly such that something
exemplifies it. I will avoid the finer points of this view
unless they are essential to the present discussion. 29
Chisholm uses the phrase 'direct attribution' to refer
to the relation of self-ascription between a person and a
property. Although he takes this relation to be primitive,
he also affirms the following two principles concerning the
capabilities of believers to think directly about
themselves
:
PI For every x, every y and every z, if x
directly attributes z to y, then x is
identical with y. . .
.
P2 For every x, every y and every z, if x
directly attributes z to y, then z is a
property. 30
29For example, Chisholm also affirms two principles
about properties that imply that they are qualitative, in a
way, e.g.
,
that individual essences are not (see his pp. 7-
8). Hence Chisholm cannot treat the Hume/Heimson case
analogously to Lewis, who (at least in his discussion of the
case) makes use of the property of being Hume. Neither view
of properties, of course, is essential to the general thesis
of the Property Theory.
30Chisholm (1981), p. 28.
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Like Lewis
,
Chisholm wants to say that there are cases
of believing that can be (best) accounted for only by taking
belief to relate believers and properties. I will not
review more examples here. These cases typically may be
described in terms of the 'he himself' locution. Chisholm
gives the following definition:
D1 x believes that he himself is F = Df. The
property of being F is such that x directly
attributes it to x . 31
The logical structure that Chisholm gives to sentence S
above will be along the lines of D1
.
What about de re belief, an example of which, perhaps,
is sentence Q? Chisholm, like Lewis, wishes to analyze de
re belief in terms of direct attribution. He writes:
I make you my object by attributing a certain
property to myself. The property is one which, in
some sense, singles you out and thus makes you the
object of an indirect attribution. 32
On this account, a person attributes a property to another
thing in virtue of directly attributing a certain property
to himself. This latter property is somewhat complex: it
implies that there is exactly one thing to which the person
bears a relation that enables him somehow to single out that
thing, and that the thing to which he bears the relation has
31Ibid. Another matter of terminology: Chisholm uses
the term 'content' to describe the attributed property, and
reserves the term 'object' for the individual to which it is
attributed.
32Ibid.
,
p. 29
.
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the other relevant property. (Chisholm would explain this
by saying that the directly attributed property is
necessarily such that whatever exemplifies it bears the
relation uniquely to something that exemplifies the other,
former property.)
Chisholm defines this notion of indirect attribution
with the following pair of definitions:
D2 y is such that, as the thing that x bears R
to, x indirectly attributes to it the
property of being F = Df. x bears R to y
and only to y; and x directly attributes to x
a property which entails the property of
bearing R to just one thing and to a thing
that is F. . .
.
D3 y is such that x indirectly attributes to it
the property of being F = Df . There is a
relation R such that x indirectly attributes
to y, as the thing to which x bears R, the
property of being F . 33
Presumably, the right-hand side of D3, after the quantifying
phrase 'There is a relation R such that', is equivalent to
the left-hand side of D2. We might wish to constrain in
some way the kind of relation that the subject bears to the
res: e.g., we may require it to be a certain relation of
causal acquaintance. I discuss this issue in the next
section of this chapter.
Now that Chisholm has posited the relation of direct
attribution - between subjects and properties - to underlie
our true attributions of belief, and has defined the
relation of indirect attribution in terms of it, he is ready
33Ibid.
,
p. 31
.
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to solve the problem of the logical relations between the
sentences Q and S, shown earlier. The task was to represent
the two sentences in such a way that S implies Q, although Q
does not imply s.
According to Chisholm, S and Q are essentially
abbreviations for the following two attributions of belief,
respectively:
S' There is an x such that x is identical with
the tallest man, and the property of being
wise is such that x directly attributes it to
x.
Q' There is an x such that x is identical with
the tallest man, and the property of being
wise is one such that x directly or
indirectly attributes it to x . 34
Given the definitions of direct and indirect attribution, it
is clear that Q' does not imply S', although S' implies Q'
.
On Chisholm's view, as on Lewis's, belief is the purely
intentional relation that makes ordinary language belief
sentences true, and so it is the reflexive relation of
directly attributing a property to oneself.
Indirect attribution is also explained in terms of this
relation. Hence, de re belief (more precisely, the purely
psychological part of de re belief) is reduced to direct
attribution. Moreover, Chisholm would account for the de
dicto sentence P roughly as Lewis would - also by analyzing
it in terms of the direct attribution of a property ( in the
case of P, the property of being such that the tallest man
34Ibid.
,
p. 34
.
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is wise). In this way, the claims that P does not imply s,
and that S does not imply p, can reasonably be maintained.
3 • 3 Lewis and De Re Belief
Lewis defends a view of de re belief in terms of the
notions of self-ascription and of a relation of causal
acquaintance between a subject and a concrete individual.
According to Lewis, de re beliefs - our beliefs about
objects, in some intuitive sense of 'about' - are certain
states of affairs that obtain only partly in virtue of the
subject's self-ascriptions, and as a result are not beliefs
properly so called. On this narrowly psychological view of
belief, our self-ascribed properties are all of our beliefs:
Beliefs are in the head; but ... beliefs de re, in
general, are not. Beliefs de re are not really
beliefs. They are states of affairs that obtain
in virtue of the relations of the subject's
beliefs to the res in question. 35
The relations that Lewis has in mind are those of
causal dependence, and he calls them 'relations of
acquaintance'. In order for someone to have de re beliefs
about something - i.e., to ascribe a property to an object,
or, in Chisholm's terms, to indirectly attribute a property
to it - her being in the particular mental state that she is
in must depend in a peculiar way upon some prior state of
the object. As Lewis puts it:
35Lewis (1983a), p. 152.
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I and the one of whom I have beliefs de re are so
related that there is an extensive causaldependence of my states upon his; and this causaldependence is of a sort apt for the reliable
transmission of information. 36
The phrase 'extensive causal dependence' reflects the
vagueness of de re belief attributions. According to Lewis,
it is impossible to specify precisely the sorts of relation
that must hold between a subject and an individual in order
for the subject to ascribe any property to the individual.
(Just when, for example, would the detective believe de re,
of the murderer
,
that he was wearing shoes of a certain
type, or that he weighs over two hundred pounds?)
Lewis's strategy is similar in broad respects to
Chisholm's. He first proposes an account of what it is for
someone to believe something about an object under some
description of that object, or, as Lewis says, to ascribe a
property to an individual under a description - where a
description is taken to stand in for a relation between the
believer and the individual: e.g., the relation expressed in
English by the expression 'person whose crime I am
investigating'. Here is Lewis's definition:
A subject ascribes property X to individual Y
under description Z if and only if (1) the subject
bears the relation Z uniquely to Y, and (2) the
subject self-ascribes the property of bearing
relation Z uniquely to something which has
property X. 37
36Ibid.
,
p. 155
.
37Ibid.
,
p. 153
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The account of belief de re uses the notion of a
relation of acquaintance: a relation between a conscious
subject and a res that holds exactly when there is an
extensive causal dependence, of the sort suitable for the
transmission of information, of the subject's mental states
upon certain states of the res. We can now state Lewis's
account of de re belief (or, in his terminology, the
ascription of a property to an individual) as follows: a
subject ascribes a property X to an individual Y if and only
if there is some description Z such that Z is a relation of
acquaintance between the subject and Y; and the subject
ascribes X to Y under Z. 38
In Chapter 7, I discuss some problems for Lewis's
attempt to reduce de re beliefs to de se self-ascriptions
together with relations of acquaintance. In the remainder
of this section, I would like to point out some of the
consequences of this kind of reduction - in particular, its
effect on belief attributions in cases that perhaps are not
paradigm examples of de re belief.
Consider Tony, an ordinary earthling who believes that
aluminum is ductile, but who is unfamiliar with the atomic
facts about aluminum: that its atomic number is 13, its
atomic weight about 26.98, and so on. Does Tony believe the
38 I have ignored one of Lewis's sufficient conditions,
viz., that the description Z "captures the essence" of the
res Y. Lewis observes that "it is unclear that anything is
gained by providing for essence-capturing descriptions as
well as relations of acquaintance." Cf. ibid., p. 155.
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proposition call it 'Al' semantically associated with
the English sentence 'aluminum is ductile'? (Let us assume
that aluminum is only contingently ductile, and therefore
that A1 is not the necessary proposition.)
Consider now a counterfactual situation containing a
near-duplicate of Earth and a microphysical duplicate of
Tony (viz., Twin-Tony). 39 Twin-Tony's planet is just like
Earth except for the fact that there is no aluminum there;
rather, the metal that is called 'aluminum' by those who
speak what is called 'English' where Twin-Tony lives has
guite a different structure than aluminum: its atomic
number is not 13, and so on. However, the metal in Twin-
Tony's world - 'twaluminum'
,
we may as well say - is
qualitatively almost exactly like aluminum, and is used in
exactly the way aluminum is used here on Earth.
Like Tony, Twin-Tony assents to his sentence 'aluminum
is ductile', and to many other sentences about twaluminum:
'some houses have aluminum siding', 'aluminum is abundant in
the Earth's crust', and so on. Indeed, throughout their
lives, Tony and Twin-Tony have always had qualitatively
identical thoughts, perceptions, and experiences. Since
they are psychologically and physically similar in this way,
Tony and Twin-Tony self-ascribe all of the same properties.
39I assume familiarity with Putnam-style thought
experiments. For my purposes here, I do not suppose that
the planet upon which Twin-Tony lives is a this-worldly
counterpart of Earth. Cf. Putnam (1975).
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To return to our question: does Tony believe Al?
Since Tony and Twin-Tony self-ascribe all of the same
properties, on Lewis's view Tony believes Al if and only if
Twin-Tony believes Al also. To believe Al
,
on Lewis's view,
is to self-ascribe the property of inhabiting a world in
which aluminum is ductile. But Twin-Tony is clearly in no
position to self-ascribe such a property, simply because he
has had no causal interaction whatsoever with aluminum.
(Alternatively, we might imagine that there is some aluminum
in Twin-Tony's world - although of course it is not called
'aluminum' - and that it is not ductile there, and also that
Tony knows this. Hence, he would not self-ascribe the
property of inhabiting a world in which aluminum is
ductile
.
)
Since Twin-Tony does not self-ascribe this property,
neither does Tony. According to Lewis, then, Tony doesn't
believe Al. 4 ° Nevertheless Tony believes that aluminum is
ductile. How can this be? Lewis would say that the
sentence 'Tony believes that aluminum is ductile' is not
wholly about Tony's system of belief; instead it is partly
about his psychology, and partly about his environment and
4
°This is not a peculiarity of Lewis's view.
Stalnaker, for example, would also say that Tony does not
believe Al . There is simply a loose connection between
Tony's beliefs and the meanings of the sentences that he
would most naturally use to express them.
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his relationship to it. 41 The most natural way to treat
this sentence, from the perspective of the Property Theory,
is to view it as involving implicit quantification over
relations of acquaintance, making it equivalent to the
following: 'There is a relation of acquaintance R, such
that Tony bears R to aluminum, and only to aluminum, and
Tony self
-ascribes the property of bearing R to something
ductile'
.
It seems to me that Lewis should have to say similar
things about almost all of our ordinary attributions of
belief. Only when we know the essences that natural kind
terms (and perhaps names) express, it appears, may we be in
a position to believe the propositions expressed by natural
language sentences containing those terms.
It might be argued against Lewis's view that it makes
the following, clearly valid, inference come out invalid:
1. Tony believes that aluminum is ductile.
2. Twin-Tony believes everything that Tony believes.
3. Therefore, Twin-Tony believes that aluminum is
ductile
.
The first premise is true since, as Lewis might put it,
there is some relation of acquaintance R such that Tony
bears R only to aluminum and self-ascribes the property of
bearing R to something ductile. (R might be, for example,
41Cf . Lewis (1986), pp. 33-4. There Lewis discusses
the sentence 'Ralph believes that Bernard is a spy' (fn.
25) .
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the relation of having heard of something under the name
'aluminum'.) The second premise is true because Tony and
Twin-Tony self-ascribe all of the same properties, and our
self-ascribed properties exhaust all of our beliefs.
However, the conclusion is obviously false.
This is clearly not a devastating objection, however,
to the view that properties are the objects of belief. if
Lewis wanted to save inferences of this sort, he could reply
that premise (2) is equivocal. On one reading, it does
assert that Twin-Tony self-ascribes every property that Tony
self-ascribes
,
in which case the inference does indeed turn
out to be invalid. But there is another reading of premise
(2), according to which it asserts that if Tony believes, de
re, of an object, that it has any property, then Twin-Tony
also believes de re, of that object, that it has the same
property. (In Lewis's terms: if Tony ascribes a property
to any individual (or kind of individual), then Twin-Tony
also ascribes the property to that individual. Using
Chisholm's helpful terminology: any property that Tony
indirectly attributes to an individual is such that Twin-
Tony indirectly attributes it to the same individual.) On
this reading, Lewis can claim that the inference is indeed a
valid one; however, on this reading, premise (2) turns out
to be false. Tony ascribes ductility to aluminum, but Twin-
Tony does not ascribe ductility to aluminum (he ascribes it
to twaluminum instead)
.
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Much of the remainder of this thesis will be a defense
of the Property Theory as an account of the objects of the
attitudes, and a revision of the way in which Lewis applies
it to de re belief. In chapter 6, I defend the Property
Theory against various objections that have been raised
against it in the literature. In chapter 7, I consider the
Property Theory in the light of some arguments and issues
concerning de re belief. In the next chapter I turn to a
discussion of the relation between the Property Theory and
the Triadic View.
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CHAPTER 4
BELIEF STATES AND SELF-ASCRIBED PROPERTIES
A reputable tradition in twentieth-century
Philosophy of Mind takes belief to be the paradigmatic
propositional attitude - i.e., as ultimately some sort of
relation between the believer and a proposition. The word
proposition' is a technical term, and usage does vary. I
suppose that there are propositions, and make only one
assumption about their nature: each one is either true or
false, and its truth value is not relative to a person, a
time, a language, etc. (although it may be relative to a
possible world or situation).
Perhaps believing a proposition may be understood as
being disposed to behave as if it were true; perhaps it may
be understood as conceiving or grasping the proposition in
some way, and accepting it to some degree. Regardless, the
traditional view that belief is a propositional attitude has
recently come under fire. There is a persuasive argument
against the view that belief is a binary relation between a
subject and a proposition (I suppress mention of the fact
that believing is something that is done at a time, and so
that a time might also be one of the relata). As we have
seen in chapter 2, the argument is implicit in some of
Perry's work on indexical or self-locating belief. 1
xSee especially Perry (1979), reprinted in Salmon and
Soames ( 1988 )
.
One of the argument's premises requires an account of
how a subject's beliefs can explain her behavior. in the
first section of this chapter, I sketch an account that
should suffice for our purposes. I discuss a version of the
argument in the second section. Consideration of this
argument (or something like it) has led some philosophers to
reject the view that belief is in general a propositional
attitude, and to replace it with alternatives. in the third
section, I briefly review two recent alternatives: the
Triadic View and the Property Theory. It may appear at
first that these alternatives are incompatible. However, I
argue in the fourth section that they are consistent with
one another. I also try to show that, on fairly plausible
assumptions, the two views are actually equivalent.
4.1 Explanatory Attribution of Belief
Perry presents his now familiar case of the messy
shopper in the following way:
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket
floor, pushing my trolly down the aisle on one
side of a tall counter and back along the aisle on
the other, seeking the shopper with the torn bag
to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip
around the counter, the trail became thicker. But
I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on
me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. 2
2Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 83.
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To be kind to Perry, let us suppose that the messy
shopper is someone else: call him 'Felix'. Felix is
generally a neat person, and has a standing desire to avoid
making messes. We may even suppose (as Perry suggests) that
before it finally dawned on him that he himself was the
messy shopper, Felix had seen a reflection of a man in a
supermarket mirror and, without realizing that he was
looking at himself, had thought that he had glimpsed the
shopper whom he was trying to catch.
Felix's epiphany is a change in belief - this much, I
think, is uncontroversial
. Somehow, this change in belief
explains his subseguent change in behavior: Felix stops
following the trail of sugar, and stops making a mess (by
rearranging the torn bag of sugar in his grocery cart)
. Let
us say that someone's change in belief explains his
subsequent behavior if the statement that attributes a new
belief to him is one of the premises of a sound, deductive-
nomological argument, the conclusion of which is the
statement that he behaves in the relevant way.
On this conception of psychological explanation, we can
explain why Felix stops making a mess as follows:
(PI) Felix believes himself to be making a mess.
( P2
)
Felix desires to avoid making messes.
( P3 Felix would intend to bring it about that he stops
making a mess, if he both desired to avoid making
messes and believed himself to be making one.
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( P4 ) For all agents a and states of affairs s, if a
intends to bring it about that s, then ceteris
paribus a brings it about that s.
(P5) Ceteris paribus conditions hold for Felix's
intention
.
(C) Felix brings it about that he stops making a mess.
In the above explanation, (PI) attributes to Felix the
new belief, i.e., the belief that he comes to have when the
truth finally dawns on him. We have assumed that Felix has
a standing desire to avoid making messes, and this desire is
attributed to him by (P2). Premise (P3) presents a
dispositional fact about Felix - perhaps it is an instance
of a generalization over a larger domain of agents.
Premise (P4) is a hedged, folk-psychological law
connecting agents' intentions to bring about states of
affairs with their bringing about those states. The law is
hedged by ceteris paribus conditions: conditions that,
along with the antecedent, are sufficient for the
consequent. Such conditions might be (i) that the agent is
able to bring about the state of affairs in question, (ii)
that the agent has no intentions that override the one given
in the antecedent, (iii) that no heavy object falls on the
agent's head before she can bring about the state of
affairs, and so on. (P5) states that in the case of Felix's
intention to stop making a mess, all such conditions hold.
79
On this conception of adequate psychological
explanation
,
the proposition that Felix (brings it about
that he) stops making a mess is a logical consequence of
some empirical propositions and at least one relevant law.
One of the propositions is expressed by an attribution of
belief to Felix - premise (PI). The present-tense sentence
that expresses this proposition becomes true at the time of
Felix's change in belief. For our purposes in this chapter,
Felix's change in belief explains his mess-assuaging
behavior since the new belief attribution is a premise of a
sound, deductive-nomological argument, the conclusion of
which states that Felix behaves in such a way that he stops
making a mess.
4 • 2 The Argument from Explanatory Attribution
Now that we have some idea as to how someone's coming
to believe something can explain some interesting feature of
her behavior, we may take a look at the argument against the
view that coming to believe something is necessarily coming
to believe a new proposition. The reasoning behind each of
the premises should already be somewhat clear from the
preceding chapters. The whole argument can be stated simply
as follows:
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( 1 ) If belief is a binary relation between an agent
and a proposition, then there is a proposition
such that Felix's coming to believe it explains
why he stops making a mess.
(2) There is no proposition such that Felix's coming
to believe it explains why he stops making a mess.
(3) Therefore, belief is not a binary relation between
an agent and a proposition.
Call this 'the argument from explanatory attribution'
.
I do not know whether Perry himself would consider this
argument to be uncontroversially sound. 4 However, as we
have seen in chapter 2, he does use something like the
argument from explanatory attribution to motivate a new view
about the nature of the belief relation.
Premise (1) of the argument is obviously true if we
admit that sometimes our behavior is explainable partly in
terms of our beliefs (given the proviso in footnote 3). If
Felix's belief that he himself is making a mess is just (a
relation between Felix and) a proposition, then his coming
to believe this proposition explains, in virtue of the
argument in section 4.1, why he stops making a mess.
3The word 'belief' in this premise is intended to refer
to whatever relation makes true our true belief-attributions
in natural language. E.g., if Salmon's account of belief
sentences (see chapter 2) is correct, then it refers to the
relation called 'BEL'; even if Salmon refuses to call this
relation 'belief'.
4See, e.g., the section entitled 'Limited Accessibility'
in Perry ( 1979 ) .
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The second premise is somewhat less obvious and
somewhat more controversial; nevertheless, Perry gives us
some reasons to believe it. Premise (2) says that there is
no proposition such that Felix's coming to believe it
explains his behavior. The most plausible candidate for
such a propositional object of Felix's belief appears to be
the proposition that Felix is making a mess. (Whatever sort
of entity this proposition is, it is true if Felix is making
a mess, and false otherwise.) Perhaps it is belief in this
proposition that we attribute to Felix when we say that he
believes himself to be making a mess.
However, it seems that Felix's coming to believe this
proposition - whatever it is - does not explain why he stops
making a mess. As Perry remarks, this is because whatever
sort of thing this proposition is, it seems that Felix could
believe it without believing that he himself is making a
mess: e.g., when he looked into the supermarket mirror,
pointed to himself, and thought 'he is making a mess'.
One way to put this point is to say that belief in the
proposition that Felix is making a mess explains Felix's
behavior only given the additional information that he
believes himself to be Felix (which of course re-introduces
the problem) . In terms of the deductive-nomological
explanation in section one, if it is merely belief in the
proposition that Felix is making a mess that premise (PI) of
the argument attributes to Felix, then (P3) turns out to be
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false. After he looks into the mirror, for example, Felix
himself does not intend to stop making a mess; rather, he
keeps on chasing the messy shopper. Perhaps, to claim that
this proposition is the one that Felix comes to believe as
of his epiphany is to mistakenly think that he was
previously lacking merely de re beliefs about himself,
rather than genuine de se ones.
If there were a more or less qualitative way in which
Felix picked himself out in his thought, this might show
that there is indeed a proposition such that his coming to
believe it explains why he stops making a mess. The
trouble, however, is that Felix has to pick himself out as
himself, so to speak, and not merely as something that he
believes to have a certain property. Perry makes this point
as follows:
even if I was thinking of myself as, say, the only
bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the
Mississippi, the fact that I came to believe that
the only such philosopher was making a mess
explains my action only on the assumption that I
believed that I was the only such
philosopher.
. .
.
5
Returning to the case of Felix and the earlier
explanation of his behavior, premise (PI) says that Felix
believes himself to be making a mess. If this premise means
that for some more or less qualitative property X, Felix
believes the proposition that the thing that has X is making
a mess - e.g., the proposition that the only bearded
sSalmon and Soames (1988), p. 88.
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philosopher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi is
making a mess - then line (P3) again turns out to be false.
Felix could believe any such proposition, it seems, and
desire to avoid making messes, but fail to intend to stop
making a mess.
The case for premise (2) of the argument from
explanatory attribution, then, goes something like this: if
Felix's coming to believe a certain proposition explains his
behavior, then the proposition must be either gualitative or
non-gualitative ; but neither alternative yields a plausible
candidate, since all such candidates are consistent with a
lack of genuine self-belief; so there is no proposition such
that Felix's coming to believe it explains, in the
appropriate way, why he stops making a mess.
4 • 3 Belief States vs. Self-ascribed Properties
Both the Triadic View and the Property Theory of belief
are consistent with the soundness of the argument from
explanatory attribution. I have discussed them,
respectively, in chapters 2 and 3. In this section, I
briefly review these two alternatives to the view that
belief (or whatever makes belief attributions true) is
ultimately a binary relation between a subject and a
proposition.
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The Triadic View says that what often explains
someone's behavior is her believing a certain proposition by
being in a particular belief state. People who are in the
same belief state - e.g., the group of people each of whom
believes himself to be making a mess - will, given some
other similar attitudes, behave alike in a way that is of
central importance to commonsense psychology. On the
Triadic View, the similarity of such behavior is explained
not by which propositions are believed, but instead by the
fact that everyone involved is in the same belief state.
(More precisely, everyone involved is in the same partial
belief state.) Belief states, then, are individuated by the
role that they play with respect to purposeful behavior and
the prediction and explanation of such behavior.
Given the metaphysical view, a guestion about the
English word 'belief' arises: does it express the three-
place relation (viz., BEL) between believer, proposition,
and belief state (believing a proposition by being in a
belief state); or the two-place relation between believer
and proposition believed (or, perhaps the relation between
the believer and whatever characterizes the belief state)?
I discussed this question briefly in Chapter 2, but I will
avoid it here by stating the Triadic View in a way that is
neutral as to whether belief is a binary or a tertiary
relation, as follows:
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(TV) Necessarily, a subject S believes something if and
only if there is a proposition p and a belief
state x such that BEL (S, p, x)
.
Salmon's BEL relation is familiar from chapter 2 - to
say more about it requires an elucidation of the concept of
a belief state, which is one of the tasks of this chapter.
According to (TV), it is the tertiary relation BEL that
makes our belief attributions true.
Most proponents of the Triadic View maintain that the
propositional relata of BEL are structured entities, that
they have absolute truth values, and that it is possible for
two or more people to stand in BEL to the same proposition
while being in different belief states (and perhaps the same
belief state). In addition to these Fregean claims, most
proponents of the Triadic View maintain that it is possible
for someone to stand in BEL to a singular proposition.
Unlike general propositions, singular structured
propositions have at least one constituent which is not a
property or relation of some order: e.g., an ordinary
physical object like a person; or, a time; etc.
Let's return briefly to the case of Felix in the light
of the Triadic View. Since every proposition is such that
Felix could believe it without coming to intend to stop
making a mess, his new intention and subsequent behavior may
be explained only by a change in his belief state. Let us
suppose that Felix believed the singular proposition that
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Felix is making a mess even before he realized that he
himself was the mess-maker. What explains his rearranging
the torn bag of sugar, then, is his coming to be in a new
belief state, in virtue of which he believes the selfsame
singular proposition.
What is it about this new belief state that gives it
such explanatory force? The answer to this question should
depend on a more precise characterization of belief states.
For the time being, let us appeal to the fact that the
belief state is of the sort that, in chapter 2, I called an
I-guise: necessarily, any subject x who is in this belief
state will believe the singular proposition that x is making
a mess, in virtue of being in it.
The Property Theory has also been proposed to solve
Perry's problem. This view implies that what often explains
someone's behavior is her self-ascribing a certain property,
and that the binary relation of self-ascription between a
subject and a property is what makes our belief attributions
true. I might, for example, self-ascribe the property of
being left-handed, and thereby believe myself to be left-
handed; or I might self-ascribe the property of watching a
spy in virtue of watching Ortcutt and only Ortcutt, and
thereby believe that Ortcutt is a spy.
We may formulate the general claim of the Property
Theory as follows:
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(PT) Necessarily, a subject S believes something if and
only if there is a property F such that S self-
ascribes F.
The meaning of (PT) depends in part upon what the word
property' means. In chapter 3, I considered two versions
of the Property Theory, due to Chisholm and Lewis. Despite
the differences in their views about properties, both
philosophers are happy to make use of such properties as the
property of being left-handed, of having heard of someone as
a philosopher called 'Hume', of being such that anything
extended has mass, and so on.
The Property Theory applies straightforwardly to the
case of Felix. At the time of his epiphany, Felix comes to
self-ascribe the property of making a mess; whereas before
that time, he had only self-ascribed a property such as
looking at someone in the next aisle who is making a mess,
or following the sugar trail of the shopper who is making a
mess. On this view, premise (PI) of the earlier deductive-
nomological argument must mean that Felix self-ascribes the
property of making a mess, and it is this self-ascription
that explains the change in his behavior. Earlier, he had
in fact ascribed the property of making a mess to himself;
but this ascription was indirect, obtaining only because he
happened to be the one at whom he was looking in the mirror,
and the one whose trail of sugar he had been following. So,
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there is a difference between (indirectly) ascribing a
property to oneself, and self-ascribing a property.
^ ^ Belief
—States and Self
—ascribed Properties
In this section, I want to make a case for the claim
that in some strong sense, the Triadic View and the Property
Theory are not actually rival theories of belief. I shall
argue that on certain very plausible assumptions (which, if
true, are necessarily true), the two views are actually
equivalent, in the sense that each one entails the other.
Finally, I will attempt to show that the entities posited by
the Triadic View to play a semantic role in theorizing about
belief - viz., believed-true propositions - may be defined
and used by the Property Theory in a systematic way. In
essence, we can take the Property Theory to be a theory of
belief states, which play a theoretical role with respect to
the explanation of behavior, and then define any other
entities that might be needed to play other theoretical
(e.g., semantic) roles. I shall suggest, however, that the
Property Theory enjoys a methodological advantage over the
Triadic View in that it does not need to posit propositions
to explain the sorts of phenomena they are supposed to
explain
.
Let us recall from chapter 2 the first characterization
of belief states as propositional functions. This was
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Lewis's suggestion in his paper "Attitudes De Dicto and De
Se," where he interprets Perry's version of the Triadic View
to imply that there are two objects of belief, viz., (l)
structured propositions, and (2) belief states. m that
paper, Lewis also evaluates Perry's view with respect to his
own version of the Property Theory. He writes:
Perry's proposal must work at least as well as
mine, because mine can be subsumed under his.
Whenever I say that someone self-ascribes a
property X, let Perry say that the first object of
his belief is the pair of himself and the property
X. Let Perry say also that the second object is
the function that assigns to any subject Y the
pair of Y and X. 6
We may take this passage to be an argument for the
conclusion that the Triadic View and the Property Theory are
consistent, since Lewis is maintaining that if the Property
Theory is true, then the Triadic View is also true. Hence,
if Lewis's remarks are plausible, we have a reason to think
that it is possible for both of the views to be true.
However, these remarks appear to be incompatible with
some of what Perry and Salmon, for example, say about the
Triadic View of belief (or, at least, Lewis's suggestion
seems to be incomplete). For clear cases of de se belief,
Lewis's translation schema works well enough: e.g., if I
self-ascribe the property of being left-handed, then (1) the
proposition that I believe is the proposition that Feit is
left-handed, and (2) the belief state that I am in is the
6Lewis (1983a), p. 151.
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function that takes any subject S into the proposition that
S is left-handed - and so the belief state is a way of being
related to a singular proposition about oneself. On the
other hand, Lewis's suggestion seems to leave out some of
what the proponents of the Triadic View say about de re
belief, and in particular some of what they say about the
BEL relation.
Let's suppose that I am in direct perceptual contact
with Ortcutt - e.g., I am watching him - so that on most any
view I can have de re beliefs about him. On the version of
the Triadic View favored by Perry and Salmon, for example,
to have a de re belief about an individual is to stand in
BEL to a singular proposition about that individual, and a
belief state or propositional guise. If I am watching
Ortcutt, then, I can easily come to stand in BEL to a
singular proposition about him. So let us suppose that it
is the proposition that Ortcutt is a spy, and hence that I
believe de re of Ortcutt that he is a spy.
The way in which Lewis accounts for this de re belief,
as we have seen in chapter 3, is as follows: I am watching
Ortcutt and only Ortcutt, and I self-ascribe the property of
watching exactly one person who is a spy. Since watching is
a suitable relation of acquaintance, I thereby believe de re
that Ortcutt is a spy. If Perry were to follow Lewis's
translation schema, however, he would have to say that the
proposition that I believe is the proposition that Feit is
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watching one and only one spy, or, the pair of myself and
the property of watching a unigue spy. Perry might well
want to say this, indeed he should want to say it. The
point is, however, that Lewis's translation procedure gives
Perry no way to say what he clearly wants to say in this
case, viz., that the singular proposition that Ortcutt is a
spy is an object of my belief.
Since the proposition that Ortcutt is a spy and the
proposition that Feit is watching a spy do not have the same
truth conditions, the difference is not trivial. I am not
arguing that Lewis has not shown that his view is "subsumed"
under the Triadic View. I think that Lewis has shown this.
I am arguing that Lewis's procedure by itself does not let
the proponent of the Triadic View say everything that he
wants to say about the objects of belief, since it cannot
generate believed-true singular propositions about any
individual other than the subject of belief. Can Lewis's
suggestion be modified in order to incorporate such
propositions as relata for the BEL relation? I shall
discuss this question shortly, since I think that a worked-
out answer to it will be necessary for any attempt to argue
that the Triadic View and the Property Theory are in a
strong sense equivalent.
Lewis proposed that a belief state is a function that
takes the subject as an argument, and delivers as a value
the proposition that the subject believes. We may not have
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to abandon a general view of belief states along these
lines, but there is now reason to think that we ought to
look for another characterization of a belief state. (There
is also the problem from chapter 2 for an account of belief
states as functions from subjects into propositions: the
two sentences 'Twain is Twain' and 'Clemens is Twain'
characterize two different belief states, but the belief
states are ways of believing the same singular proposition,
and so representing them as functions from subjects into
propositions would wrongly conflate them.) Before we look
for another account, however, I think that it will be
helpful to review briefly some other attempts to say either
what a belief state is, or just when two subjects are in the
same belief state.
I am not concerned with whether belief states are, or
are reducible to, types of brain states or other possibly
disjunctive physical states; although I do think that as a
matter of fact what belief state one is in is determined by
one's intrinsic physical state. Since belief states are
supposed to play a theoretical role with respect to
information-acquisition and the explanation of behavior, one
might be tempted to view them as relations to things that
have semantic or quasi-semantic properties. With this in
mind, we might think of belief states as relations to
sentences, such as the sentence 'I am making a mess'.
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such a view
We have seen that Perry at least entertains
when he suggests that sincere, articulate adults are often
in the same belief state if and only if they are disposed to
utter the same or similar sentences. We have also seen that
this view is implausible, if it is intended as an analysis
of the concept of a belief state, since it denies belief
states to creatures without language, and implies that two
subjects who do not speak the same language cannot be in the
same belief state. (Of course, the proposal is useful as a
heuristic device and as a characterization for creatures
speaking the same language.)
Perhaps we could avoid these difficulties by thinking
of belief states as relations to sentences (i.e., things
with some kind of syntactic structure) of a so-called
language of thought. This may be the view of philosophers
such as Hartry Field and Jerry Fodor, although they do not
use the terminology of the Triadic View. 7 I would rather
not commit myself to the existence of a language of thought,
and moreover, it seems plausible that not all belief needs
to be "tokened" in the head like the sentences of a language
of thought. Regardless, it seems that this view would
suffer at least some of the problems of the previous one,
especially if sentences of the language of thought are
understood as mental tokens of natural language sentences.
This is hardly a thorough look at the language of thought
7See, e.g., Field (1978) and Fodor (1981).
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hypothesis; however, some other conception of a belief state
would be appropriate, I think, even if it turns out to be
correct
.
A tentative proposal about when two subjects are in the
same belief state is given by A. J. Chien. 8 The proposal
is that subjects are in the same belief state if and only if
they are disposed to utter sentences that (1) have the same
character (in roughly Kaplan's sense), and (2) contain pure
indexicals or demonstrative terms of the form 'that F'. 9
This suggestion fares somewhat better than the one that
required subjects to be speakers of the same natural
language in order to share belief states. However, it
appears to be implausible for a few reasons.
First, it seems too restrictive to say that subjects
are in the same belief state only if they are disposed to
utter sentences containing indexical or demonstrative
sentences. Perry himself maintains that belief states may
be classified by sentences without indexicals. For example,
the indexical-free sentences 'Twain is Twain' and 'Clemens
is Twain' serve to classify distinct belief states. Second,
and more important, this view of belief states still denies
belief states to creatures without dispositions to utter
sentences, which surely is untenable.
8Chien (1985).
9See ibid., especially pp. 285-87.
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With this is mind, the next move is perhaps to forget
about dispositions to utter sentences and focus on sentence-
meanings, or characters. Some of Kaplan's remarks suggest
that a belief state is a relation between a subject and a
character. 10 This is more plausible than the previous
views, since it is at least reasonable to think that an
intentional state of a subject without language could
nevertheless be characterized by a meaning. Perhaps
sentences are not the only means of being related to
sentence-meanings
.
On the present view, Felix believes the proposition
that he is making a mess in virtue of being related to a
certain character, which happens to be the character of the
sentence 'I am making a mess'. In this case the character
is a function from possible contexts into propositions,
where the value for any context is the singular proposition
about the agent of the context to the effect that he or she
is making a mess.
We have seen in chapter 2 that Salmon argues for the
conclusion that belief states cannot in general be taken to
be characters of sentences. (X will not review the argument
here; but the point is that taking belief states to be
characters would conflate distinct belief states, since a
subject could in effect understand the very same sentence,
and hence the same character, in different ways.) Salmon
1QSee Kaplan (1977), published in Almog et. al. (1989).
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himself does not offer much in the way of a positive
characterization of belief states; however, this is because
he is primarily interested in the logic, rather than the
metaphysics, of belief, salmon's claim is that there is
more to the logical form of belief attributions than a two-
place relation of assent between a subject and a proposition
(the relation that Salmon calls 'belief').
In his paper "What is a Belief State?" Curtis Brown
proposes that we take belief states to be relations between
subjects and the properties that they self-ascribe
.
"Following David Lewis and Roderick Chisholm," Brown writes,
"I suggest that belief states are best characterized by
properties." 11 Although neither Lewis nor Chisholm employs
the terminology of belief states, perhaps this is an
explicit statement of their original, general view, i.e.,
that (the object or content) of a subject's belief state is
not some mysterious indescribable entity; but rather is a
property that the subject self-ascribes
.
I would like to argue that the assumption that the
objects of belief states are properties is correct, and
hence that the Triadic View and the Property Theory are
equivalent. (This will not affect the characterization of
belief states given in chapter 2, before we had discussed
the Property Theory, since that characterization in terms of
propositional functions is trivially equivalent to the one
xlBrown (1986), p. 358.
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in terms of properties.) The technical notion of being In a
belief state is left unanalyzed (but, hopefully, understood)
by Perry, as is the technical notion of self-ascribing a
property by Lewis and Chisholm. There is good reason to
think that there really is only one notion at stake.
For example, being in the belief state that disposes a
sincere, articulate speaker of English to utter 'I am making
a mess' seems to be the same thing as self-ascribing the
property of making a mess. In fact, taking belief states to
be self-ascribed properties explains why two (articulate,
sincere) people who are in the same belief state may be
disposed to utter similar sentences of this form, a fact
that Perry does not explain. This is because a sentence of
the form 'I am such-and-such' is typically used by a speaker
to express a self-ascription. So, if Smith and I are both
disposed to utter 'I am left-handed', this may be explained
in terms of the fact that we both self-ascribe the same
property - viz., being left-handed. This explains our
dispositions in a way that merely saying that we are both in
the belief state that disposes people who are in it to say
'I am left-handed' does not.
Taking belief states to be self-ascribed properties
also accounts for the way in which belief states are
individuated. Self-ascribed properties play the same
theoretical role in explanation that belief states are
supposed to play. If we can explain, for example, why Felix
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rearranges the torn bag of sugar in his grocery cart by
appealing to the fact that he is in the belief state that
disposes one to say 'I am making a mess', then we can also
explain this behavior by appealing to the fact that he self-
ascribes the property of making a mess (and vice versa). We
ought to conclude, then, that self-ascriptions play exactly
the same theoretical role that belief states are expected to
play.
We have just argued for the claim that if any subject s
self ascribes a property x, then x characterizes s's belief
state; and if x characterizes s's belief state, then s self-
ascnbes x. More precisely (taking 'B*' to denote the
relation between a subject and the object of her belief
state), we may affirm the following principle: necessarily,
for all subjects s and for any x, B*(s, x) if and only if s
se
-*-f
~
ascr:*-kes x * (The weaker claim that there is a trivial
one-one correspondence between self-ascribed properties and
belief states would do just as well.) This, together with
one other item, will let us show that the Triadic View and
the Property Theory are equivalent, in the sense that (TV)
implies (PT), and (PT) implies (TV).
The other item is the claim that when one is in a
belief state, there is always a proposition that one
believes. This may be stated precisely with the following:
necessarily, for all subjects s and all belief states x, if
B* ( s
,
x)
,
there is a proposition p such that BEL( s , p, x) .
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This is accepted as axiomatic by proponents of the Triadic
View, who consider belief states to be a sort of means of
grasping propositions. Moreover, earlier we saw that Lewis
has shown that the claim is true: if i, for example, self-
ascribe a property f (if I am in a belief state that is
characterized by the property f), then I will believe the
singular proposition that I have f. A subject will always
have such access to a singular proposition about himself.
So, even if we do not think that this second principle is
analytic, we may note that what makes it true is the fact
that if B*(s, f), then BEL(s
,
<s,f>, f).
On these very plausible assumptions, it is easy to see
that (TV) and (PT) are equivalent. We can show that they
are equivalent if we can show that necessarily, for all
subjects s, there is a proposition p and a belief state x
such that BEL(s, p, x) if and only if there is a property f
such that s self-ascribes f. This follows from the two
principles just mentioned (together with the fact that if
BEL(s, p, x) then B*(s, x)
,
for any s, p and x).
Property theorists say that we self-ascribe various
sorts of properties, e.g., the properties of being left-
handed, being such that anything extended has mass, and
looking at one and only one person who is a spy. Proponents
of the Triadic View maintain that we believe various sorts
of propositions, e.g., the propositions that anything
extended has mass, and that Ortcutt is a spy. The truth or
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falsehood of the proposition, on this view, is what makes
for believing truly or believing falsely. Believed-true
propositions may also account for (one kind of) shared
belief if I believe that London is pretty and so do you,
then what we share is belief in the same proposition - and
for continued belief over time - if I believed in 1988 that
I was a ski bum, and if I remember that fact for the rest of
my days, then I will have continued to believe the same
proposition, viz., that I was a ski bum in 1988 .
The Property Theory by itself has the means to account
for these phenomena. However, if the property theorist
wishes to join the proponent of the Triadic View and explain
them in terms of believed true propositions, it would be
nice to be able to do so. In the remainder of this section,
I will try to show how the property theorist can do this, by
giving some general principles connecting facts about a
given subject's self-ascriptions and, when necessary, the
situation in which she is located, with facts about which
proposition or propositions she thereby believes.
Given the various explanations offered by proponents
of the Triadic View, it appears that the identity of any
believed-true proposition must depend upon the particular
sort of property that the subject self-ascribes
. For
example, if I self-ascribe the property of being an uncle,
then I believe the singular proposition that I am an uncle;
but if I self-ascribe the property of being such that there
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are spies, then I believe the general proposition that there
are spies (as well as the singular proposition that I am
such that there are spies, which is not logically equivalent
to the general one).
Let us proceed by distinguishing properties that
correspond to propositions from those that do not. Again,
if I self-ascribe the property of being such that not all
swans are white, then the proposition that I believe to be
true, according to the Triadic View, is the corresponding
proposition that not all swans are white. We may note that
actually, if something happens to be such that not all swans
are white, then everything else also is such that not all
swans are white. With this in mind, we may locate a certain
class of properties, which for lack of a better term I will
call de dicto properties, by means of the following
definition:
(DD) property f is de dicto =df necessarily, if there
is an x such that x has f then for any y, y has f.
Some examples of de dicto properties are the properties
of being such that there are spies, and being such that not
all swans are white. Each of these properties also has a
proposition that corresponds to it: in general, the
proposition that corresponds to a de dicto property is the
proposition that, of necessity, is true if and only if
something has the property. I should note that (DD) implies
that properties like being red or not red, or being round
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and square, are de dicto properties, the former because it
is a necessary truth that everything has it, and the latter
because it is impossible that something should have it.-
We will want to say that if someone self-ascribes a de
dicto property, then she has the corresponding proposition
as an object of belief. Since not all properties are de
dicto, however, we must consider the cases in which someone
self-ascribes a non-de dicto property. One such property is
the property of watching one and only one spy - someone can
have this property while someone else lacks it. I will call
a property like this a de re property, and I suggest the
following definition:
(DR) property f is de re =df f is not de dicto; and
necessarily, for all x, if x has f then there is a
y such that x bears a relation of acquaintance to
y. 13
I have discussed the notion of a relation of acquaintance in
chapter 3. To the extent that it is a vague notion, (DR) is
also vague; but this should not be troublesome here. For
12This will be inconsequential to my project in the
rest of this chapter. We could rule out such properties by
requiring a de dicto property to be contingent; but this
move would exclude from the class of de dicto properties
such ones as the property of being such that no bachelors
are married.
13The first clause of the definiens is needed to rule
out properties like being such that everyone is watching
someone. Intuitively, this property is de dicto; but
whoever has it does indeed bear a relation of acquaintance
(viz., watching) to someone.
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convenience, I will not consider identity to be a relation
Of acquaintance.
Finally
,
we will need the notion of a de se property.
If a subject self
-ascribes such a property, then he has as
an object of belief the singular proposition, about himself,
to the effect that he has the property. We may give the
following simple definition:
(DS) property f is de se =df . f is neither de dicto nor
de re
.
Clearly, (DD), (DR) and (DS) divide the class of properties
into three exhaustive and exclusive groups.
It will be helpful, I think, to list some properties in
order to show where they fall under this classification
scheme. Consider the following six properties:
1. being wise
2. being an uncle
3. watching someone who is a spy
4 . looking at someone whose sister I remember
5. being such that anything extended has mass
6. being such that there are sticks and stones.
The first property is de se, since someone could have it
while someone else lacks it, and someone could have it at a
time without bearing a relation of acquaintance to anything
at that time. The second is also de se, even though anyone
who has it does bear some sort of relation to someone else.
The third is de re, since anyone who has it is watching
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someone, and watching is a relation of acquaintance. The
fourth is also de re, and it implies the holding of two
distinct relations of acquaintance. The fifth is de dicto,
but does not imply the existence of anything apart from that
which has it (there might be a world without extension in
which a single Cartesian mind has this property). Finally,
the sixth is also de dicto, although no conscious subject
could have it without there also being some things in
existence apart from the subject.
Suppose now that the Property Theory says that a given
subject s self-ascribes any property f. The property f will
either be de se, de dicto, or de re: it must belong to one
of these classes, and it cannot belong to more than one of
them. So, let us consider each of them in turn. First,
suppose that s's self-ascribed property f is a de se
property. in this case, we let the Triadic View say that
the believed-true proposition is the singular proposition
that s is f. This accords with what the proponents of the
Triadic View maintain about such a case. We now have the
first of our three principles: if s self-ascribes f, and f
is de se, then BEL( s , <s,f>, f).
Second, suppose that s's self-ascribed property f is a
de dicto property. In this case, we let the Triadic View
say that s believes the proposition that s has f, and the
proposition that corresponds to the de dicto property. Call
this latter proposition 'pf ': necessarily, for any de dicto
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f/ Pf is true if and only if something has f. So, if f is
the property of being such that there are sticks and stones,
then pf is the proposition that is true if and only if
something is such that there are sticks and stones, which is
the proposition that there are sticks and stones.-
We can now affirm the second of our three principles
connecting the Triadic View to the Property Theory: if s
self
-ascribes f and f is de dicto, then (1) BEL( s , <s,f>, f)
and (2) BEL( s , pf , f). If f is de dicto in virtue of being
a necessary or impossible property, then p f will either be
necessary or impossible as well. For example, if I self-
ascribe the property of being human or not human, then this
propositional object of my belief will be true if and only
if something is either human or not human, and hence will be
the necessary proposition. Again, those who maintain that
there are many distinct necessary propositions may wish to
say that in this case I believe only one of them, perhaps
one that can be recovered from the property that I self-
ascribe. Another possibility would be to claim that if f is
de dicto but either necessary or impossible, then a subject
who self-ascribes f need not believe the proposition pf .
14 It may also be the proposition that there are stones
and sticks, which, although necessarily equivalent to the
first, is distinct from it on most views of propositions
favored by Triadic View theorists. I will basically ignore
such complications in this chapter. pf could be taken to be
a class of equivalent propositions, all of which the subject
believes to be true. Then again, if the property f itself
is a structured entity, there may be some non-arbitrary way
to find a unique corresponding proposition.
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However, I am not much interested in cases having to do with
believing the necessary or impossible.
Finally, suppose that s's self-ascribed property f is a
de re property. This case is somewhat more complicated than
the previous two, for a few reasons. First, it seems that
most proponents of the Triadic View will want to say that
which propositions are believed depends upon whether or not
a res is actually present, i.e., whether or not s really
does bear a relation of acquaintance to something. And
second, some de re properties imply multiple acquaintance
relations - e.g., the property of looking at an x and
remembering a y such that y is the sister of x - which can
get a bit messy. For simplicity, I suppose here that all de
re properties have the following sort of form: bearing R to
just one thing and to something that has the property g. 15
this simplifying assumption, if s self-ascribes f
and f is de re, then f will be a property like: bearing R
to exactly one thing that has g. I might, for example,
self-ascribe the property of watching one and only one spy.
On the pictures of de re belief sketched by philosophers who
hold the Triadic View, if I really happen to be watching a
spy, then one of the things that I believe - propositionally
15R is a relation of acquaintance, as required by the
definition (DR) in the text. An example of a property of
this form is the property of watching a (unique) spy - where
R is the relation of watching and g is the property of being
a spy. This form should be familiar from the discussion of
Chisholm and Lewis in chapter 3.
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speaking is the singular proposition about the individual
x whom I am watching, to the effect that x is a spy. Like
Macbeth and his dagger, however, it might happen that I
self-ascribe the property of watching a spy without actually
watching anybody - i.e., without actually bearing the
acquaintance relation to anything that I could conceivably
believe to be a spy. i might hallucinate, for instance. in
such a case, it seems that I do not believe a singular
proposition about any x distinct from myself to the effect
that x is a spy. What, then, do I believe? Let us consider
these cases in turn.
The first case is that in which I do bear the relation
of acquaintance to a res . 16 if someone self-ascribes a
property of the form: bearing R to something that has g,
let us call R 'the self-ascribed relation of acquaintance'.
From the above discussion of this case, if our subject s
bears the self-ascribed relation of acquaintance to an
individual, then s believes, according to the Triadic View,
a singular proposition about that individual, with respect
to cases in which a subject does not bear the self-ascribed
relation of acquaintance to anything, we must say only that
he believes a singular proposition about himself, to the
16It might be argued that even when I am hallucinating
a spy, I am still watching something: perhaps a location in
space, or a portion of the atmosphere. I cannot address
this argument here; although I do think that either it can
be refuted, or else the problems it raises can be handled
plausibly.
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effect that he has the self-ascribed property (just as in
the other cases). So, if I self-ascribe the property of
watching a spy without watching anything, then I believe
only the singular proposition that I am watching a Spy.»
When a property f has the form: bearing R to something
that has g, I will call g 'the indirect property of f * or
' Ind( f ) ' . 18 we may now give the third principle connecting
the self-ascription of properties with the believing of
propositions by being in belief states: (a) if s self-
ascribes f, and f is de re, and there is an object o such
that s bears the self-ascribed relation of acguaintance to
o, then (1) BEL( s , <s,f>, f) and (2) BEL( s , <o,Ind(f)>, f);
and (b) if s self-ascribes f, and f is de re, but it is not
true that there is an o such that s bears the self-ascribed
relation of acquaintance to o, then BEL( s , <s,f>, f). 19
If the previous simplifying restriction on the form of
de re properties were dropped, the treatment would have to
be generalized to cover the more complex sorts of these
17There may be other plausible ways to handle such
cases. Some might want to say, for example, that what I
believe is a singular proposition involving some of my sense
data or some item of mental experience, such as a visual
image
.
18After Chisholm's notion of indirect attribution.
19The antecedent of part (a) would be true if s stood
in the relation of acquaintance to several things, or to
each of several things, instead of just one. For now, let
us assume that if a subject bears a relation of acquaintance
to something, then she bears it only to that thing. I
discuss de re beliefs about pluralities and the individuals
of pluralities in chapter 7.
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properties
.
It seems to me that the generalization would be
fairly straightforward, if somewhat tedious, and so would
raise no new issues with respect to the project of finding
believed-true, singular propositions to correspond to self-
ascribed de re properties
.
20
Finally, I would like to take another look at the case
of Felix in the light of these considerations. it may have
been the case, when Felix first noticed the trail of sugar
on the floor, that he had a merely de dicto belief to the
effect that the shopper with the torn bag was making a mess.
(It may have been the case, perhaps; but more likely Felix
identified the shopper in relation to himself, as the person
who created the trail of sugar he was following, and so had
a de re belief about himself.) When Felix sees himself in
the mirror, he clearly has a de re belief about himself. He
looks at himself (without self-ascribing the property of
being an x who is looking at x), and says something like 'he
is making a mess!'.
From the point of view of the Property Theory, along
with the principles just discussed, Felix at this point
self-ascribes a property such as looking at exactly one
2
°We may also want principles that generate other de re
beliefs in certain cases. For example, if I self-ascribed
the property of looking at a globe that is orange all over,
in virtue of looking at a globe that is orange all over,
then perhaps I would believe, of the top half of the globe,
that it is orange, and so on. But would I also believe a de
re proposition about the back half of the globe, which I do
not even see?
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person who is making a mess - and, in virtue of the facts
that the property is de re and he is looking at himself and
nobody else, he believes the singular proposition that he is
making a mess.
Why, then, doesn't he begin to tidy up, or at least
check to see what the problem is? The answer to this
guestion is that Felix does not yet self-ascribe the
property of making a mess: he thus believes the singular
proposition by self-ascribing a de re property, rather than
a de se one. From the fact that he believes the proposition
that Felix is making a mess we cannot infer anything about
his behavior; regardless of how much we know about his
physical abilities and his desire for cleanliness.
When the truth finally dawns on him (when he comes to
self-ascribe properties like being an x such that x saw x in
the mirror, and having made a trail of sugar on the floor),
Felix comes to self-ascribe the de se property of making a
mess. This, and not his believing a singular proposition,
is what explains why he rearranges his bag of sugar. (Of
course, from the first principle above, he could not self-
ascribe this property without believing the proposition that
he is making a mess.) The change in belief that explains
his subsequent behavior, then, must be a change in self-
ascription, and need not be a change in believed-true
propositions at all.
Ill
CHAPTER 5
PROPOSITIONS RECONSIDERED
In the last few chapters, we have considered some
alternatives to the doctrine of propositional objects of
belief. These alternatives were proposed to handle problems
about indexical belief in general, and de se or self-
locating belief in particular. In the present chapter, I
wish to consider an attempt to solve these problems within
the framework of the view that takes belief to be (or to be
ultimately analyzable in terms of) a binary relation between
a conscious subject and an abstract proposition. For the
moment, let us assume only that propositions are things that
are either true or false; and not merely true or false for a
person, at a time or a place, and so on.
Although many philosophers maintain that all of our
beliefs about ourselves are beliefs in propositions, I will
focus on the work of one philosopher, Robert Stalnaker, who
has considered the allegedly problematic de se cases in some
detail, and who argues that the doctrine of propositional
objects of belief is amenable to the data concerning
indexical belief. I will discuss only briefly the views of
others who share Stalnaker' s general thesis. In the last
section of the chapter, I consider what I take to be an
important test case for, and an argument against, the
doctrine of propositional objects of belief: this is
Lewis's puzzling case of the two gods (see chapter 3).
5 ‘ 1 The Doctri ne of Propositions and De Se Bel i Pf
Stalnaker focuses on John Perry's case of the amnesiac
lost in the library. Perry writes as follows:
An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in theStanford library. He reads a number of thinas inthe library, including a biography of himself, anda detailed account of the library in which he islost He still won't know who he is, and wherehe is, no matter how much knowledge he piles up
until that moment when he is ready to say,
This place is ... Main Library, Stanford.
I am Rudolf Lingens. 1
Distinguishing what this man Lingens believes or knows,
on the one hand, from what he doesn't, on the other,
Stalnaker glosses the example thus:
He . . . knows guite a bit about Rudolf Lingens. Heknows, for example, that Lingens is a distant
cousin of a notorious spy. But he does not know
that he is Lingens - that he is a distant cousin
of a notorious spy. No matter how complete the
biography, it will not by itself give him the
information he lacks. 2
The problem for Stalnaker has two parts. The first
part is to identify the proposition that the amnesiac
Lingens believes, say, when he believes that Lingens is a
cousin of a spy. The second is to identify the distinct
proposition that Lingens would come to believe, were he to
learn that he himself is a cousin of a spy. Distinguishing
these two propositions is important because, on the view
1Perry (1977), p. 492. Lingens is a character in
Gottlob Frege's "Thoughts," in Salmon and Soames (1988).
Cf . the case of the war hero in Castaneda (1968).
2Stalnaker (1981), p. 130.
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that propositions are the objects of belief, the fact that
Lingens comes to believe the second proposition may explain
some interesting feature of his behavior, something that his
believing the first proposition could not explain. For
example, we may suppose that when Lingens learns from the
biography that Lingens is currently lost in Main Library, he
just continues to read; but when he to comes to believe that
he himself is lost in Main Library, he consults the detailed
account of the library in search of a way out.
We should at this point consider Stalnaker's concept of
a proposition in somewhat greater detail. On Stalnaker's
view, a proposition is a function from possible worlds into
truth values: propositions "are ways of dividing a space of
possibilities - ways of picking out some subset from a set
of alternative ways that things might be." 3 This
conception of a proposition lets Stalnaker say that to
believe something is directly to rule out certain
possibilities while retaining others. The object of a
belief is, roughly, a rule for doing this.
According to the present view, "propositions are not
structured entities with concepts, objects or senses as
parts; they are not complexes which reflect the grammatical
or semantic structure of the sentences that express them." 4
What about possible worlds, in terms of which propositions
3Ibid.
,
p. 134
.
4Ibid
.
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are defined? stalnaker takes these to be abstract entities
of some sort, something like maximal properties that the
world might have, or might have had." 5
Stalnaker seems to maintain that just as context helps
to determine the attributed proposition in a belief report,
it also helps to determine what counts as a possible world
in the very beliefs of the subject. He writes:
The alternative possibilities used to definepropositions must be exclusive alternatives which
are maximally specific, relative to the
distinctions that might be made in the context athand. But one can make sense of this reguirement
even if there is no ultimate set of possibilities
relative to which any possible distinctions mightbe made. 6
Consider, for example, Perry's case of the messy
shopper. On Stalnaker 's view, there may be a time - e.g.,
when Perry points to a reflection of himself in the mirror
and says "he is making a mess!" - at which Perry believes a
proposition that is true at a unique world in which Perry
himself is pushing around a very tidy grocery cart, while
someone else is leaving a sugary trail. This state of
affairs counts as a possible world, with respect to Perry's
beliefs, even though it is not specific about many things -
for example, about whether or not the messy shopper is a
philosopher, or has any children. This point will be
relevant to the proposal considered in the next section.
5Ibid.
,
pp. 134-5. In this thesis I do not consider
issues about the ontological status of possible worlds.
6Ibid.
,
p. 135.
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5
- 2 Stalnaker 's Snlni-inn
With Stalnaker ' s view of propositions in mind, let us
return to the case of Lingens lost in the library. if each
of Lingens 's beliefs is a relation between Lingens and some
proposition, then there is a proposition that he believes
when, while lost in the library, he believes that Lingens is
a cousin of a spy. Which proposition does he believe?
Stalnaker proceeds by enumerating the possible worlds
that are relevant to attributing to Lingens the belief that
Lingens is a cousin of a spy. He gives an illustrative
account of the example, according to which there are three
such worlds - called i, j and k. Two of these worlds are
compatible with everything that Lingens believes. The other
possible world, however, is not one of Lingens 's "belief
worlds": he rules out this world when he believes that
Lingens is a cousin of a spy. Stalnaker writes: "in all
possible worlds compatible with Lingens 's beliefs, there is
a person named 'Lingens 7 about whom a biography was
written.... [T]he subject of this biography is a distant
cousin of a notorious spy." 7
The possible worlds or situations i, j and k are
described by Stalnaker as follows:
Situation i is the actual situation. Lingens, the
amnesiac, is the subject of the biography, and is
a cousin of a spy. But in situation j, the
7Ibid.
,
p. 136
.
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l0graPhY °f ^ensT™^ som^fa^flai . Lingens 2's cousin is not a spy in k!*
In the actual situation, Lingens comes to believe that
Lingens is a cousin of a spy as a result of reading a token
of the sentence 'Lingens is a cousin of a spy'. This
sentence expresses in English a certain proposition.
Stalnaker writes that "this token exists, not only in the
actual situation, but also in the other two possible
situations I have described."’ This observation might make
one wonder just which proposition is expressed in each
possible world, by the token that occurs in that world.
In order to determine which proposition is expressed by
a token of 'Lingens is a cousin of a spy', Stalnaker assumes
that a certain semantic account of the sentence is true.
This account implies that the name 'Lingens' designates
rigidly a certain individual, and that the predicate 'is a
8Ibid., p. 137. Stalnaker wants worlds i and j to becompatible with Lingens 's beliefs. He writes that "in the
original story, Lingens does not believe that he is not
Lingens. He doesn't have an opinion one way or the other
about who he is" (p. 136). World k is supposed to be
incompatible with Lingens 's beliefs, and hence it cannot
characterize any proposition that he believes. Presumably
Stalnaker includes world k in order to show which sorts of
worlds are ruled out by the proposition Lingens believes.
9Ibid. Stalnaker notes that even if the sentence
tokens in the different possible situations are distinct, it
suffices that they "are epistemic counterparts for Lingens"
(fn. 14 )
.
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a certain relational
cousin of a spy' expresses
property,
such that the proposition expressed by the entire sentence
is true if and only if the designated individual has the
property expressed by the predicate.
Here is how Stalnaker evaluates the token of the
sentence in the actual world:
in situation i, the name 'Lingens' riqidlvdesignates Lingens - our Lingens, the amnesiac,his person is a cousin of a spy in situation i
a COUSln ° f a spy in j or in k. So theproposition expressed by the sentence is the onethat is true at i, but false at the other two
situations. 10
Stalnaker continues to evaluate the sentence token as it
occurs in the other two possible worlds that are relevant to
attributing belief to Lingens:
in situation j, the occurrence of 'Lingens' inquestion rigidly designates a different person,
Lingens 2. This man is a cousin of a spy at j
#
but presumably does not exist at all at i, and' is
not a cousin of a spy in k. Hence the proposition
expressed by the token as it occurs in j is the
one that is false at i, true at j, and false at k.
In k, the name also rigidly designates Lingens 2,
so the same proposition is expressed as is
expressed in j . 11
In "Indexical Belief," Stalnaker uses what he calls a
propositional concept to help summarize the facts that he
has given above about the propositions expressed by the
sentence 'Lingens is a cousin of a spy'. In an earlier
paper, "Assertion," he gives the following definition: "[a]
10Ibid., pp. 137-8.
“Ibid.
,
p. 138
.
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propositional concept is a function from possible worlds
into propositions, or, equivalently, a function from an
ordered pair of possible worlds into a truth value. The
propositional concept for the sentence 'Lingens is a cousin
of a spy' is represented in the following matrix:
i j k
i T F F
j F T F
k F T F
In the matrix, the horizontal lines represent the
proposition that is expressed by the sentence 'Lingens is a
cousin of a spy' in each of the relevant possible
situations. So, the proposition expressed by the sentence
in world i is true at i but false at j and k, and so on, as
Stalnaker has claimed. Since the same proposition is
expressed in j and k, only two propositions are represented
horizontally in the matrix.
This sort of approach to the example starts with a
question about just which possibilities are, or are not,
compatible with Lingens 's beliefs. Stalnaker uses the
propositional concept above to try to determine the content
of the belief we attribute to Lingens when we say, while he
is still lost in the library, that he believes that Lingens
is a cousin of a spy:
12Stalnaker (1978), p. 318.
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iLi S T Clear fS°m the description of the examplethat Lingens does not know whether he is insituation i or situation j, although he doesthat he ls not in k, since he believesthat what the biography says is true. it followsthat he does not believe either of the twopropositions represented by the rows of the
m
K
tr
i
X * Xt also foHows that he does not know
which of the two propositions the sentence in thebiography expresses. But he does believe this-
whichever proposition the sentence expresses it
i
S Ltrue one - T1?is is whY he can safely assentto the statement in the biography
.
13
According to Stalnaker, Lingens 's belief that Lingens
is a cousin of a spy does not enable him to exclude either
world i or world j from the set of worlds compatible with
his beliefs. For all he believes, either of these worlds
might be actual. If Lingens believed either one of the
propositions represented horizontally in the matrix,
however, he would be able to exclude one world or the
other - since neither proposition is true at both worlds.
So, Lingens does not believe either one of these
propositions
.
On the other hand, Lingens 's belief that Lingens is a
cousin of a spy does allow him to exclude world k from the
set of worlds compatible with his beliefs. This is because
in k the subject of the biography is not a cousin of a spy.
Stalnaker thinks that we should conclude from all of this
that the object of Lingens 's belief is the proposition that
is true at both i and j but false at k. This proposition is
(equivalent to) the proposition that the sentence 'Lingens
“Stalnaker (1981), p. 138.
120
IS a cousin of a spy' expresses a truth (evaluated at the
world in which it occurs). Stalnaker writes:
This is a different proposition from either of theones represented by rows of the matrix, but it isrepresented on the matrix: it is the diagonalproposition, the proposition that is truest x(for each x) if and only if the proposition
expressed in x is true at x. This proposition i
he
9!®
',,
13 thS belief that Lin9ens expresses ^hensays Lingens is a cousin of a spy,' and thebelief we ascribed when we wrote that Lingensbelieves that Lingens is a [cousin of a] spy indescribing the example. 14
Saying that the diagonal proposition is the object of
Lingens 's belief that Lingens is a cousin of a spy will
allow Stalnaker to say that, were Lingens to learn that he
himself is a cousin of a spy, he would come to believe the
proposition represented in the first row of the matrix. if
we don't restrict the class of possible worlds to the three
in question, then presumably this proposition is equivalent
to the singular proposition, about Lingens, to the effect
that he is a cousin of a spy. Only when he learns this
proposition is he ready to exclude world j from the set of
worlds compatible with his beliefs.
Let me now summarize Stalnaker 's approach to the
problem of reconciling the doctrine of propositional objects
of belief with the phenomena involving indexical belief.
The problem, with respect to the Lingens case, is somehow to
distinguish two different propositions that can plausibly
serve as the objects of Lingens's beliefs: first, his
14 Ibid
.
,
pp. 138-9 .
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"third-personal" belief that Lingens is a cousin of a
spy ; 15 and second, his "first-personal" belief that he
himself is a cousin of a spy. on the view that belief is a
binary relation between a conscious subject and an abstract
proposition, these two propositions must be different, since
Lingens behaves differently when he comes to believe the
second in addition to (or rather than) the first.
According to Stalnaker, the context of our discourse in
general - and our discourse about the psychological states
of others in particular - often restricts the domain of
possible worlds in which we are interested. Stalnaker, in
his discussion of the Lingens example, makes the simplifying
assumption that the case requires us to consider only three
possible worlds. The relevant propositions, then, are
functions from each of these three worlds into truth values.
There are many ways in which the biography that Lingens
reads might have been written about someone else - some
other person who happens to be the cousin of a spy. One of
these is world j; but there are countless others. Likewise,
there are many ways in which Lingens 's belief might have
turned out to be false. One of these is world k; but again,
there are others: the subject of the biography might have
15Stalnaker, it seems to me, does not want to say that
this is a de re belief, or a belief about Lingens (see esp.
(1981), p. 136). I find many of Stalnaker's remarks on de
re belief puzzling (e.g., pp. 140-41), and partly for this
reason I will not discuss the issue here. See also Austin
(1990), chapter 5 (esp. pp. 93-97).
122
been a cousin of an electrician, or nobody's cousin at all.
The differences between these possibilities, Stalnaker
presumes, are not relevant to Lingens's beliefs or to the
context in which we are attributing belief to Lingens.
In order to attribute a belief to Lingens, Stalnaker
says, we need to know something about how Lingens conceives
the world. Three different possibilities are relevant to
this example: in the first, he himself is the subject of
the biography; in the second, someone else is; and in the
third, the subject of the biography, whoever he is, is not
actually a cousin of a spy. For all that Lingens believes,
the first situation might be actual. The same goes for the
second situation. We have seen, however, that Lingens has
ruled out the third possibility.
According to Stalnaker, the propositional object of the
belief that we attribute to Lingens, when we say that he
believes that Lingens is a cousin of a spy, is true at the
first possible situation, true at the second, and false at
the third - it is the diagonal proposition of the matrix
shown earlier. We might compare this with a Fregean view
according to which the sense Lingens associates with the
name 'Lingens' is something like the individual concept:
being the person named 'Lingens' who is the subject of a
certain biography.
If someone were to tell Lingens that he is Rudolf
Lingens, a cousin of a notorious spy, then he would come to
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believe (assuming that he would believe what he was told) a
proposition that is true at the first situation above, but
false at the other two. There may be some question as to
whether the proposition represented by the first row of the
matrix - i.e., the one semantically associated with the
English sentence 'Lingens is a cousin of a spy' - would be
the object of Lingens's new belief that he himself is a
cousin of a spy. I discuss this issue in the next section
of the chapter.
It might be helpful to contrast briefly Stalnaker's
view of the example with two other recent and influential
theories about the objects of belief and other attitudes
.
16
According to a theory like the Triadic View, Lingens does
not come to believe a new proposition when he learns or
infers that he himself is a cousin of a spy. Lingens (we
may assume) believes all along the singular proposition
consisting of Lingens and the property of being a cousin of
a spy, under some guise or other, or in virtue of being in
some belief state or other. Rather, when he comes to
believe that he himself is a cousin of a spy, Lingens
believes the same proposition in a new way: by being in a
different belief state, or believing it under a different
16Stalnaker is careful to avoid giving a theory about
the semantics for belief sentences. In a footnote to
(1981), he warns that "I am not proposing the hypothesis
that in general x believes that p is true if and only if x
believes the diagonal proposition of the propositional
concept for the expression that p" (fn. 16).
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guxse - an I-guise. Perhaps this guise is to be identified
with the meaning, or character, of the sentence 'I am a
cousin of a spy'. The new way in which Lingens comes to
believe the same proposition explains the subsequent change
in his behavior, so that change in belief is not necessarily
change in believed-true propositions.
According to a theory like the Property Theory, the
object (or, using Chisholm's terminology, the content) of
someone's belief is a property rather than a proposition. A
person has the various beliefs that he or she has in virtue
of self-ascribing, or directly attributing to himself or
herself, certain properties - entities that are neither true
nor false. (In chapter 4, I argued that the theory of
belief states and that of self-ascribed properties are not
really different theories.)
On Lewis's version of this view, for example, all along
Lingens has ascribed (indirectly) to Lingens the property of
being a cousin of a spy; but of course Lingens has not yet
self-ascribed this property. Rather, Lingens must have
self-ascribed some such property as the property of reading
a biography of someone named 'Lingens' who is a cousin of a
spy. Since Lingens was in fact reading about himself, he
did ascribe (or indirectly attribute, as Chisholm would say)
the property of being a cousin of a spy to himself.
However, self-ascribing this property not the same thing as
merely ascribing it, in this indirect way, to himself - and
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Lingens self-ascribes the property of being a cousin of a
spy only when he discovers himself to be Lingens, the
subject of the biography.
A number of philosophers maintain that belief is a
binary relation between a subject and a proposition, and
would maintain with Stalnaker that the object of Lingens's
belief that Lingens is a cousin of a spy is a proposition,
and the object of his belief that he himself is a cousin of
a spy is another, distinct proposition. Some of these
philosophers are neo-Fregeans who encounter the problem of
de se belief by working on the semantics of belief reports.
Graeme Forbes, for example, follows Frege in saying that
each of us has a mode of presentation of himself, which is
inaccessible to anybody else and which plays an essential
role in self-belief
.
17
Consider the sentence 'Ralph believes that he (himself)
is making a mess'. Forbes represents this as follows:
B (Ralph, [self ] Ralph A [making a mess']). 18
In this regimentation, ' [ self ] Ralph ' denotes a mode of
presentation of Ralph such that only Ralph could use it in
thought. According to Forbes, this is a token of the first-
person type of mode of presentation, so that if I, for
example, were to believe myself to be making a mess, I would
17See Forbes (1987), especially pp. 18-23. Cf. Frege's
"Thoughts," in Salmon and Soames (1988).
18Forbes (1987), p. 23.
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employ a different token of the same type, which accounts
for the way in which Ralph and I would believe alike. 19
(The corner quotes are "sense quotes," and the symbol
stands for the way in which senses are concatenated to form
a sinqle complex sense.)
It seems that Forbes and Peacocke must say that only
Ralph could qrasp the very thouqht that he expresses when he
says 'I am makinq a mess'. For suppose that someone else -
call her 'Alice' - thinks a thouqht with the very same
sense. Then Alice employs a constituent sense which is at
the same time a mode of presentation of Ralph, and, by
hypothesis, a mode of presentation of herself - since it is
a token of the first-person type of mode of presentation.
This does not seem to be possible, since it leads to the
loqical absurdity that her thouqht is possibly such that it
is both true and false. Since nothinq that Stalnaker says
about propositions entails that certain of them are in
principle inaccessible to certain subjects, perhaps there is
a reason to prefer his view to the one just considered. 20
Some other accounts of de se belief may also be
classified as versions of the doctrine of propositional
19Cf. Peacocke (1981). Peacocke sugqests that only a
thought made up of token senses can play the dual role of
truth-value bearer and object of an attitude.
2
°See Markie (1988) for more discussion (especially pp.
579-83) .
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objects of belief
.
21 However, I take Stalnaker's view as a
paradigm and consider it, in the next section, in the light
of an objection based on a case developed by David Lewis.
Lewis's argument can, I think, be applied in one way or
another to each of the views alluded to in this section.
^ Propositions and the Case of the Two Gods
I would like now to consider, in greater detail,
Stalnaker's treatment of de se beliefs - the beliefs that we
normally express in English with sentences of the form 'I am
such-and-such' - e.g., there is the belief that Lingens
comes to have when he learns that he himself is a cousin of
a spy. I shall consider some arguments against Stalnaker's
version of the doctrine of propositional objects of belief,
and suggest that the Property Theory is to be preferred. I
find these arguments to be compelling; needless to say, some
may find them to be inconclusive.
David Lewis has objected that Stalnaker's view cannot
account for self-locating belief properly so called, and
instead accommodates merely de dicto belief. Lewis presents
an example that, he alleges, shows that the objects of some
beliefs cannot be propositions, and hence that we should not
in general consider belief to be a binary relation between
21See, e.g., Markie (1988), Schiffer (1978), Zemach
(1985), and Boer and Lycan (1986).
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subjects and propositions. The example is the case of the
two gods, discussed in chapter 3. Here again is what Lewis
says
:
Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit acertain possible world, and they know exactly
which world it is. Therefore they know everyproposition that is true at their world. Insofaras knowledge is a propositional attitude, thev areomniscient. Still I can imagine them to sufferignorance: neither one knows which of the two heTh
?y
are not exactly alike. One lives on top
of the tallest mountain and throws down manna; theother lives on top of the coldest mountain andthrows down thunderbolts. Neither one knows
whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on the
coldest mountain; nor whether he throws manna orthunderbolts
.
22
Lewis claims that the situation is a possible one, and
is thus a legitimate test case for our views about knowledge
and belief. He also suggests that the gods might lack the
beliefs that they do because "they have an egually perfect
view of every part of their world, and hence cannot identify
the perspectives from which they view it." 23 Since the
gods believe all of the propositions true at their world,
but nevertheless could believe more than they in fact do,
according to Lewis, the objects of the missing beliefs could
not be propositions.
Lewis's solution, as discussed earlier, is to say that
the objects of belief and other attitudes are properties
rather than propositions. On his view, belief is also a
22Lewis (1983a), p. 139.
23Ibid
.
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binary relation, but not between a subject and a truth-value
bearer in any absolute sense. if the god on the tallest
mountain were to learn that he himself lived on the tallest
mountain, he would not come to believe a new proposition;
rather, he would self-ascribe a new property: viz., the
property of living on the tallest mountain. This property
does not correspond to any proposition, since the god who
lives on the tallest mountain is the only one in his world
who has it.
Stalnaker, on the other hand, maintains that the god on
the tallest mountain would indeed come to believe a new
proposition, were he to learn that he himself lives on the
tallest mountain - just as Lingens would, were he to learn
that he himself is a cousin of a spy. This view, Stalnaker
holds, follows from the doctrine of Haecceitism - the view
that facts about non-qualitative aspects of individuals may
distinguish between the (representative features of the)
qualitatively indiscernible worlds that they inhabit.
According to Stalnaker, Lewis has misdescribed the case
of the two gods by claiming that the gods are omniscient
with respect to all propositions, and hence that they know
exactly which possible world they inhabit. This reply
allows Stalnaker to maintain that the gods, in each possible
world in which they live, are really ignorant of some of the
propositions that are true there. He writes that Lewis's
example is
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a case of ignorance of which of two indiscprnihiopossible worlds is actual. One of these possibleworlds is the actual world (assuming that thetheologian's story is true), while the other is
^
except that the god who is in fact on thetallest mountain is instead on the coldest
mountain, with all the properties which the god onthe coldest mountain in fact has. 24
In the other world, of course, the god on the coldest
mountain has all of the qualitative properties that the god
who is in fact on the coldest mountain has; but they must
have distinct non-qualitative haecceities. Thus for all
that the god on the tallest mountain believes, either one of
two qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds might be
actual
.
For convenience, let us give some names to these gods
and the putative worlds that they inhabit. Let us call the
actual (we are assuming) world 'W' and the other possible
world, in which the gods have traded places, 'V'
.
And let
'Gl' name the god who is on the tallest mountain in W and on
the coldest mountain in V, and 'G2' name the god who is on
the coldest mountain in W and on the tallest mountain in V.
The context of the case, Stalnaker would say, is such that W
and V are the only worlds that are relevant to attributing
beliefs to Gl and G2.
Let us focus arbitrarily on god Gl and world W.
According to Stalnaker, Gl is ignorant as to whether W or V
is the actual world. When Gl wonders whether he is on the
24Stalnaker (1981), p. 143.
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tallest mountain, the object of his wondering is the
proposition that is true at w but false at V. G1 believes
the proposition containing W and V - the one that is true at
each of these worlds - but he doesn't believe the one
containing w alone - the one that is true at w but not at V.
If G1 somehow were to learn that he himself lives on the
tallest mountain, Stalnaker says, he would thereby come to
believe the proposition containing W alone. On this view,
his coming to believe that he himself lives on the tallest
mountain gets analyzed as his coming to believe this
proposition
.
Suppose that G1
,
in his state of ignorance, looks upon
the world and notices the god on the tallest mountain, then
thinks to himself 'he throws down manna'. Gl believes,
correctly, that this sentence is true. Stalnaker must
maintain that Gl does not know which proposition his
sentence expresses, since he believes that the sentence is
true but fails to believe the proposition that it expresses,
viz., the one that is true at W but false at V. The object
of Gl's belief that he [demonstrating himself] throws down
manna, on Stalnaker 's view, is the proposition that contains
both W and V. This follows from Stalnaker 's views on
diagonal ization.
In W, when Gl says 'he throws down manna', his use of
'he' rigidly designates (and directly refers to) Gl, who
throws down manna in W but not in V. But the sentence token
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occurs in world V also. in V, Gl's use of 'he' rigidly
designates G2 - the god atop the tallest mountain there -
who throws down manna in V but not in w. On this view,
then, the object of the belief that G1 expresses by 'he
throws down manna' is the diagonal proposition represented
in the following propositional concept:
W V
W T F
V F T
Now for Lewis's objection to Stalnaker. Lewis argues
that Haecceitism does not do the job that it was intended to
do, and therefore that there are some beliefs for which
propositional objects will not account, even if non-
qualitative propositions are countenanced. He writes as
follows
:
Let's grant, briefly, that the world W of the gods
has its qualitative duplicate V in which the gods
have traded places. Let the god on the tallest
mountain know that his world is W, not V. Let him
be omniscient about all propositions, not only
qualitative ones. How does that help? Never mind
V, where he knows he doesn't live. There are
still two different mountains in W where he might,
for all he knows, be living. 25
This may seem like a plea for a more complete account
of the matter rather than an argument against the view that
Haecceitism helps to solve the problem about the gods'
25Lewis (1983a), p. 141. In fact, Lewis's paper
precedes Stalnaker 's. Lewis here argues against a standard
Haecceitist view, which Stalnaker favors.
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beliefs. But Lewis's point, I think, is this: it is
possible that G1 should believe the proposition containing w
but not V, and at the very same time wonder about whether or
not he lives on the tallest mountain - i.e., he could know
exactly which world is the actual world, without knowing
where he is located within it. Since this is possible, it
is incorrect to analyze his coming to believe that he
himself lives on the tallest mountain as his coming to
believe the proposition containing W alone instead of the
one containing both w and V.
Stalnaker replies that Lewis's argument begs the
question against his view. "One cannot just stipulate that
the god knows that he is in W, and not in V," he writes,
"for on the proposed explanation, that amounts to the
assumption that he knows which mountain he is on." 26
According to this reply, in the first premise of Lewis's
argument it is illegitimately assumed that the (still
ignorant) god knows the proposition containing W alone - on
Stalnaker 's account of the case, to assume that the god
knows this proposition is to assume that he knows that he
lives on the tallest mountain rather than the coldest one.
Stalnaker, then, maintains that one can know exactly which
world is actual only if one knows one's own place within
it - so that if G1 is ignorant about his location, as Lewis
says, he cannot know the proposition containing W alone.
26Stalnaker (1981), p. 144.
134
What is going on here? Stalnaker's reasoning must go
somewhat as follows. Lewis has assumed that G1 has ruled
out world V as a world in which he might be living. if G 1
knows that he lives in one, rather than the other, of two
qualitatively indiscernible worlds, then he must know which
mountain he lives on top of, since by hypothesis he must be
able to discern the purely haecceitistic differences between
the two worlds. Hence, Lewis's assumption is not consistent
with the claim that G1 still doesn't know that he himself
lives on the tallest mountain.
This claim also follows from Stalnaker's views on
diagonalization. In world W, Gl's utterance of 'I live on
the tallest mountain' expresses the proposition that is true
at W but false at V, since his use of 'I' rigidly designates
himself, and he lives on the tallest mountain in W but not
in V. (So, if we assume that G1 is still ignorant as to
which world he inhabits, then he does not know whether his
sentence is true or false.) In world V, Gl's utterance of
live on the tallest mountain' also expresses the
proposition that is true at W but false at V, since his use
of 'I' again rigidly designates himself. The propositional
concept for the god's sentence is therefore as follows:
W V
W T F
V T F
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that Lewis
Presumably, this is why Stalnaker claims
begs the question. Suppose that G1 knows all of the
propositions that are true at his world, not only the
qualitative ones, and as a result that he knows that he
lives in W rather than V. since G1 knows the proposition
containing W alone, according to the matrix above he knows
(and thus believes) that he himself lives on the tallest
mountain. This proposition would be the object of his
thought that he himself lives on the tallest mountain, and
so if he knows it he thereby knows which mountain he is on.
Lewis, the objection goes, has already assumed that the god
in question has the knowledge that he allegedly lacks.
All of this may follow from Stalnaker's claims about
diagonalization, but it does not show that diagonalization
gives the right account of the example in the first place.
According to Stalnaker, that G1 believes that he himself
lives on the tallest mountain follows from the fact that he
can discern the purely haecceitistic differences between the
two worlds - or, at least, from the fact that he believes
the haecceity being (identical to) G1 to be instantiated by
the god on top of the tallest mountain. The value of
diagonalization in this case, and as a tool for accounting
for belief in general, is based upon the validity of this
inference; however, there is good reason to think that the
inference does not go through.
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Let us assume that G1 knows the proposition containing
W alone - i.e., exactly which world is actual, since he
knows that world V - qualitatively indiscernible from the
actual world - is not actual, it follows that he can
distinguish between the worlds in virtue of their
haecceitistic differences alone. This ability to discern
the differences between the worlds is the ability to know
where the haecceities in question are instantiated. So, G1
knows that the property of being (identical to) G1 is
instantiated atop the tallest mountain and the property of
being (identical to) G2 is instantiated atop the coldest
mountain, and not vice versa.
This, however, is just where Lewis's point comes in.
Gl's knowledge seems to be consistent with his not knowing
that the property of being (identical to) G1 is his very own
individual essence or haecceity, rather than that of G2
.
Therefore, his knowing that W is actual and V is not seems
to be compatible with his failing to believe that he himself
lives on the tallest mountain. He might still wonder 'is my
essence being G1
,
or is it being G2'.
We have been assuming that there is a fact of the
matter as to which of the omniscient perspectives belongs to
which of the individuals atop the two mountains. Such an
assumption might be disputed. But even if it is disputed,
the objection remains, since either of the gods could still
wonder whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on the
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coldest one, even though there is no fact of the matter
about which one it is.
I have suggested that there is good reason not to
identify beliefs about one's own haecceity with beliefs
about oneself; but I do not claim to have shown that these
sorts of belief must be distinguished. Nevertheless, it
still seems to me to be correct to claim that, for example,
if G1 knows precisely which world is actual, then he knows
exactly when and where his own haecceity is instantiated but
he need not know that the haecceity in question is his own.
From the fact that G1 can discern the worlds based upon
their purely haecceitistic differences, it does not follow
that he knows that he himself lives on the tallest mountain.
It seems, then, that we should conclude that the approach
taken by Stalnaker cannot account for some beliefs, and
therefore that he has not succeeded in his attempt to solve
the problem of indexical belief within the framework of the
view that belief is a binary relation between a conscious
subject and an abstract proposition.
Probably, what has been said so far would do little to
persuade someone like Stalnaker, who would likely stick to
his guns and identify a subject's beliefs about herself with
her beliefs about her own haecceity. I am not at all sure
that one could show that such beliefs must be distinguished.
If it could be shown that the beliefs play different roles
with respect to the explanation of behavior, then Stalnaker
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would clearly be in trouble; but again, I am not sure that
this could be done. Let me take one more shot, however, at
arguing against a view like Stalnaker's. What follows is an
argument very similar to the preceding one, and it is also
based upon an argument suggested by Lewis, in a footnote to
his paper "Individuation by Acguaintance and by
Stipulation
.
1,27
Consider logical space - the class of all logically
possible worlds. Suppose that we have a particular class P
of propositions, themselves total functions from logically
possible worlds into truth values (or, sets of possible
worlds), such that (1) P contains some contingent
propositions, and (2) P is consistent (all propositions p in
P could be true together). Then, P determines a class W of
possible worlds, such that for any world w, w is in W if and
only if every p in P is true at w.
In each world w in W, there are various individuals
with various properties, standing in various relations to
one another. Let us suppose, along with Stalnaker, that the
same individual may exist in more than one possible world,
and that qualitatively indiscernible worlds may differ with
respect to the way in which they represent the identities of
particular individuals, i.e., with respect to which
individuals are which.
27Lewis (1983b), pp. 24-25 (fn. 16).
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Now, suppose that the following is true:
(A) There is a subject x such that, for all
propositions y, x believes y if and only if y i s
in P.
According to Stalnaker
,
one's believed-true propositions
exhaust all of one's beliefs, and so (A) gives a complete
characterization of someone's doxastic state. in other
words, if (A) is true, then there is someone whose belief
state is characterized completely by P (and hence by w) .
For example, (A) implies either that there is someone who
believes that there are sticks and stones, or that there is
someone who does not believe that there are stick and stones
(which one it implies depends of course upon whether or not
the attributed belief is in P)
.
If Stalnaker 's view is true, then if (A) above gives a
complete characterization of a subject's belief state, then
it should also entail exactly one of the following:
(B) There is a subject x who believes himself or
herself to be left-handed
or
(C) There is a subject x who does not believe himself
or herself to be left-handed.
If there is someone who believes all and only the
propositions in P, and propositions are the only objects of
belief - so that nothing is left out - then either (B) or
(C) should follow from (A): again, which one does follow
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must depend upon the details of p, and hence of w. However,
(A) entails neither (B) nor (C). Even if there is an
individual i at every world in W, and i is left-handed at
every world in W, and no other individual is left-handed at
every world in W
,
it still does not follow from (A) that
there is someone who believes himself or herself to be left-
handed. This is because (A) does not give any information
about the identity of the subject who makes it true - in
particular
,
whether or not the subject is i
.
To summarize the argument: if Stalnaker's view is
correct, then (A) implies either (B) or (C); but (A) implies
neither (B) nor (C); so the view is not correct. What
should be a complete characterization of a subject's belief
state (of "the world according to the subject"), on
Stalnaker ' s view, turns out not to be. The problem, it
seems, is that Stalnaker's view requires that a belief state
cannot be characterized completely without information about
the identity of the subject whose state it is. The identity
of a given subject of beliefs, however, seems irrelevant to
the characterization of a belief state - of a way that the
world might be, according to a possible subject of beliefs.
Stalnaker could change his view and maintain that, with
respect to a subject's total belief state, the subject is
the only individual that is identical across the possible
worlds in the state. I do not know whether Stalnaker would
want to make this move, but he explicitly denies it in the
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paper under discussion here. in effect, this result is
achieved by a view like Forbes's, according to which some
propositions are such that they could only be believed,
desired, considered, etc., by a single subject. i cannot
explore this view to the extent that it deserves, but I
suggest that, in addition to being significantly more
complicated than the Property Theory, it leaves certain
mysteries unsolved
.
28
Even if these mysteries can be solved, there are at
least two reasons to prefer the Property Theory as a view of
belief and the other attitudes. First, a property theorist
need not accept the controversial metaphysical thesis of
Haecceitism in order to give an account of our beliefs about
ourselves. Second, the Property Theory is simpler than any
view like Stalnaker's. There seems to be no good reason to
say that my belief that I am sitting, for example, is a
proposition that entails that something exemplifies a
certain haecceity, viz., the property of being me, when it
is open to say that my belief is just the property of being
seated, which I self-ascribe
.
28For one thing, why are certain propositions
inaccessible to certain subjects, and why isn't this a
barrier to communicating them? (Might there be a God who
thinks of me in the same way in which I think of myself?
Cf. Nozick (1981), p. 72). For another, just why is my
acquaintance with myself such as to allow me to be the only
individual to appear throughout my belief worlds (on one way
of stating the theory)?
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Of course, there would be reason to say that my belief
is a proposition, if there were a good argument against the
self-ascription view. in the next chapter, however, I
review some of the arguments in the literature against the
Property Theory, including one presented by Stalnaker, and
find each of them to be unsound. Finally, in chapter 7, i
consider some general problems about de re belief from the
perspective of the self-ascription view. These are problems
that any account of de re belief will have to face, and I
try to show that they can be handled within the framework of
the Property Theory.
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CHAPTER 6
DEFENDING THE PROPERTY THEORY
In this chapter I give a partial defense of the
Property Theory by considering, and objecting to, some
arguments that have been presented against it. Arguments
against the Property Theory in the literature are few and
far between, and persuasive ones are even rarer. Some of
them raise interesting issues; but it seems to me that all
of them can be defeated plausibly.
The arguments that I shall discuss are general
arguments against the self-ascription view, and are not
merely intended to refute one particular version of it,
while leaving another unaffected. For example, I will not
discuss arguments that pertain to Chisholm's version of the
Property Theory but not to Lewis's - say, because of the way
in which Chisholm individuates properties. 1 I will, on the
other hand, consider arguments that have been directed
against a particular self-ascription theorist, if they are
also applicable to the Property Theory in general.
6 . 1 The Property Theory and Self-Awareness
Some have argued that the Property Theory cannot give a
plausible account of self-consciousness, on the grounds that
it cannot distinguish one's thoughts that are about oneself
See, e.g., Villanueva (1991).
from thoughts that are not about oneself. Allegedly, the
flaw in the Property Theory is its reduction of de dicto
belief to de se belief, i.e., the claim that to believe a
certain proposition p is by analysis to self-ascribe the
property that is necessarily such that anything has it if
and only if, p is true. So, to borrow an example from
Lewis, believing the proposition that cyanoacrylate glue
dissolves in acetone is self-ascribing the property of being
such that cyanoacrylate glue dissolves in acetone. 2
Consider the following passage from Peter Markie's
paper "Multiple Propositions and 'De Se' Attitudes":
This reduction of de dicto beliefs to de se ones
keeps the theory from giving an adequate treatment
of self-consciousness. On Monday, Hume is working
in his laboratory and is so lost in thought as to
be unaware of himself. The only thoughts going
through his head are chemical equations,
descriptions of chemical reactions and the like.
He comes to the conclusion that cyanoacrylate
dissolves in acetone. On Tuesday, he is back in
his laboratory but cannot concentrate on his work.
He keeps thinking about himself. The thoughts
going through his head all concern himself as he
comes to the conclusion that he needs to find a
new career. There is a clear difference between
the two cases. Hume is conscious of himself on
Tuesday in a way in which he is not conscious of
himself on Monday. De se property theorists
cannot explain this difference. 3
Markie clearly thinks that the reason why the Property
Theory cannot explain the difference between the thoughts on
Monday and the thoughts on Tuesday is the reduction of de
2See Lewis (1983a), p. 137.
3Markie (1988), p. 593.
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dicto to de se belief. One natural way to explain the
difference would be to say that on Monday, Hume comes to
have a de dicto belief about chemistry; whereas on Tuesday,
he comes to have a de se belief (about himself). Markie
thinks that this natural explanation is unavailable to the
property theorist, who must claim that on Monday Hume also
comes to have a de se belief.
I will soon maintain that the natural explanation is
ultimately available for use by the Property Theory. Markie
entertains that property theorists might respond to his
objection in another way, but he rejects the response:
They might say that Hume is forming de se beliefs
on each occasion, but it is only on Tuesday that
he is consciously aware of the fact that he is
doing so.... We have no reason to assume that
Hume is this reflective on Tuesday. On that
occasion, he does not just think about chemistry;
he thinks about himself, but that is not to say he
takes the extra step of thinking about the fact
that he is thinking about himself. 4
Markie may be right to reject such a reply. Even if it
usually happens that we have such second-order attitudes
when absorbed in thought about ourselves - e.g., that Hume,
on Tuesday, self-ascribes the property of self-ascribing the
property of needing to find a new career - it may be that
such attitudes are not essential to this sort of thinking.
So the reply might not yield a plausible way to distinguish
Hume's thoughts on Tuesday from his thoughts on Monday.
4Ibid.
,
p. 594.
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reply to be
However, even supposing the above sort of
inadequate, the property theorist can distinguish any
differences there may be between Hume's mental states, in
virtue of the contents of those states. The property that
Hume self
-ascribes on Monday (being such that cyanoacrylate
dissolves in acetone) is of a quite different sort than the
one he self-ascribes on Tuesday (needing to find a new
career). The former property, for a start, corresponds to a
proposition - i.e., it is necessarily such that if something
has it, then everything has it - and in this sense it is de
dicto. We can thus distinguish it from the latter property,
which is not de dicto, and explain the difference in Hume's
states in the natural way, by saying that on Monday, Hume
has a de dicto belief, and on Tuesday, he has a de se (non-
de dicto) belief. If this does not suffice to distinguish
the way in which Hume is conscious of himself on Tuesday, we
could also point to the fact, say, that the property of
needing to find a new career is necessarily such that
whoever has it is a conscious subject with beliefs, desires,
projects, and so on.
Of course, it might be complained that the same sort of
distinction between mental states is also relevant when we
compare de re attitudes with irreducibly de se ones. 5 For
example, we may want to say (although I do not think that we
are forced to say) that when I believe myself to be sitting
5Cf . Castaneda (1980).
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down, I am conscious of myself in a way in which I am not
conscious of myself when I see myself seated in a mirror,
but fail to realize that the person who I see is me (or when
I see anyone else sitting down, for that matter). But the
same sort of explanation is open to the property theorist in
this case as well: self-ascribing the property of sitting
down is quite different from self-ascribing, for example,
the property of seeing someone who is sitting down. The
latter property is necessarily such that whoever has it
bears a relation of acquaintance to something, and in this
sense it is de re. The former property is not de re, and so
we may explain the difference between the states by saying
that one of them is a de re belief about the person in the
mirror, while the other is a de se (non-de re) belief about
me
.
Markie raises a similar objection when he complains
that the Property Theory cannot allow for the possibility
that "some thinkers (perhaps animals, children, or
computers) could be capable of de dicto attitudes but lack
the sort of self-awareness involved in de se ones." 6 It
appears, however, that Markie misinterprets the Property
Theory by maintaining that one must be consciously aware of
oneself, in some intuitive sense, in order to have a de se
belief. There is no reason to think that more than a
special subclass of de se beliefs require such self-
6Markie (1988), p. 594.
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awareness. The Property Theory, it seems to me, easily
allows for the possibility that a creature could be capable
of self-ascribing properties that correspond to propositions
while lacking the sort of self-awareness required to self-
ascribe other sorts of properties (for example, those
associated with second-order beliefs).
The philosopher who wishes to object along these lines
to the Property Theory must show that there is a need to
distinguish belief in a proposition p from self-ascription
of the property of being such that p. I do not think that
there is any such need: Markie has not shown that the
latter requires any kind of self-awareness not required by
the former, and it does not seem that they play different
roles in the explanation of behavior. So, I suggest that
when subject to examination the general argument discussed
in this section does not carry much force against any
version of the Property Theory.
6 . 2 The Contingent Existence of the Subject
In an earlier paper, Markie presented another sort of
objection to the general framework of the Property Theory.
This objection involves issues having to do with the
existence and possible nonexistence of a given subject of
attitudes. Although Markie directs the objection
specifically against Chisholm's version of the Property
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Theory, he clearly intends it to be applicable to
versions of the general view. When discussing Markie's
argument, I shall try to make my remarks such that they may
be incorporated by either Chisholm's or Lewis's version of
the theory.
Markie introduces the argument as follows:
Sometimes we adopt an attitude de dicto and the
content is an impossibility? sometimes we adopt an
attitude de dicto and the content is a possibility
that includes our nonexistence. Chisholm's theory
fails to capture this distinction because it
reguires that each de dicto instance of an
attitude involves a de se one. 7
Markie gives an example of the distinction with a pair of
sentences, which attribute the attitude of considering
something. Here are the two sentences:
(1) Descartes considers its being the case that
two and two does not egual four.
(2) Descartes considers its being the case that
he neither exists nor has any properties but
someone is wise. 8
The consideration attributed to Descartes in (1) is an
impossibility, since of necessity 2+2=4; but the
consideration attributed in (2) is a possibility that
happens to entail the nonexistence of Descartes.
Now, to consider something is not to believe it, and so
self-ascription does not come into play here. (Presumably,
it would never be correct to attribute to someone the belief
7Markie (1984), p. 236.
8Ibid. (I have renumbered Markie's sentences.)
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that he does not exist.) A property theorist, however, will
want to say in general that all attitudes are relations
between subjects and properties. In particular,
consideration will be analyzed as a relation between
subjects and properties. Markie calls this relation 'direct
consideration'
,
and gives the following property-theoretic
versions of (l) and (2):
(la) Descartes directly considers ... being such
that two plus two does not equal four.
(2a) Descartes directly considers ... being such
as to neither exist nor have any properties
but to be such that someone is wise. 9
Markie claims that although (la) captures the fact that
(1) involves Descartes' considering something impossible,
(2a) fails to capture the fact that (2) involves Descartes'
considering something possible: it attributes to Descartes
the direct consideration of an impossible property. (Let us
call the property attributed in (2a) 'F' - nothing could
have F, it seems, since if something had F it would have at
least one property, and hence would not exemplify F.)
There seems to be a bit of trickery going on here; but
before we attempt clearly to expose it, let us consider a
direct reply to Markie 's objection. All that the property
theorist must do, in order to handle the problem raised by
Markie, is provide a plausible interpretation of (2) that
attributes to Descartes a property that something could
9Ibid. (Again, I have renumbered the sentences.)
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exemplify. Such an interpretation may be available, along
the lines of the following:
(2b) Descartes directly considers: being possibly such
that he neither exists nor has any properties
while someone is wise.
However, it might be objected that the consideration
attributed to Descartes in (2) is something that is not
actually the case, since Descartes does in fact exist;
whereas the consideration attributed in (2b) is a property
that is actually exemplified by Descartes. The objection is
even more weighty in the case of desiring (wishing, wanting)
nonexistence. 10 Any subject who wishes not to exist (never
to have existed) is certainly not wishing to have a property
that he or she actually has - like possible nonexistence -
so an account of such a desire along the lines of (2b) will
misdescribe the facts of the case.
With this in mind, we might wonder why Markie did not
simply use an example having to do merely with the
nonexistence of the subject, such as
(3) Descartes considers its being the case that he
doesn't exist (never has existed or will exist),
for which he could have given a property-theoretic
formulation along the lines of the following:
xoWhat is at issue here is the omnitemporal sense of
'nonexistence'. Cases of wanting not to exist as of some
time in the future, for example, are easily handled by the
Property Theory.
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(3a) Descartes directly considers: not existing.
Why doesn't the same problem arise for (3) and (3a), given
that the consideration attributed in (3) is clearly possible
while the one attributed in (3a) seems not to be? How could
the property of being such as not to exist ever be
exemplified by something?
Markie must think that the Property Theory can somehow
plausibly account for (3) but not for (2). I will argue,
however, that any plausible property-theoretic account of
(3) carries over to (2) as well. How then can we give a
plausible interpretation of (3) (or of the case in which a
subject desires nonexistence)? We might take the object of
the consideration of (or the wish for) one's nonexistence to
be the property of being nonidentical with oneself (which is
to be distinguished from the property of being non-self-
identical). This would yield the following interpretation
of ( 3 )
:
(3b) Descartes directly considers: being nonidentical
with Descartes,
as well as an analogous account of the desire not to exist.
Such a treatment of attitudes involving one's own
nonexistence would yield the desired result that the
consideration attributed to Descartes in (3) is a
possibility, insofar as it is a property that something
could exemplify. Indeed everything save Descartes actually
has the attributed property. However, this fact may give
153
rise to a related and familiar problem: the consideration
attributed in (3) is something that is not actually the
case; whereas the property that is attributed in (3b), as we
have noted, is exemplified by many things that actually
exist.
If this objection has some force (and I am inclined to
think that it does), we may replace (3b) with a nearby
alternative that has at least as much plausibility, as
follows
:
(3c) Descartes directly considers: being such that
everything is nonidentical with Descartes.
(3c) has an advantage over (3b) in that the property it
attributes is not actually exemplified by anything, which
corresponds to the fact that the consideration attributed in
(3) does not actually obtain. As in (3b), however, the
property attributed in (3c) is one that something could
exemplify: it is had by everything in possible situations
in which Descartes does not exist. 11 I suggest, therefore,
that we take (3c) to give the property-theoretic analysis of
(3), since it has all of the advantages and none of the
disadvantages of (3b).
We can now extend this analysis to cover Markie's
original objection that the Property Theory cannot give an
X1A counterpart theorist such as Lewis could take the
attributed property to be the one that is exemplified by
something in a world w if and only if there is no
counterpart of Descartes in w.
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adequate account of attribution (2), in which Descartes is
said to consider someone's being wise while he himself
neither exists nor has any properties. The property
theorist is not forced to make the implausible claim that
sentence (2) attributes to Descartes the consideration of an
impossible property; such as the property that seems to be
attributed by (2a), viz., being such as to neither exist nor
have any properties but to be such that someone is wise.
A property-theoretic account of attitudes involving
merely the nonexistence of the subject (along the lines of
(3c) above) can easily be extended to account for examples
of more complicated attitudes like the one attributed to
Descartes in (2). The following interpretation of (2) seems
to me to get things right:
(2b) Descartes directly considers: being such that
everything is nonidentical with Descartes and
nothing that is identical with Descartes has any
properties and someone is wise.
Some philosopher might wish to claim that it really is
impossible for something that actually exists to have no
properties whatsoever; if only because of the idea that, for
example, if I were to fail to exist, I would have the
property of not being human (since I would clearly fail to
have the property of being human) . Such a philosopher might
want to distinguish a "basic" property like being human from
a "nonbasic" one like not being human, and then insert the
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term 'basic' before the word 'properties' in (2b). or, one
might maintain that the part of (2) that implies that
Descartes considers his not having any properties does not
add anything to the meaning of the rest of the attribution,
and so that (2) can be rendered adeguately as follows:
(2c) Descartes directly considers: being such that
everything is nonidentical with Descartes and
someone is wise.
Regardless of whether (2b) or (2c) is chosen as the
analysis of (2), it is clear that the property theorist can
avoid Markie's objection. Both (2b) and (2c) capture the
fact that (2) attributes to Descartes the consideration of
something possible that excludes his existence: in both
cases the property attributed is such that something could
exemplify it but Descartes could not.
6 . 3 Stalnaker and the Exchange of Information
In this section, I would like to discuss an argument
presented by Robert Stalnaker, in his paper "Indexical
Belief," against the view that properties are the objects of
belief and other attitudes. The argument is based upon the
example of Rudolf Lingens, the amnesiac who is lost in the
library and reads a biography of himself, discussed earlier
in chapter 3. Although Stalnaker 's objection is directed
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against Lewis's version of the Property Theory, it applies
straightforwardly to any version of the general view.
Stalnaker imagines the following auspicious ending to
the Lingens saga:
/ still lost in the Stanford Library
meets Ortcutt. "I've lost my memory and don't
know who I am," says Lingens. "Can you tell me?
Who am I?" "You're my cousin, Rudolf Lingens "
replies Ortcutt.
This seems to be a simple case of direct and
successful communication. Lingens requested a
certain piece of information; Ortcutt was able to
provide it, and did. Ortcutt was sincere - he
believed what he said - and Lingens believed what
he was told. Furthermore, Ortcutt 's reply was
direct: he did not just say something from which
Lingens was able to infer the right answer to his
question. He told him the answer. 12
On Stalnaker's view, the objects of belief and the
other attitudes are propositions. Stalnaker accounts for
our beliefs in much the same way that he accounts for our
assertions, the objects of which, for him, are also
propositions. Roughly, before Ortcutt replies to Lingens
there is a set of possible situations that represents the
shared background knowledge of the two people. Ortcutt 's
answer then expresses a certain proposition that narrows
down the members of this set by distinguishing between them
(presumably, between the situations in which Lingens is the
subject of the biography he has read and is the cousin of
Ortcutt and is called 'Lingens', on the one hand, and those
in which these things do not obtain, on the other).
12Stalnaker (1981), p. 146.
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According to Stalnaker's account, Lingens has reguested
a certain bit of propositional information, which Ortcutt's
reply subseguently expresses. The proposition expressed by
Ortcutt's assertion is the very one that Lingens then comes
to believe. Stalnaker argues that Lewis cannot account for
the case in this relatively simple and straightforward way,
as follows:
If Lewis holds that the objects of speech acts, as
well as of attitudes, are properties - that to"
make an assertion is also to ascribe a property to
oneself - then he will have to describe the case
in something like the following way: Lingens asks
which of a certain set of properties is correctly
ascribed to himself. Ortcutt responds by
ascribing a different property to himself.
Lingens is then able to infer the answer to his
question from Ortcutt's assertion.... The answer
to the question is thus quite indirect, and this
is not a special feature of this example. The
account I am putting into Lewis's mouth must hold
that all answers to questions are indirect in this
way. If assertions are always self-ascriptions of
properties, then people talk only about
themselves
.
13
It seems, however, that it is open to Lewis, as a
property theorist, to claim that the objects of speech acts
and the objects of the attitudes are of different sorts: in
particular, that although the latter are self-ascribed
properties, the former are propositions. But Stalnaker has
an argument against this move as well:
Alternatively, Lewis might hold that speech acts,
unlike attitudes, have propositions rather than
properties as objects. But then he must deny that
speech is a straightforward expression of
thought - that what a person says, when he
13Ibid.
,
pp. 146-7
.
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believes what he says, is what he believes. ifLewis makes this move, then he may save theintuition that Ortcutt's reply is a direct answerto Lingens's question, but he cannot say that the
content of the answer is the information that
resolves Lingens's doubt. 14
Stalnaker ' s argument appears to be at least partly a
methodological one: it concerns the balancing of pre-
theoretic intuitions about the flow of information with the
utility of more systematic accounts of it. I think that it
will be helpful, for purposes of evaluation, to have at hand
a more precise formulation of the argument. Consider the
following reconstructed version.
(1) If the Property Theory of belief is true, then
either the objects of assertions are self-ascribed
properties, or else they are propositions.
(2) If the objects of assertions are self-ascribed
properties, then people talk only about
themselves
.
(3) If people talk only about themselves, then all
exchanges of information are indirect.
(4) If the objects of assertions are propositions,
then assertion is not a straightforward expression
of thought.
(5) If assertion is not a straightforward expression
of thought, then all exchanges of information are
indirect
.
14Ibid.
,
p. 147.
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(6) Therefore, if the Property Theory of belief is
true, all exchanges of information are indirect.
(7) Some exchanges of information are direct.
(8) Therefore, the Property Theory of belief is not
true
.
It seems that Stalnaker wishes to maintain premise (7),
and that he offers the exchange between Ortcutt and Lingens
as a case in point. An exchange of information from a
speaker to a hearer is direct, it seems, if and only if what
the hearer comes to believe (or, at least, part of what she
comes to believe), in virtue of what the speaker asserts, is
the very object (or perhaps one of the objects) of the
speaker's assertion. Otherwise, the exchange is indirect -
what the hearer comes to believe is somehow inferred from
what the speaker says (i.e., the object of the speaker's
assertion) and facts about the context of the utterance.
How might the property theorist in general
,
or Lewis in
particular, object to this version of Stalnaker's argument?
I would like to consider a pair of plausible objections.
Probably, Lewis would want to say that the objects of
assertion, like the objects of belief, are properties. In
this way we could express properties that we self-ascribe
but that do not correspond to propositions. He might,
however, wish to deny that this view entails that every
conversational exchange of information is indirect. Let
this be the first objection.
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One way of making such an objection is to claim that
there is some equivocation in the meaning of the word
about' in premises (2) and (3). Let us distinguish two
possible meanings that the word might have, a "stronger" one
and a "weaker" one. To say that people talk only about
themselves in the strong sense is to say that in virtue of
our assertions we ascribe properties only to ourselves, and,
in so doing, never ascribe them to others. If the word
'about' is used in this sense, Lewis can reasonably claim
that premise (2) is false. Indeed, we have seen that Lewis
has an account of how we ascribe properties to things other
than ourselves, and hence talk about things other than
ourselves, by self-ascribing properties to ourselves.
On the other hand, to say that people talk only about
themselves, in the weak sense, is to say that self-ascribed
properties are the objects of assertions, but assertions are
sometimes used by certain speakers to ascribe properties to
individuals distinct from themselves. If 'about' is used in
this sense, premise (2) seems to be true. But what about
premise (3)? Could Lewis maintain that premise (3) is false
when 'about' is interpreted in this way; i.e., could there
be some direct exchanges of information if people talked
only about themselves, in the weak sense of 'about'?
Given the notion of a direct exchange of information,
the answer to this question appears at first to be negative.
For example, if Ortcutt self-ascribes a property when he
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says ' you are Lingens', he ascribes something like the
property of looking at exactly one person (and at a person)
who is Lingens. Even if we suppose that Ortcutt is talking
only about himself in the weak sense here, and not in the
strong one, the purpose of his remark is not to get Lingens
to self-ascribe the property of looking at exactly one
person who is Lingens; rather, it is to get him to self-
ascribe the property of being Lingens. This is not
Ortcutt 's self-ascription
,
however, and so it appears that
Lewis must admit that the exchange is indirect.
In order to undermine premise (3) on Lewis's behalf, we
might claim that although self-ascribed properties are
objects of assertions, so are properties that are ascribed
to other things. Ortcutt 's remark, on this view, would have
two objects: the property of looking at exactly one person
who is Lingens, which he self-ascribes ; and the property of
being Lingens, which he ascribes to Lingens himself (the
individual at whom Ortcutt is looking) . We might want to
say, along with Chisholm, that the latter property is the
indirect object of the assertion.
According to the present view about assertion, the
property that Lingens comes to self-ascribe (viz., the
property of being Lingens) just is one of the objects of
Ortcutt 's assertion, and hence, the exchange of information
between them turns out to be direct. So premise (3) can be
denied on the weak reading of the word 'about'. However,
162
this line of reasoning has some problems: first, the
strategy of positing multiple objects of assertions, simply
for the sake of making possible direct exchanges of
information, seems somewhat ad hoc; and second, we have not
yet given any reason why Lingens comes to self-ascribe (and
is intended to come to self-ascribe) just one of the objects
of Ortcutt's assertion and not the other. No doubt this
could be done, but I think that a more promising objection
to Stalnaker's argument is open to Lewis, as well as to any
property theorist.
The strategy of the next objection is to concede that
Lewis's view of belief entails that information exchanges
are indirect - i.e., that line (6) of the argument is true -
but to deny premise (7). Could Lewis plausibly deny that
some exchanges of information are direct? It seems to me
that he could. 15 All that is needed to accompany this
position is an adeguate explanation of how the relevant sort
of indirectness is in no way an impediment to successful
communication. I will try to sketch a plausible account, in
terms of the intentions and beliefs of the subjects, without
15Clear cases of expression of de dicto beliefs would
be an exception: for some proposition p, the speaker would
self-ascribe the property of being such that p in order to
get the hearer to self-ascribe the very same property. We
must, therefore, put into Lewis's mouth the somewhat weaker
claim that such cases are the only cases of direct exchanges
of information. The case under discussion is not of that
sort: Stalnaker here worries that Lewis's view implies that
de re exchanges of information are indirect.
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going into issues having to do with what sort of mechanisms
underlie the relevant exchange of information.
We might give such an explanation, for the present
case, in the following sort of way. Ortcutt says to Lingens
"You're my cousin, Rudolf Lingens," and the unique object of
his assertion is a certain property that he self-ascribes
.
Along the lines of our previous characterization, this
property is necessarily such that whoever has it is looking
at exactly one person who is his cousin and is Rudolf
Lingens
.
Now, it is probably the case that Lingens doesn't know
exactly which property Ortcutt ascribes to himself; but he
must know that it is one of a class of similar properties,
each of which is necessarily such that whoever has it is in
a position to point, say, to his cousin Lingens. As a
result, Lingens comes to believe that Ortcutt (the person
with whom he is talking) self-ascribes a property of this
sort. But Lingens knows much more than this, since he knows
that Ortcutt has just addressed him with the English word
'you' and he knows that Ortcutt is looking at him and only
at him. So, Lingens comes to believe that whichever
relation of acquaintance plays a role in Ortcutt's self-
ascription, he himself is the unique person to whom Ortcutt
is so related.
Lingens is therefore in a position to self-ascribe the
property that Ortcutt intends him to self-ascribe. After
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all, Lingens knows that Ortcutt's self-ascription entails
that whoever is at the other end of the relation of
acquaintance is Lingens, and he knows that he himself is the
only person at the other end of the relation, whichever it
is. So, believing Ortcutt to be sincere, Lingens self-
ascribes whatever properties Ortcutt's self-ascription
entails that this other person has: viz., he self-ascribes
the property of being Lingens. The description of the
exchange may seem complicated; but there is no good reason
to think that it should be much simpler, and the complexity
of the description does not preclude the naturalness and
ease with which the information is actually exchanged.
The fact that the object of Ortcutt's assertion is not
identical with the information that Lingens had requested,
therefore, does not prevent Lingens from easily acquiring
it. The intuition that many conversational exchanges of
this sort are direct in the sense intended by Stalnaker -
i.e., are such that the object of the speaker's assertion
itself becomes an object of the hearer's belief - can
reasonably be discarded. This is made even more plausible
when it is remembered that only certain technical senses of
the terms 'direct' and 'indirect' are presently at issue.
In fact, it seems that Stalnaker 's own account of such
exchanges (in terms of the diagonal propositions expressed
by the various assertions - see chapter 5) should have to be
much more complicated than he suggests in the passage under
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consideration here. I conclude that Stalnaker's argument,
like the ones discussed earlier, does not constitute a
serious objection to the view of the attitudes taken by
proponents of the Property Theory.
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CHAPTER 7
SELF-ASCRIPTION AND BELIEF DE RE
The Property Theory of belief is the view that, as a
matter of some sort of necessity, someone believes something
if and only if there is a property such that he or she self-
ascribes it. In this chapter, I evaluate the Property
Theory with respect to some issues concerning de re belief.
I intend both to defend the theory as a view about the
attitudes in general, and to point out, and try to resolve,
some problems about de re belief for the view defended in
particular by David Lewis.
In the first section, I review the general account of
de re belief given by Lewis. Some remarks by Kripke in
Naming and Necessity suggest that no such account of de re
belief will work. I discuss Kripke's argument in the second
section. The next two sections of the chapter contain
discussions of more arguments against Lewis's property-
theoretic account of de re belief: in the third I object to
an argument presented by Thomas McKay, and in the fourth I
present what I think is a stronger argument against Lewis's
view. I also attempt to modify the Property Theory in light
of the objection to one version of it. Finally, in the
fifth section, I turn to some issues having to do with de re
beliefs about pluralities and the individuals contained
within them.
7 • 1 Do Re Belief and the Property Theory
I think that there is a kind of pre-analytic notion of
believing something of, or about, an object or collection of
objects. Such believing is typically attributed with
sentences like the following:
Ash believed to be from a great explosive eruption
that buried the Minoan colony on the island of
Santorini 36 centuries ago has been extracted from
deep in an ice core retrieved last year from
central Greenland. 1
This sentence entails that some people, presumably experts,
believe, of a certain bit of volcanic ash recently taken
from a certain ice core, that it came from a certain place
at a certain time. The logical features of relevantly
similar sentences have received much recent attention.
Sentences like the example above do not convey much
information about how the subject or subjects would express
the attributed belief. Suppose for simplicity that the
sentence attributes belief to just one person, say, Sarah.
We do not know, then, in virtue of knowing that the sentence
expresses a truth, how Sarah thinks of the ash in question,
and hence we do not know how she might express her belief:
she might be in a position to point to the sample of ash,
and so might express it by saying (if she speaks English)
'that ash comes from Santorini...'; or, she may think of it
as the ash that Sasha sent her, and so might say 'the ash
^he New York Times, Tuesday, June 7, 1994, page C8.
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Sasha sent me comes from Santorini...'; or she might have
named the sample 'Sam' and so might express her belief by
saying 'Sam comes from Santorini...'.
What appears to make this sort of belief attribution
true is, roughly, a state of affairs in which the denoted
subject thinks of the res - in this case, the ash - in some
way or other and thinks of it as having whatever property is
expressed in the attribution. Moreover, it seems that the
subject can think of the res in this way only if she has had
some sort of interaction or epistemic contact with it; even
if it is the sort of interaction that is mediated by the
attitudes and behavior of others.
Some philosophers are skeptical about the notion of de
re belief. One of them is Daniel Dennett, who argues that
there is no principled way to distinguish de re belief as a
"subvariety" of belief proper (a concept about which Dennett
is also skeptical). Consider the following passage:
Suppose I am sitting in a committee meeting, and
it occurs to me that the youngest person in the
room (whoever that is - half a dozen people
present are plausible candidates) was born after
the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Call that
thought of mine Thought A. Now in the weak sense
of 'about', Thought A is about one of the people
present, but I know not which. I look at each of
them in turn and wonder, e.g., 'Bill, over there -
is it likely that Thought A is about him?' Call
this thought of mine Thought B. Now surely (one
feels) Thought B is about Bill in a much more
direct, intimate, strong sense than Thought A is,
even if Thought A does turn out to be about Bill.
For one thing, I know that Thought B is about
Bill. This is, I think, an illusion. There is
only a difference in degree between Thought A and
Thought B and their relation to Bill. Thought B
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is (weakly) about whoever is the only person I am
looking at and whose name I believe to be Bill and
... for as long as you like. Bill, no doubt, is
the lone satisfier of that description, but had
his twin brother taken his place unbeknownst to
me, Thought B would not have been about Bill, but
about his brother. 2
We might agree with Dennett that there is no subvariety
of belief called 'de re belief', if only because de re
belief involves more than just psychological content, or
belief proper. It seems, however, that Dennett wants to
make a stronger claim - viz., that the notion of de re
belief doesn't make sense. Dennett backs this claim up by
arguing that there are no plausible grounds for holding that
Thought B is a de re thought about Bill, whereas Thought A
is not.
The obvious reply is to claim that Thought B is caused
by Bill (in some ordinary sense) but Thought A is not. One
who favors the Property Theory might want to add to this the
claim that Thought A does not involve or imply a relation of
acquaintance that Dennett bears to Bill (since 'the youngest
person in the room' expresses no such relation, even though
it denotes Bill), whereas Thought B does imply a relation of
acquaintance that Dennett bears to Bill (e.g., the relation
expressed by 'the person I am looking at' or 'the person who
I am now attending to').
It seems to me that this reply is more or less correct;
but Dennett might wish to respond by maintaining that the
2Dennett (1982), p. 84.
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notion of a relation of acquaintance is vague, and that any
distinction between a relation of acquaintance and a mere
description will be a matter of degree and will not mark a
difference in kind. As to this second point, we may note
that sometimes a difference in degree can make for a
difference in kind. For example, the difference between
Smith's skill level in carpentry and Jones's may just be a
difference in degree; but in virtue of this difference it
might be the case that Smith is a master and Jones is a
journeyman. These are kinds that may be very useful for
certain purposes.
It may also be true that the notion of de re belief is
infected with vagueness. However, this would not entail
that one ought to be skeptical about the very notion, since
there may still be clear cases in which subjects have de re
beliefs. This is not to say anything about the theoretical
fruitfulness of the concept in question, which is another
matter about which Dennett entertains some doubts. 3 I am
not much concerned with this issue here; rather, I am trying
to make a pre-theoretical notion somewhat more precise. But
as we shall see below, a concept of de re belief might be
useful for certain purposes, e.g., in accounting for one of
the ways in which subjects can be said to share beliefs.
The Property Theory implies that the belief attributed
by any belief sentence, even one with a de re reading -
3See, e.g., ibid. p. 86-87.
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i.e., a mental state of affairs needed to make the sentence
true - is of the same kind as all other belief: it is a
relation between a subject and a property that the subject
self-ascribes
. We can, however, distinguish a few different
sorts of property in order to find the one that is generally
associated with de re belief, i.e., ascribing a property to
an object. 4 First of all, de re self-ascriptions do not
correspond to propositions - e.g., excluded are such
properties as the property of being such that every elm is
deciduous. The properties that we seek are not necessarily
such that if something has one of them, then everything else
also has it. Those properties are used (fairly, I think) by
the Property Theory to account for propositional (de dicto)
belief
.
Next, de re self-ascriptions generally imply that the
subject bears a relation of acquaintance to some object or
other. 5 For example, if I were to believe something that I
might express by saying 'that man is a spy', then according
4It might be said that on the self-ascription view, all
beliefs are de re, insofar as they are about the subject, or
ascribed to the subject. In the sense outlined in the text,
however, a subject may have de se beliefs without believing
anything, de re, of himself. (See also chapter 4.) Of
course, we are familiar with cases in which someone (the
messy shopper, or Rudolf Lingens) has a de re belief about
himself without having what we might call a corresponding de
se belief.
5Such relations have been discussed, e.g., in chapters
3 and 4. Of course, to have a de re belief it is not enough
to merely self-ascribe a property of this sort; one must
also bear the relation in question to a res.
172
to the Property Theory my belief is a self-ascription of a
property - e.g., the property of looking at a man who is a
spy - that has the following feature: it is necessarily
such that whatever has it bears a relation of acquaintance
to something or other. In this way, de re beliefs may be
distinguished from de dicto beliefs and de se ones (which,
in the sense intended here, are neither de dicto nor de re).
Lewis takes belief to be a relation that obtains
between a subject and a property in virtue of some intrinsic
state of the subject - the objects in one's environment are
not directly relevant to the individuation of one's beliefs:
The main purpose of assigning objects of attitudes
is, I take it, to characterize states of the head;
to specify their causal roles with respect to
behavior, stimuli, and one another. If the
assignment of objects depends partly on something
besides the state of the head, it will not serve
this purpose. The states it characterizes will
not be the occupants of the causal roles. 6
I am inclined to agree with Lewis. Even if we think that
objects of belief, to be properly so-called, must play
another role - e.g., a semantic role - that is determined in
part by the identities of the things in a given subject's
environment, we may stick with the Property Theory and
define the needed objects of belief. 7
6Lewis (1983a), pp. 142-43.
7See chapter 4. For example, if you believe that
London is pretty and I believe that too, we may want to say
that we share an object of belief, viz., the proposition
that London is pretty. This may be the case even if we are
acquainted with London in different ways and hence if we
self-ascribe distinct properties.
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It is this commitment to a narrowly psychological view
of belief, perhaps, that leads Lewis to make the paradoxical
remark that de re beliefs are not really beliefs. According
to Lewis, "they are states of affairs that obtain in virtue
of the relations of the subject's beliefs to the res in
question." 8 The relevant beliefs, in this case, are self-
ascribed properties that have a form in common: anybody who
has one of them stands in an acquaintance-relation to
exactly one thing that has a certain attribute.
On Lewis's view, a de re belief (sticking with the
simple case of ascribing a property to a single individual)
is a state of affairs in which (1) the subject does in fact
self-ascribe a property that entails standing in some
relation to something that has a particular attribute, and
(2) the relation in question is a suitable relation of
acquaintance that the subject bears uniquely to the res.
For example, there is the state of affairs in which (1)
Ralph self-ascribes the property of watching a spy, while
(2) Ralph is watching Ortcutt and nobody else. (Again, a
relation of acquaintance is a more or less extensive causal
dependence of the states of the subject upon those of the
res
.
)
In the analysis above, condition (1) is the
psychological part of the compound state of affairs, and
8Lewis (1983a), p. 152.
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condition (2) is the non-psychological part. 9 The present
account of de re belief may be restated more clearly, as
follows: a subject S believes of an object 0 that it has
property P if, and only if, there is a relation of
acquaintance R such that S bears R to 0 and only to 0, and
self-ascribes the property of bearing R to something that
has P. (The Property Theory could also be used to sketch a
semantics for de re belief attributions. For example,
consider the (de re reading of the) sentence 'Pierre
believes that London is pretty' . We could say that the
sentence is true if and only if there is a relation of
acquaintance R such that Pierre bears R to London and only
to London, and self-ascribes the property of bearing R to a
thing that is pretty. We might also want to posit a
contextually supplied restriction on the domain of relations
of acquaintance.)
On Lewis's view, then, de re reduces to de se: i.e.,
the object of the subject's belief, in a de re belief state
of affairs, is a property that the subject self-ascribes.
Moreover, the property will not in general correspond to a
proposition, since it could be true of one inhabitant of a
possible world and false of another. In the next section, I
9Some may complain that condition (1) leaves out part
of the psychological description of the subject - e.g., that
the res itself enters into the psychological content. I do
not wish to address this issue here, in part because it
seems to me that it might be to a large extent a
terminological one. Perhaps Dennett's phrase orgamsmic
contribution to belief' would be helpful here.
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would like to discuss a point made by Kripke before the
self-ascription view was even put forward, but which he
seems to want to use against the view of reference implied
in the present account of de re belief.
7 . 2 De Re Belief and Identifying Descriptions
Consider the following passage, in which Kripke seems
to be maintaining that someone may succeed in referring to
something even if he, the subject, does not know of any
description that is true of it, the res, and of nothing
else
:
Someone, let's say, a baby, is born; his parents
call him by a certain name. They talk about him
to their friends. Other people meet him. Through
various sorts of talk the name is spread from link
to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the
far end of this chain, who has heard about, say
Richard Feynman . . . may be referring to Richard
Feynman even though he can't remember from whom he
first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard
of Feynman. He knows that Feynman is a famous
physicist. A certain passage of communication
reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach
the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even
though he can't identify him uniquely. 10
Kripke implies that someone can believe that Feynman is
a famous physicist (have a thought about him, say something
about him) without being able to identify Feynman uniquely.
If this were correct, it would refute the views put forward
by Lewis and Chisholm. On Lewis's view, for example, I can
10Kripke (1980), p. 91.
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believe that Feynman is a famous physicist only if there is
a suitable relation R between myself and Feynman (and nobody
else) such that I self-ascribe the property of bearing R to
a famous physicist. It seems impossible to deny that if I
cannot identify Feynman uniquely, I cannot self-ascribe any
such property. If I can still believe that Feynman is a
famous physicist, then something is wrong with Lewis's view.
Kripke might want to hold that in the case envisaged,
the man would have de dicto beliefs about Feynman, but not
any de re ones. 11 This may come from a suspicion about the
very notion of a de re belief, or of a de re reading of an
attribution of belief. I will not discuss Kripke 's views on
this issue, in part because it seems to me that we do have a
clear enough notion of de re belief, even if it does not
apply to borderline cases. For example, if we think that
more than mere reference is necessary for having a de re
belief about something, then there may be no determinate
answer to the question whether a certain four-year-old, say,
has de re beliefs about Aristotle.
Before discussing Lewis's reply to the worry raised by
Kripke 's remarks, I would like to consider an inadequate
one. The reply runs as follows: in the above case, I do
not refer to Feynman, and hence do not have any beliefs
about him, even though the name 'Feynman' refers to him and
“See Kripke (1979); e.g., Salmon and Soames (1988),
pp. 104-06.
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is part of my vocabulary. This claim may perhaps rest upon
the idea that for obvious reasons I have a less than
adequate mastery of the name. So, the reply goes, contrary
to Kripke 's assumption, I do not really know (and hence
believe) that Feynman is a famous physicist.
Another way of stating this reply might be to say that
in this case I do not have a concept of Feynman. Perhaps
one who favors such a reply might also claim, for example,
that I lack the concept of a beech or an elm, and so cannot
have any beliefs about these. This sort of reply, however,
is clearly inconsistent with ordinary usage. In the case
that Kripke describes, it is surely right to say that the
man in question believes that Feynman is a famous physicist.
(Of course, we are not thus committed to any particular
analysis of this attribution of belief.) To claim otherwise
would lead one to say that a great many of our ordinary
attributions of belief (which presumably would typically be
considered true by English speakers) are simply false. Such
a position is untenable and should be avoided, if possible.
Lewis wishes to maintain that, when the man in Kripke 's
example believes that Feynman is a famous physicist, this is
in virtue of there being some relation of acquaintance R
between him and Feynman such that the man self-ascribes the
property of bearing R uniquely to a famous physicist. In
this case, R is probably the relation expressed by 'having
heard of under the name of "Feynman" ' . The fact that the
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man can identify Feynman with a description that mentions
his name is ready to be exploited. So, according to Lewis,
it turns out that the man in question can identify Feynman
uniquely after all, in relation to himself. Consider
Lewis's remark on a similar example:
If I have a belief that I might express by saying
"Hume was noble," I probably ascribe nobility to
Hume under the description "the one I have heard
of under the name of 'Hume'." That description is
a relation of acquaintance that I bear to Hume.
This is the real reason why I believe de re of
Hume that he was noble. 12
Probably, Lewis would maintain that the relation
between the man and Feynman is a suitable relation of causal
acquaintance, for roughly the same reason that Kripke gave
in support of the claim that the man refers to Feynman: "A
certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the
man himself [Feynman] does reach the speaker [the man]."
The relation expressed by 'having heard of under the name of
"Feynman"' obtains between the man and Feynman just in case
some present state of the man (presumably, his current self-
ascription) depends causally, in the appropriate sort of
way, on some prior state of Feynman (e.g., an extrinsic
state like his baptism)
.
Perhaps I can identify something uniquely if I have a
purely qualitative description of the thing that fits it and
nothing else. Clearly, I can identify something uniquely if
12Lewis (1983a), p. 155. Schiffer makes a similar
point in his (1978), see especially pp. 198-99.
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I am in a position to look at it under good conditions and,
say, point to it. But Lewis claims that other sorts of
relation between a subject and an object will suffice to
allow the subject to have de re beliefs about the object.
Consider the following passage from On the Plurality of
Worlds
:
A relation of acquaintance needn't be so very
direct and perceptual. Other relations will do,
so long as they afford channels for the flow of
information. For instance there is the relation
which obtains when one has heard of something by
name. Let us say that one is 'Londres'
-acquainted
with something when one has heard of it under the
name 'Londres'. Each of Pierre's doxastic
alternatives is 'Londres '-acquainted with a pretty
city; Pierre himself is 'Londres '-acquainted with
London; thereby Pierre ascribes prettiness to
London; and that is how he believes that London is
pretty. 13
Lewis, then, has an answer to Kripke's puzzle about
belief, with which I assume familiarity. 14 Pierre, having
some French names in his English vocabulary, is ready to say
something like 'Although Londres is pretty, London is not'.
Pierre's doxastic alternatives are those possible men who
self-ascribe
,
and have, every property that Pierre actually
self-ascribes : they inhabit worlds that, for all Pierre
believes, are actual. Pierre happens to be ' Londres '-
acquainted and 'London '-acquainted with the same city;
however, this is not the case with any of his doxastic
alternatives
.
13Lewis (1986), p. 33.
“See Kripke (1979).
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Analogously, on Lewis's view, the man who believes that
Feynman is a famous physicist does so in virtue of (l) being
'Feynman '-acquainted with Feynman and only with Feynman, and
(2) self-ascribing the property of being ' Feynman '-
acquainted with someone who is a famous physicist. It
doesn't really matter whether or not we wish to say, in
virtue of the fact that the man is 'Feynman '-acquainted with
Feynman, that he can thereby identify Feynman uniquely;
perhaps he can in one sense and can't in another. Either
way, it seems that Lewis is able to give a plausible account
of the kind of case that Kripke has in mind, in which one
has heard of something by name but is presumably unable to
produce a certain kind of qualitative description that fits
the thing uniquely.
We should note that the descriptions that Lewis prefers
to use in cases of this sort make essential reference to the
person who, so to speak, employs them in thought: e.g., I
have a belief about Feynman by thinking of some relation
that I bear to him, for instance by thinking of him as the
person of whom I have heard under a certain name. Hence, on
Lewis's view, the object of an attitude in which such a
description occurs is still irreducibly de se: I self-
ascribe the property of having heard of someone under the
name 'Feynman'....
Nevertheless some complications arise. I might have
heard of two or more distinct people under a single name,
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say 'Bach 7
,
and I might be fully aware of this. Probably,
then, I am not ' Bach ' -acquainted uniquely with anyone? but
this fact can hardly prevent me from having de re beliefs
about the various Bachs with whom I am acquainted. In a
typical case, the name in question can be disambiguated by
means of more or less qualitative descriptions of the things
that bear it. For example, if the description 'the one I
have heard of under the name of "Bach"' could express a
relation of acquaintance between two people, then 'the
composer named "Bach" who wrote the Brandenburg Concertos'
could also . 15
It is less clear that there could be cases in which a
subject believes something de re of an object, but has no
linguistic description of it that picks it out uniquely.
But perhaps this is possible. Perhaps I could believe
something about Bach, as the composer I have heard of under
the name 'Bach', without being able to produce a qualitative
description that disambiguates (or somehow yields the bearer
of) his name.
In an extreme case of this sort, it seems that we need
to depend upon something like the notion of the causal role
played by "a token of a name in a person's head," i.e., a
15As is well known, a name that has only one bearer
(let us suppose) may also be disambiguated (wrongly) by a
subject who thinks that two or more things share the name,
thus the descriptions 'the musician I have heard of called
"Paderewski"' and 'the politician I have heard of called
"Paderewski" '
.
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self-ascription of a property that implies that someone or
something bears the name in question. We need to assume,
roughly, that in virtue of the various causal roles played
by different name tokens, the tokens may be classified into
types, in such a way that tokens of the same public-language
type or that are in some sense syntactically identical
(e.g., would sound the same if uttered or would look the
same if written) may be tokens of distinct types. Any
theory of belief, it appears, will have to make a similar
assumption in order to handle such extreme cases.
Mark Richard has used the locution 'representational
type' when discussing this sort of classification of mental
tokens. 16 He suggests, roughly, that two name tokens
(e.g., of the name 'Bach') are of the same representational
type for a certain subject if and only if they are of the
same public-language word type, and the subject groups them
together or uses them as if they named the same thing.
Richard considers two different name tokens to be of
the same word type only if they have the same bearer, so
that two tokens of 'Bach' may be of different word types.
The justification for this is essentially the causal theory
of naming, according to which a given token of a name
denotes its bearer in virtue of its place in a causal chain
of name tokens going back in time, perhaps to some sort of
16See Richard (1990), pp. 182-85. Richard's notion of
a mental term token is not quite the same as the one being
used here.
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baptism of the bearer or some other reference-fixing use of
the name. 17 We may employ something like Richard's account
to the sort of case under consideration.
Suppose that I am ' Bach' -acquainted with two composers
but that I cannot disambiguate the name(s) by means of
descriptions, and that I have de re beliefs about each of
them (for example, I believe of each one that he was a
famous composer) . Now suppose that I self-ascribe the
property of being ' Bach' -acquainted with someone who was a
distinguished organist. In this case, my self-ascription
implies that someone is named 'Bach', and it (i.e., my self-
ascription) is a node in a causal chain that ultimately goes
back to one of the two men with whom I am ' Bach' -acquainted
.
This, then, is the one whom I believe to be a distinguished
organist
.
What makes my belief about one Bach rather than another
is therefore a matter of what goes on outside of my head, of
which events caused my self-ascription . What makes it the
case that I believe that I have heard of two distinct
individuals called 'Bach' is a matter of my psychology -
somehow, in my thought I manage to track certain occurrences
of the name 'Bach', grouping some of them together as a name
of one person, and some others together as a name of someone
17This is all quite rough and vague, but the topic of
naming is far from central to the thesis. Of course, the
causal relations that constitute the chain must be of the
sort appropriate to preserve reference. See Kripke (1980),
especially around p. 96.
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else
.
As a result the various name tokens will play one of
two different causal roles, so to speak, in my head.
7 . 3 McKay's Objection to Lewis
If Lewis's account of de re belief is correct, then a
subject's beliefs about an object are individuated by a
relation of acquaintance that she bears uniquely to it, even
if it is the relation of having heard of something under a
certain name. According to Lewis, a subject has a de re
belief about a certain thing if and only if there is some
suitable relation of acquaintance R that she bears uniquely
to the thing, such that she self-ascribes the property of
bearing R uniquely to something that is such-and-such.
In his paper "De Re and De Se Belief," McKay presents
an argument against Lewis's view of de re belief. The
argument is based upon an example, which McKay describes as
follows
:
Smith can stand in a relation of acquaintance to
Wilson, yet believe that he (Smith) stands in that
relation to Jones. Thus Wilson might be hatless
and visible to the left of Smith; Smith might also
see Jones, who is on his right, and believe
(correctly) that Jones is wearing a hat. If Smith
confuses left and right, the following will be
true
.
(i) Wilson (and only Wilson) is perceived from
the left of Smith
(ii) Smith self-attributes perceiving someone from
his left who is wearing a hat.
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Yet Smith's belief is about Jones, not Wilson,
contrary to Lewis's analysis. 18
I take it that McKay is arguing against Lewis's view
both as a sufficient and as a necessary condition for de re
belief: the former because (i) and (ii) may be true even if
Smith does not have a belief about Wilson; and the latter
because Smith can have a belief about Jones even if he does
not self-ascribe a property which implies a relation of
acquaintance that he actually bears to Jones. The argument
does not seem to me to succeed, however. I think that it
rests upon a confusion between Smith's belief, on one hand,
and the way in which Smith would express his belief, on the
other. McKay's claim (ii) about the property self-ascribed
by Smith, I shall suggest, is unwarranted because it does
not follow from the earlier assumption that Smith confuses
left and right.
The only way to make sense of someone's confusing left
and right is to construe it as some sort of linguistic
mistake: he somehow uses or understands the word 'left',
for example, to mean what the word 'right' in fact means, or
vice-versa. (It thus requires the distinction between
linguistic meaning and speaker (or thinker) meaning.) So,
in the example above, although Smith might express his
belief by saying 'the person on my left is wearing a hat' ,
18Austin (1988), p. 209. McKay uses the term 'self-
attributes' where Lewis would use ' self-ascribes ' and
Chisholm would use 'directly attributes'.
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it does not follow that he self-ascribes the property of
perceiving someone from his left who is wearing a hat. in
virtue of confusing left and right, Smith would incorrectly
express the property that he in fact self-ascribes.
Suppose we accept McKay's premise that Smith believes
that Jones is wearing a hat. It is then open to Lewis - and
it seems to me that this is correct - to maintain that Smith
really does self-ascribe the property of perceiving someone
from his right who is wearing a hat, and that this is how he
believes de re, of Jones, that he is wearing a hat (given
that Smith does actually see Jones from his right) . Since
(ii) is not true, moreover, Lewis's account does not entail
the falsehood that Smith believes de re, of Wilson, that he
is wearing a hat.
Although more could be said about the issues raised by
the present argument and objection to it, I think that I
have shown that McKay's argument does not go through. It
seems to me that something about it (or about the intuition
behind it) is correct, however, and so I shall try to locate
exactly what it is in the next section. In particular, I
shall attempt to describe a case in which Lewis's account
implies that a subject has de re beliefs about a particular
object (a person), when in fact the subject does not believe
anything de re of this person (but instead has de re beliefs
about somebody else).
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7 • 4 The Case of the Shy Secret Admirer
The example to be presented in this section raises
general problems about de re thought, and views of belief
other than the Property Theory could be tested against it.
However, it is my intention to apply it here to Lewis's
version of the Property Theory, and to make some suggestions
about how one might modify the theory in order to give a
plausible account of the case. Along the way I will make
some reference to other discussions of de re belief; but it
is not my purpose to evaluate these other views here.
Suppose that Fran has a shy secret admirer, Frank.
Frank engages a friend of his, Fred, to write letters on his
behalf to Fran, signed only 'A secret admirer'. Frank, let
us suppose, sometimes tells Fred what to write but sometimes
he doesn't. Whenever Frank has Fred write things about him
to Fran, they are true. Moreover, what Fred writes about
Frank on his own is also mostly true. No description in any
of the letters, however, identifies Frank uniquely. One of
the things that Frank has Fred convey to Fran is his
fondness for French films.
Like the detective who has de re beliefs about the
suspect being traced (after a bit of investigation, of
course), or like the messy shopper, who has de re beliefs
about the person whose trail of sugar he is following, Fran
has de re beliefs about her secret admirer, Frank. We may
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suppose that given the information she already has, she
could more or less easily follow the trail back, through
Fred or otherwise, to Frank. One such belief is her belief,
of Frank, that he is fond of French films. An English
sentence such as the following could be used to attribute
this belief:
Frank is believed by Fran to be fond of French films.
This sentence is true partly in virtue of what Fran
believes, in virtue of her psychology. Of course, Fran
would not express her belief by saying 'Frank is fond of
French films', since she does not think of Frank under the
name 'Frank'. Instead, she thinks of Frank as her secret
admirer, and if she were to express her belief in English
she might say something like 'my secret admirer is fond of
French films'. But all of this does not make the above
sentence false. Moreover, Fran believes truly, because
Frank does in fact like French films. She also has some
false beliefs about Frank, however: one of them is her
belief, of Frank, that he wrote the letters she received.
We should note that the relation expressed by the
phrase 'my secret admirer' (or, more precisely, 'x is the
secret admirer of y') is not a suitable relation of causal
acquaintance. Hence, if it must be the case that some
relation of causal acquaintance is part of the content of
Fran's belief, then the relation of being someone's secret
admirer will not do the job. So Fran cannot believe that
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Frank is fond of French films simply in virtue of self-
ascribing the property of being secretly admired (uniguely)
by someone who is fond of French films. 19 A different
object must therefore be assigned to her self-ascription.
What, then, makes it the case that Fran can believe
things de re of Frank? The answer is fairly clear. Fran
has read some letters about Frank, most of which have their
origins in his own intentions. Indeed Frank is ultimately
responsible for all of the letters that Fran has read. In
this way Fran is acquainted with her secret admirer, and in
virtue of this acquaintance she has acquired a fair bit of
information about him.
There is a way in which the case of the secret admirer
is similar to the cases that Donnellan used to illustrate
the distinction between referential and attributive uses of
definite descriptions. 20 In such cases, a speaker succeeds
in saying something about a particular individual with a
190ne possible response to this problem might be to
adopt a view along the lines of the one suggested in Kaplan
(1968). According to such an account, there are cases in
which a subject has beliefs about an object with whom she is
en rapport where no part of the content of the belief is a
relation of acquaintance that she bears to the object.
Instead, what makes the belief de re (in our terminology) is
a condition on the subject's representation of the object:
it must be a sufficiently "vivid" name of the object for the
subject. One could adapt this solution to the framework of
the Property Theory, but there are good reasons to include
relations of acquaintance as part of the content of belief.
In particular, a subject's dispositions to behavior will in
general depend upon such relations.
2
°See, e.g., Donnellan (1966).
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sentence containing a definite description, even though the
description does not literally denote that individual (and
indeed may denote something else). in the present sort of
case, one of a subject's self-ascriptions implies a relation
of acquaintance that the subject bears to something (e.g.,
Fred) ; but in virtue of the self-ascription the subject has
a belief about something else (Frank), a thing to which the
subject in some sense intends to refer.
We are now in a position to raise a problem for Lewis's
view of de re belief. Suppose that Fran self-ascribes the
property of having read some letters written by someone who
is fond of French films . 21 Since the relation expressed by
'x has read some letters written by y' is a suitable
relation of causal acquaintance that Fran in fact bears to
Fred, Lewis's view implies that Fran believes de re, of
Fred, that he is fond of French films. But the facts of the
case, I suggest, are such as to make Fran's de re beliefs
about her secret admirer beliefs about Frank; she does not
have any such beliefs about Fred. It seems to me, as a
result, that Lewis has not presented adequate sufficient
conditions for belief de re: a subject may bear a relation
of acquaintance R to an object, and self-ascribe bearing R
to something that has a certain property F, without thereby
21The word 'written' is probably ambiguous between
'inscribed' and 'authored'. Since Fran thinks that her
secret admirer has inscribed the letters himself, it will be
convenient for us to use the former reading.
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having a de re belief about the object to the effect that it
has F
.
What rules out Fred as an individual about whom Fran
may have de re beliefs? To answer this question, we could
if we wished exploit the conception of propositions as sets
of possible worlds and talk about Fran's "belief worlds,"
the set of possible worlds at which all of the propositions
that she believes are true. The Property Theory implies
that her belief worlds do not completely characterize her
system of beliefs, however, since surely some of her self-
ascriptions do not correspond to propositions (see chapter
3). So let us for the moment talk about Fran's doxastic
alternatives, viz., the possible individuals who self-
ascribe, and have, all and only the properties that Fran
actually self-ascribes
.
Each of Fran's doxastic alternatives has received
letters written by a unique secret admirer who is fond of
French films, and each of her alternatives bears a number of
relations of acquaintance to her secret admirer: e.g.,
having read about him, having read letters authored by him,
having read letters written by him, etc. When we consider
Fran herself, we notice that she does not bear all of these
relations to the same person. As a result, in the actual
world there are two people, Frank and Fred, who are similar
to the secret admirers of Fran's doxastic alternatives with
respect to the relations of acquaintance between them.
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In terms of doxastic alternatives, my claim about the
case goes roughly as follows: the relations of acguaintance
between Fran and Frank are more similar to the relations of
acquaintance between her alternatives and their secret
admirers, than are the relations between Fran and Fred.
Give;!"1 the fact that Frank and Fred have somehow been merged
or identified in Fran's beliefs, this is what makes it the
case that she ascribes the property of being fond of French
films to Frank, rather than Fred, when she ascribes it to
the person who wrote the letters that she has read. (We
cannot just compare the intrinsic qualities of Frank, Fred
and the alternative secret admirers here, since for example
Frank might have conveyed a lot of misinformation about
himself in the letters to Fran.)
For convenience, let us introduce two relations called
'Rfrank' and ' Rfred ' • Rfrank is one of the relations of
acquaintance that Fran actually bears to Frank, e.g., the
relations of having read about him, or having read letters
of which he is ultimately the author. Rfred is one of the
relations of acquaintance that Fran bears to Fred, like the
relation of having read letters written (inscribed) by him.
Let us also use ' F ' for the moment to denote the property of
being fond of French films. Finally, let us define a class
of acquaintance relations, called 'Ra^irer' / such that for
any relation r, r is in Radralrer if and only if Fran self-
ascribes the property of bearing r and Rfrank ( or Rfred) t° the
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same thing. We have already pointed out some of the
relations in Radnlrer , like the relations of having read
certain letters about someone and having read certain
letters written by someone.
Fran self-ascribes the property of bearing Rfred to
someone who has F. Why then is her belief about Frank
rather than Fred (to whom she bears Rfred )? (Compare: why
does the speaker refer to the man drinking water by using a
description - e.g., 'the man drinking a martini' - that does
not denote him?) I suggest that the answer, in this case,
goes as follows: (a) there is a relation of acguaintance -
viz., Rfrank - that Fran bears to someone other than Fred,
such that (b) she self-ascribes the property of bearing it
and Rfred to the same thing, and (c) the relations between
her and Frank are more similar to the relations in Radmlrer
than are the ones between her and Fred.
This, I think, is what rules out Fred as an object of
Fran's belief, and what accounts for the fact that, were
Fran to come to learn that she bears Rfrank and Rfred to
distinct people, she would continue to self-ascribe bearing
Rfrank to someone who has F, but would no longer self-ascribe
bearing Rfred to someone who has F. Needless to say, the
notion of similarity between relations being employed here
is quite vague, and I have not discussed it at anything more
than an intuitive level. What follows, then, may be viewed
as a sketch of a modified theory of de re belief within the
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framework of the Property Theory, a sketch in need of a more
detailed account of the relevant notion of similarity.
How can we modify Lewis's account in the light of the
case of the secret admirer? I suggest the following, with a
new technical term to be defined below:
(DR) A subject s ascribes a property F to an object x
if and only if there is a relation of acquaintance
R such that (1) s bears R uniquely to x, and s
self-ascribes the property of bearing R uniquely
to something that has F; and (2) for any object y
distinct from x, if there is a relation of
acquaintance R' such that s bears R' uniquely to
y, and self-ascribes the property of bearing R and
R' to the same thing, then y is ruled out as an
object of belief for s.
In order to define the consequent in (2) in terms of
the notion of overall similarity between relations of
acquaintance, it will be useful to introduce the notion of
what I shall call an identification class of relations (of
which Radmirer above is an example) , or a class of relations
of acquaintance that a subject believes herself to bear to
the same thing. Here is a definition:
(IC) C is the identification class of R for s =df . s
self-ascribes the property of bearing R uniquely
to something, and for all relations of
acquaintance r, r is in C if and only if s self-
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ascribes the property of bearing r and R to the
same thing.
We may now say what it is for something to be ruled out
as an object of someone's beliefs:
(RO) y is ruled out as an object of belief for s =df
there is an object x distinct from y such that (i)
there are relations of acquaintance R and R' such
that s bears R uniquely to x and s bears R'
uniquely to y, and (ii) s self-ascribes the
property of bearing R and R' to the same thing,
and (iii) the relations of acquaintance that s
bears to x are more similar to the identification
class of R (or R' ) for s than are the relations of
acquaintance that s bears to y.
(DR) gives the following account of the case of the
secret admirer: Fran ascribes the property of being fond of
French films to Frank, since conditions (1) and (2) obtain
(in particular, Fred is ruled out as an object of belief for
Fran) ; but Fran does not ascribe this property to Fred,
since, although condition (1) obtains, condition (2) does
not: Frank is not ruled out as an object of belief for
Fran. It seems to me that (DR) gives a fairly plausible
treatment of cases in which a subject bears many different
relations of acquaintance to distinct objects, but wrongly
thinks that she bears them to a single res.
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Any account of de re belief should have something to
say about the general problem raised by examples like the
case of the secret admirer. For example, a view couched in
terms of singular propositions - like the Triadic View of
Kaplan, Perry, Salmon and others - must give an account of
how and why Fran refers to Frank, so as to grasp a singular
proposition about him rather than one about Fred. Some of
the groundwork for such a view was discussed in chapter 2;
but as I have said, here I am only considering the problem
with respect to the Property Theory of belief.
7 . 5 Pluralities and De Re Belief
In this section, X would like to discuss some issues
concerning plurally de re beliefs, and how they relate to
individually de re beliefs. I will make some remarks about
a few different types of cases illustrated by different
examples, and will try to give some plausible general
principles, within the framework of the Property Theory,
that govern the various cases. The account from the
previous section - viz., (DR) - may have to be revised in
order to account for the examples to be discussed here.
Although I will not present a fully detailed modified view,
I will try to say something about how such a modification
would go.
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First, suppose for example that Mary is a knowledgeable
lover of violin music who is listening, through a single
speaker, to a solo being played by Peter, who is a skilled
violinist. Suppose that she is auditioning violinists by
listening to demo tapes on which they play certain solos.
We may stipulate that Mary stands in a suitable relation of
acquaintance uniquely to Peter - the one expressed by 'x is
listening to a violin solo played by y' - and that she self-
ascribes the property of listening to a violin solo being
played by a virtuoso. Hence, on the analysis given by the
Property Theory, Mary ascribes virtuosity to Peter: i.e.,
she believes de re that Peter is a virtuoso.
Now, suppose that we change the example somewhat.
Instead of listening to Peter play a violin solo, Mary is
listening to virtuoso-level violin music being piped through
a single speaker; however, what Mary now hears is the music
of two distinct people, Peter and Paul, simultaneously
playing the piece. Their timing is so precise that Mary
cannot tell that what she hears is the music of two players,
and so she mistakenly thinks that she is listening to a
single violinist. We may suppose Mary to be in the same
(narrow) psychological state as in the previous example - in
particular, she self-ascribes the property of listening to a
violin solo being played by a virtuoso. Overtly, she might
say something like 'this candidate is really a virtuoso!'.
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Since the non-psychological facts about Mary have been
changed, she now does not bear the relation expressed by
'listening to music being played by' uniguely to anyone at
all (i.e., she does not bear it to some person and only to
that person; although she does bear it to Peter and Paul).
According to the property-theoretic accounts of de re belief
discussed so far - Lewis's original view and (DR) above -
then, Mary does not have any de re beliefs either about
Peter or about Paul. (According to these views, she may
have some de re beliefs about the plurality containing Peter
and Paul, since she does bear a relation of acquaintance
uniquely to it. I shall return to this point shortly.)
We may want to hold, contrary to the results given by
Lewis's view and (DR), that in this case Mary does believe
de re, of Peter, that he is a virtuoso, and that she does
believe de re, of Paul, that he is a virtuoso. After all,
she is willing to admit that anyone who can play a violin
piece like the piece to which she is listening must be a
virtuoso, and the piece to which she is listening is played
by Peter and Paul . I suggest that Mary does in fact have
these de re beliefs; although I do not have any arguments
that are likely to convince anyone who does not share this
intuition
.
In making this claim about what Mary believes de re, I
do not intend to be making any analogous claims about other,
perhaps similar, cases, from which the present case may be
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distinguished. Certain facts about this case, I think,
warrant these de re attributions to Mary. First, Mary does
stand in a suitable relation of acquaintance uniquely to
(the plurality consisting of) Peter and Paul. Second, Mary
stands in the above relation to Peter, and also to Paul;
although she does not stand in it uniquely to either of
them. Third, Mary self-ascribes the property of listening
to music played by a virtuoso. Fourth, the property of
being a virtuoso is a property that both Peter and Paul can
have (unlike, say, the property of being the best violinist
in the world), and Mary knows this. All of these points, I
suggest, should make us think that Mary believes de re that
Peter is a virtuoso, and that Paul is too.
We may contrast this case with another in which a
subject has a plurally de re belief without having one of
the corresponding individually de re beliefs. For example,
suppose that from a distance I see a large gathering of a
thousand or so people. I may come to believe de re of the
crowd (of them) that each member is a person (that each one
of them is a person). Would I thereby come to have a de re
belief about a particular member of the crowd, say Mr. X, to
the effect that he is a person? Surely not, the answer
seems clearly to be, if I am in no way acquainted with Mr. X
himself (uniquely or otherwise).
What are the differences between the case of the crowd
and the case of Peter, Paul and Mary? There are at least
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two that may be relevant to attributions of belief de re:
first, in the case of the crowd, I do not mistake the
plurality for a single res (a single person); whereas Mary
does make a mistake of this sort, since she takes herself to
be listening to a single violinist when in fact she is
listening to two of them. (This may be the reason, or part
of the reason, why there is no way that I could be said to
believe de re of Mr. X, say, that he is big, if I were to
believe de re of the crowd that it is big.) Second, in the
case of the crowd, I do not bear a relation of acquaintance
to every member of the group (e.g., I do not see Mr. X) ;
whereas Mary does bear such a relation to Peter, as well as
to Paul (although, as we have said, she bears it uniquely to
neither of them) . 22
With these differences in mind, let us attempt to
distinguish various cases of plurally de re beliefs, and
also to determine, with respect to each sort of case,
whether or not an individually de re belief about one or
more members of the plurality is possible. All of the
relevant cases will have a subject who bears a relation of
22 I will want to say that, in the case of the crowd, I
do bear a relation of acquaintance uniquely to the crowd, so
that I can have de re beliefs about it; but this cannot mean
that I bear this relation to each one of its members and to
nobody else. So, I must say something like this: I can be
acquainted with them (with the plurality) in virtue of being
acquainted with some of them. For example, I might see the
ones who are closest to me. This is analogous to the fact
that a building can be on fire in virtue of, say, its second
story being on fire.
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acquaintance uniquely to a plurality. These cases subdivide
into those in which the subject stands in a relation of
acquaintance to some of the members of the plurality, but
not uniquely to any of them (like the case of Peter, Paul
and Mary); and those in which there are no relations of
acquaintance to the individual res (like the case of Mr. X
and the crowd) . Each of these further subdivides into cases
where the subject wronqly thinks that he has acquaintance
with an individual, rather than a plurality; and cases where
the subject does not make such a mistake.
Let us first consider an example like that of Peter,
Paul and Mary, but in which Mary does not wronqly take
herself to be listeninq to a sinqle musician. Suppose that
Mary knows that she is listeninq to two violinists. Mary
cannot single out either Peter or Paul: any acquaintance
relation that Mary bears to Peter is such that she also
bears it to Paul. Nevertheless Mary is acquainted with
Peter, since she is listening to music being played by him.
The same goes for Paul. In such a case, Mary might self-
ascribe the property of listening to music being played by
virtuosos. Clearly, then, she would believe de re of Peter
and Paul (the plurality of them) that each of them is a
virtuoso. I suggest that in this case, as before, Mary has
the corresponding de re belief about Peter, and about Paul.
If Mary has a de re belief about Peter, how does she
have it? It seems to me that four conditions are jointly
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sufficient, viz., (1) she bears the 'listening to music
being played by' relation uniquely to the plurality
containing Peter and Paul; (2) she bears the same relation
to Peter; (3) she self-ascribes the property of listening to
music being played by a plurality such that each one of them
is a virtuoso; and (4) the property of being a virtuoso does
not imply the property of being a member of a plurality -
i.e., it is not necessarily true that whatever is a virtuoso
is a member of some plurality. I think that condition (4)
is needed in order to handle the following sort of example:
suppose that Mary knows that the violinists to whom she is
listening are the Dynamic Duo. Then she might self-ascribe
the property of listening to music being played by a
plurality such that each one of them is a member of the
Dynamic Duo. It seems to me that if this were the case, we
should not say that Mary believes de re of Peter (or Paul)
that he is a member of the Dynamic Duo.
We may give a general principle connecting plurally de
re beliefs with individually de re ones, with respect to the
sort of case presently being considered. If a subject s is
acquainted with a plurality X and does not mistake X for an
individual, then s believes de re, of some x in X, that x
has property F if and only if there is some relation of
acquaintance R such that (i) s bears R uniquely to X, (ii) s
bears R to x, ( i i i ) s self-ascribes the property of bearing
R uniquely to an X such that every x in X has F, and (iv) F
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does not imply the property of being in (a member of, one
of) a plurality. In the (admittedly uncommon) cases where
such conditions hold, a subject's plurally de re belief that
X is such that every x in X has F will yield an individually
de re belief that x has F.
What about cases like the above, except for the fact
that the subject wrongly thinks that he is acquainted with
an individual rather than a plurality? Such cases are very
similar to the one just discussed; but here there is always
a chance that the subject will ascribe to the plurality a
property that cannot be exemplified by more than one of its
members: 23 for example, in the original case of Peter,
Paul and Mary, Mary could have believed herself to be
listening to the best violinist in the world. Unlike the
property of being a virtuoso, that of being the best
violinist in the world is one that cannot be exemplified at
the same time by Peter and by Paul.
If Mary did in fact self-ascribe the property of
listening to music being played by the best violinist in the
world, it may be wrong to say that she believes de re that
Peter is the best violinist in the world, and also that Paul
is. This may be wrong because, if Mary were to learn that
230f course, there is also the chance that the subject
will ascribe to the plurality a property that could not be
exemplified at all by a plurality of things (e.g., the
property of being a virtuoso?). I suggest that by itself
this doesn't rule out the ascription of such properties to
an individual res in cases such as the one in the text.
204
she had been listening to two musicians rather than just
one, she would surely retract her belief that she was
listening to the best one in the world . 24
We could rule out such attributions that arise from
mistaking a plurality for an individual by maintaining a
principle similar to the one given for the previous sort of
case. If a subject s, then, is acquainted with a plurality
X and with the individuals therein, but wrongly thinks that
he is acquainted with an individual and not a plurality,
then s believes de re, of some x in X, that x has property F
if and only if there is a relation of acquaintance R such
that (i) s bears R uniquely to X, (ii) s bears R to x, (iii)
s self-ascribes the property of bearing R uniquely to
something that has F, and (iv) it is possible for every x in
X, with whom s is acquainted, to have F (at the same time).
Since condition (iv) is necessary, this rules out the
possibility that Mary, in the case being considered, has a
de re belief about Peter to the effect that he is the best
in the world, and also that she has the analogous de re
belief about Paul. The principle does allow Mary to believe
24Mary would, in this case, believe de re, of the
plurality consisting of Peter and Paul, that it is the best
violinist in the world. This may seem odd; but there are
other cases in which a subject ascribes to an individual a
property that the individual could not have; e.g., Smith
might see Jones in the distance and think that what he sees
is his goat, thereby coming to believe de re that Jones is a
goat. And of course it is well known that a subject can
ascribe to something (e.g., London) two properties that
cannot jointly be exemplified.
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de re that, say, Peter is a virtuoso. It also does not rule
out the possibility, for example, that in this case Mary
could believe de re that Peter is one of the best two
violinists in the world (and similarly for Paul). if Mary
had been listening to music being played simultaneously by
three violinists, however, the principle implies that she
could not have a de re belief about any one of them to the
effect that he is one of the best two violinists in the
world (since it is not possible for each of the three to be
one of the best two in the world) . I hope that to the
extent that anyone has any clear intuitions about these
cases, the principle does not violate them.
What about the cases in which a subject is acquainted
with a plurality containing a certain individual, but not
with the individual itself? Given that some sort of
acquaintance is at least necessary for de re belief, we
should hold that in such cases a subject can have de re
beliefs about the plurality, but not about the individual.
Consider again the case in which I am looking at a crowd of
one thousand or so people. It is quite likely that I am
also looking at some of the individual people in the crowd
and hence that I am acquainted with them individually: for
example, I might notice Jones, who is wearing a bright red
hat. However, I will not be acquainted individually with
most of the people in the crowd. I will not see Mr. X
lurking around in the midst of a thousand people.
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In this case, where of course I do not mistake the
crowd of people for an individual person, I may have de re
beliefs about the crowd (e.g., that it is big, unruly, or
that everyone in it is a person), and about Jones (e.g.,
that she is a person, or is wearing a hat); but not about
Mr. X. I cannot believe de re, for example, of Mr. x, that
he is a person. Lewis's original account of de re belief,
it seems to me, gives all of these results for the present
case. The principles suggested to cover the previous two
sorts of case may be used to supplement Lewis's account - or
the revised account (DR) - to cover other similar cases ; 25
but no independent issues arise for this sort of example.
The same goes for cases in which a subject bears no
relations of acquaintance to (some of) the individuals in a
plurality
,
and mistakenly takes himself to be acquainted
with an individual res and not a plurality. One such case
is that of a subject who sees a group of three goats, say,
from a distance, and takes himself to be looking at a single
goat (or a person; it doesn't make a difference). He might
point and say 'that goat is coming toward me'. It seems to
me that the subject might lack acquaintance with each of the
25For example, someone might be listening, at a certain
time, to a recording of an orchestra playing a symphony. It
could be the case that at that time the person is uniquely
acquainted with a few different things (the orchestra, the
lead violinist); is acquainted, but not uniquely, with a few
different things (the violists, who are simultaneously
playing the same notes and are all equidistant from the
microphone); and is unacquainted with a few different things
(the tympanist, e.g., who is not making a sound).
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three goats, if for example his distance from them is such
that he could not see an individual goat from so far away.
In that case he would be acguainted with the plurality but
not with any of the individuals in it. But even if this
were impossible, the subject could lack acquaintance with
one or more of the goats, e.g., if one were hidden behind
another
.
In this example, the subject may have de re beliefs
about the plurality with which he is acquainted. He might
believe (correctly) of it that it is moving toward him, and
he might believe (wrongly) of it that it is a goat. As with
the previous sort of case, here the subject cannot have any
de re beliefs about the individual members of the plurality
with which he is not acquainted. Again, the present case
warrants no new de re attributions of belief that are not
derivable from Lewis's original view or from (DR), and so
raises no new problems for the attempt to give a general
account of belief de re.
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